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The language attitudes of second-generation North Africans in France: The effects of religiosity and national identity

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The language attitudes of second-generation North Africans in France: The effects of religiosity and national identity

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to John, without whom, I would not have made it this far.

"I send this token, but how little can it express my gratitude to you for making my life & any work I have done possible, and for giving me so much happiness in a world of accident & storm." (A letter from Winston Churchill to his wife Clementine)

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The language attitudes of second-generation North Africans in France: The effects of religiosity and national identity

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This dissertation explores the language attitudes (LAs) of second-generation North African immigrants in France toward Arabic and French, focusing primarily on women. I explore how these attitudes are correlated with religiosity, national identity and proficiency. Although numerous LA studies have been done in the Maghreb, none have examined the attitudes of the highly marginalized North African community in France. Previous research in LAs and in sociolinguistics has also neglected religion as a variable, a gap in the literature that this dissertation addresses.

French and Arabic have powerful language ideologies making them an ideal language pairing to study. Muslims believe Arabic is the only language through which the true message of the Qur'an can be transmitted (Suleiman, 2003). Previous LA studies in the Maghreb indicate that people there strongly associate Islam with Arabic (Benrabah 2007; Chakrani, 2010). It is also the national language of most Muslim majority countries and is linked with both national and pan-Arab identity (Dawisha, 2003). The French language is seen as the vehicle of French culture and is an important symbol of national identity that is used as a tool for the assimilation of immigrants (Weil, 2010).

There is evidence to suggest that LAs are stronger in a diaspora context (Garrett, Bishop & Coupland, 2009). Language attitudes may be especially potent for the North

African diaspora because of the colonial history between France and the Maghreb, and the strained relationship between France and its immigrant population. Given that language can act as a symbol of culture (Choi, 2003), participants who more closely identify with their North African cultural and religious heritage will express more positive attitudes toward Arabic.

In order to explore these topics, I constructed an anonymous language attitudes survey that was distributed online to second-generation North Africans in France, ages 18 to 30. The survey included questions concerning attitudes toward religious and national identity. The results indicate positive attitudes toward Arabic, Islam and North Africa, while expressing relatively neutral attitudes toward French, and negative attitudes toward France. Correlations did emerge that suggest a relationship between religiosity, national identity, and language attitudes for this population.

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1. Introduction

Today, France is home to the largest Muslim population in Europe, with official estimates putting the number at approximately 4.7 million (Pew Research Center, 2010).[1] The majority of this Muslim diaspora comes from France's former colonies in North Africa: Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria (Kaya, 2009). The North African immigrant community, including the second and third generations, has lived on the fringes of French society for several decades and has been the focus of much scrutiny because of their religious practices, particularly when those practices intersect with public places like schools. This demographic change over the past half-century has come with much societal debate surrounding cultural and linguistic assimilation and whether, and in what ways, this community is able/willing to assimilate. In order to understand this major diaspora community in France, it is necessary to understand how they perceive themselves in relationship to their country of residence as well as the country of their heritage.

One way to do this is by exploring how their attitudes toward language interact with their sense of belonging in France, their attachment to North Africa, and their religiosity. This is an especially valuable way to study this community because of the linguistic context in which this population finds itself. France is a country with a uniquely strong relationship with language. French is at the heart of the concept of French

[1] The number of Muslims in France is approximated to be a little below 5 million; however, when considering undocumented Muslims, this number is probably higher, putting it somewhere between 5 and 6 million (Kaya, 2009, p. 64).

citizenship going back to the French Revolution (Weil, 2010), and of French culture and patrimony going back even further (Lodge, 1993). Arabic, which is spoken by the majority of North African immigrants in France, has been strongly tied to Islam since its advent (Suleiman, 2003), and in the past century has been a potent symbol of Arab identity, both politically and ethnically (Dawisha, 2003). Studying the language attitudes of this population is an ideal approach because both Arabic and French have strong ties to culture and identity, perhaps more so than other languages, and yet, no studies to date have focused on studying how the North African diaspora in France views these two languages.

I propose to study the language attitudes of this community, and the role that these attitudes play as a proxy for attitudes toward religion, national identity and cultural identity. Understanding language attitudes is a way of understanding language ideologies (Garrett, 2010), which for many countries, especially France, have come to define much of what it is to be a member of that country. If we want to know how this marginalized community sees itself vis-à-vis France, their attitudes toward language should be considered a powerful indicator. In order to study these attitudes, I have conducted an online language attitudes survey targeting second generation North Africans in France.[2]

[2] The terms "survey" and "questionnaire" will be used interchangeable throughout this dissertation.

1.1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

In this section I briefly review the background and context for this study, specifically focusing on the North African immigrant community in France, language attitudes, and the language ideologies of French and Arabic.

1.1.1 North African Immigrant Community

Immigration to France from North Africa became prominent in the years after the Second World War when France was in need of a renewed workforce to aid in the effort of reconstruction (Kaya, 2009). After the end of the colonial era in the 1950s and 1960s, France maintained close ties with the Maghreb politically, economically and linguistically. This continued relationship with the Maghreb, and its geographic proximity to France, has made immigration to France relatively easy, with the proportion of immigrants from the Maghreb going from 2% in 1946 to 39% in 1982 (Hargreaves, 2007).

Today, the North African immigrant community lives predominantly in the *banlieues* on the outskirts of major metropolises such as Paris, Lyon, Grenoble and Marseille in public housing. These neighborhoods and buildings are isolated from the wealthier communities and city centers and are known for being run-down and dangerous. The majority of first generation North Africans work in manual labor jobs, with only a minority working in the professional sphere (INSEE, 2010). The second generation, although doing a little better than their parents' generation, experiences high levels of unemployment (Tribalat, 1995). Whereas the second generation in the 1980s

was interested in assimilation to French society, their counterparts today are embracing their North African cultural and religious heritage (Begag, 2007). There is a "renewed Islamization" in the North African diaspora youth community (Gray, 2005), who are overall more religious than their parents (Begag, 2007).

The majority French culture has not been very welcoming to the North African diaspora. While immigration can be a source of tension in all countries because of a perception that a population influx will endanger the economy and make jobs harder to come by, in France the debate has largely surrounded concerns and fears about Islamic fundamentalism (Tribalat, 1995). Seventy-four percent of those polled in 2013 thought that Islam is not compatible with French society's values (Le Bars, 2013). The French policy of *laïcité*, or secularism, and the firm separation of public and private life have come into conflict with the North African diaspora who, as predominantly Muslim, express their religious adherence in the form of prayer and clothing, both outward signs of religious affiliation. The most long lasting conflict has been that of the *affaire des foulards*, a battle that has spanned decades over whether or not school girls should be allowed to wear headscarves, a symbol of religion, in the secular schools.[3] This, mixed with the bitter history between France and the Maghreb during the fight for independence, has led to a volatile situation in France. In 2005, there were mass riots in the *banlieues* across France after the deaths of two North African youths at the hands of

[3] It is important to note here that while the headscarf is a symbol of religion, it can also be worn for cultural reasons.

the police. Kaya (2009) argues that the riots were caused by colonialism, racism, poverty and exclusion from French society.

This tension has extended into the linguistic realm, where the speech practices of the North African community are stigmatized because they deviate from the highly praised standard variety (Melliani, 1997; Stewart, 2012). Despite the fact that many North African immigrants knew some French before coming to France, their speech is accented and often contains Arabic words. Their children, the second generation, are sometimes viewed as being 'between' languages because they do not speak standard French, nor are they always highly proficient in Arabic. Language is therefore yet another way in which this community is identified as different and therefore stigmatized.

1.1.2 Language Attitudes, Culture and Religion

There are two basic types of language attitudes: instrumental and integrative (Baker, 1992). Instrumental attitudes are those that indicate that a language is useful to the speaker, for example, to advance their career or make them more knowledgeable. Integrative attitudes tend to involve attachment to speakers of a language and identification with the cultural activities associated with that language (Baker, 1992, p. 32). The attitudes that one holds toward a given language can be an expression of attitudes toward the culture attached to that language. Studying language attitudes is, therefore, a way to tap into how language is viewed as a proxy for attitudes toward religion and culture (Choi, 2003).

Language attitudes have traditionally been studied for language planning purposes, especially in post-colonial contexts in Africa, in order to decide on a new national language after the departure of the former colonial power, as well as to assess the effects of the language policies pre and post-independence (e.g. Bentahila, 1983). Language attitude studies are also used to examine situations where language contact is causing language shift to occur, for example in Wales (Baker, 1992), the theory being that by understanding language attitudes, these attitudes can be improved and language shift avoided. Language attitude studies are also useful for understanding a population and how they view a culture and society that is related to a language. This is especially relevant in migration contexts where immigrants are adjusting to a new language and culture.

A subset of language attitude studies explores attitudes in the diaspora. This has been done mostly by a research group who compared language attitudes in the Welsh diaspora to those in Wales (Coupland, Bishop, Evans & Garrett, 2006; Garrett, Bishop & Coupland, 2009). They found that the diaspora groups had more positive attitudes toward the Welsh language and culture than those living in Wales, indicating what they call a "diasporic lens" through which they view their culture, language and heritage, with a religious thread also emerging. These studies indicate that diaspora groups tend to identify with their country of origin both linguistically and culturally, such that positive attitudes toward their heritage language may become a defining aspect of the community, with strong links to national identity, religion and cultural norms from the country of

origin. These findings suggest that diaspora language attitudes may be unique and should be studied across various cultural and linguistic contexts.

Language attitudes are particularly important in a country like France where the concept of being 'French', both legally and culturally, is tightly intertwined with the French language and its proper usage (Judge, 2007; Weil, 2010). French language ideology goes back at least to the 16th century when it was praised for its 'inherent' beauty, and continued into the French Revolution (1789) when it was used as a tool for unifying the nation. In the last forty years it has been used as a substitute for economic success and continues to be a symbol of cultural 'purity' (Gordon, 1978; Oakes, 2001).

There is a similarly strong relationship between Arabic and Islam. Suleiman (2003) argues that Arabic is especially prestigious because it is the language of the Qur'an and the Hadith, both of which refer to it as the language of heaven, the language chosen by God and the language of the Arabs. Like French, it has been praised as a superior language for centuries as well as viewed as tantamount to being a Muslim and an Arab. This ideology has manifested itself in language attitudes in the Maghreb, where people strongly associate Arabic with Islam (Benrabah, 2007; Chakrani, 2010). Arabic was also the foundation for the now-defunct Arab Nationalist project of the 20th century, which encouraged its use as the national language in post-colonial Arab countries.

The North African diaspora in France is caught between the two formidable language ideologies surrounding French and Arabic. Studying their language attitudes is therefore a powerful tool for improving our knowledge and understanding of this marginalized group in France who is stigmatized linguistically, culturally and religiously.

It can further our knowledge of how they view their own position in France and how language acts as a stand-in for their sense of cultural and national identity.

1.2 Problem Statement

Prior sociolinguistic research on the North African diaspora in France and their language attitudes has been deficient in a few important ways. This dissertation seeks to reddress some of those deficiencies. First, there have been several studies that examine the language attitudes of North Africans toward Arabic and French in order to understand the effects of France's colonial-era language policies and of the post-independence Arabization movement (Benrabah, 2007; Chakrani, 2010); however, there are currently no language attitude studies of the North African Muslim diaspora in France.[4] There is a need to examine this population in order to understand the post-colonial language attitudes not only of those who have immigrated to the country of their former colonizer, but of the succeeding generations who have gone through the French educational system and speak French at high degrees of proficiency, but who also still have roots in North African culture and language. Examining their attitudes toward language, and how these relate to religious and cultural attitudes, will shed light on how this population identifies itself in relation to the majority French society.

[4] There are some studies that discuss language attitudes incidentally to other research questions, although none that are systematic, thorough or that are working in the language attitude tradition. These studies will be discussed in Chapter 2.

Second, previous scholarship on language attitudes in the Maghreb has paid little attention to the strong ties between Arabic and Islam. It is my contention that this is an oversight of a powerful factor in the formation of language attitudes, which has been noted, but not explored in the field. Given that the North African immigrant community in France is predominantly Muslim, religion should be considered a component of their identity and should be studied accordingly. This trend of avoiding discussing religion is also wide spread in studies on sociolinguistic variation.[5] Yaeger-Dror (2014) points out this gap in the literature and exhorts the sociolinguistic community to consider religion as a central component to identity. By highlighting and exploring religion and religiosity in this study, I hope to encourage researchers in language attitudes and sociolinguistics to take religion into consideration.

Third, despite a rich body of sociolinguistic variation research on second and third-generation Maghrebi immigrants in France (Goudaillier, 1997; Fagyal, 2004; Jamin, Trimaille and Gasquet-Cyrus, 2006), little has been done to study women in this community and the ways in which they use language as an expression of identity (Trimaille & Billiez, 2007). There is evidence that suggests that women living in the Maghreb do not experience the same freedoms as women in France (Gill, 1999; Sadiqi, 2003; Killian, 2006) and that this may affect their linguistic choices (Billiez, 1985). I propose that some women may express more positive attitudes toward French because of its relationship with French society. Unfortunately, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the

[5] I make a distinction throughout this dissertation between the fields of language attitudes and sociolinguistics in order to separate language attitude studies from sociolinguistic studies on language variation, despite the fact that language attitudes are at times classified as belonging under the umbrella of sociolinguistics and, according to Garrett (2001), are a component of sociolinguistics.

majority of participants who responded to the survey for this dissertation were women (only five men responded). This eliminated any chance comparing responses based on gender. However, it does allow for a closer examination of how women view language, France, the Maghreb and Islam in the North African diaspora in France.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The objective of this dissertation is to examine the language attitudes of the North African diaspora in France, specifically the so-called second generation, toward French, Standard Arabic and dialectal Arabic,[6] as well as their attitudes toward religion, France and the Maghreb. I explore the relationship between attitudes toward Arabic and attitudes toward Islam, given the uniquely close relationship between the two (Suleiman, 2003), in order to assess whether the language ideology of Standard Arabic is still present in the second generation of this diaspora community, and whether level of religiosity is a factor in the formation of language attitudes. I investigate how the dialectal Arabic spoken by this community is related to their attitudes toward the Maghreb and North African culture, and whether attitudes toward French are similarly correlated with attitudes toward France and French society. In addition, I also consider the extent to which proficiency (based on self-assessment) is related to language attitudes in this linguistic

[6] I do not investigate attitudes toward Berber in this dissertation, while acknowledging fully the large Berber community in France, and the role that the Berber language plays in identity for this portion of the North African diaspora. I investigate attitudes toward the standard variety of Arabic instead of Berber a) because of the close relationship between this variety and the Muslim religion, given that religion and language is one of the primary interactions that this dissertation focuses on, and b) because I am interested in attitudes toward the classic diglossic languages of dialectal and standard Arabic in the diaspora context.

context in order to contribute to general knowledge of the interaction between proficiency and attitudes.

The purpose of this inquiry into these attitudes is to understand better this large immigrant community, which has a long and troubled history with France, both during the colonial era and in the migration context, in order to provide insight into how they are integrating into life in France and whether they view themselves as insiders or outsiders in a country that has a strict definition of what it means to be French. It is also to improve our knowledge of language attitudes, their formation and components. This involves exploring the relationship between religious and national identity and language attitudes.

1.4 Significance of the Study

This dissertation makes significant and original contributions to the field of language attitudes and sociolinguistics, contributions that may have an effect on related fields such as sociology, diaspora studies, European studies and psychology. These contributions are methodological, theoretical and substantive in nature. Methodologically, I innovate where the language attitude survey tool is concerned. Whereas previous surveys have been pen and paper tasks that were done in the presence of the researcher, or were mailed out to schools and universities, I distributed my survey on the Internet. This allows for absolute anonymity, which helps to avoid effects of the researcher on the responses of participants, and also reaches out beyond the university educated to recruit participants from varying socioeconomic levels and backgrounds.

Theoretically, this research contributes to the understanding of the factors involved in language attitudes, especially concerning the effects of religion and religiosity. Language attitude studies, like sociolinguistic variation studies, ought to take religion into more careful consideration. For many communities religion is an important component of their identity, which affects linguistic attitudes and linguistic variation. Researchers in the field of sociology of religion and language have been highlighting the importance of the relationship between the two for years, but until recently there has been limited interest in the topic among sociolinguists (see Yaeger-Dror, 2014 for a recent discussion). By exploring the relationship between religion and language attitudes, this study aims to impact which variables are considered in sociolinguistic variation research. If sociolinguistics is the study of how we use language in a social setting, and attitudes are our "map of the social world" (Garrett, Coupland & Williams, 2003, p. 3), then understanding language attitudes should be fundamental to the field of sociolinguistics. Garrett (2001) argues that the two should be more integrated because language attitudes affect language variation. By furthering our understanding of what contributes to language attitudes, this study expands on the variables that should be considered in sociolinguistic research.

This dissertation also contributes theoretically to the study of language attitudes in the diaspora, an area that has only been studied to a limited extent and for limited populations. Language attitude surveys have primarily been used for the Welsh diaspora in the U.S. and South America (Garrett et al., 2009), and for the Basque diaspora in the U.S. (Lasagabaster, 2008), both Western diasporas in Western contexts. This research

provides insight into how language attitudes function in a migration context from a non-Western country to a Western one, especially where there is a colonial history.

Substantively, this research is innovative in its exploration of the attitudes of second-generation North Africans in France, a population that has been neglected in the language attitudes field, despite much focus on the attitudes of their counterparts in the Maghreb. The shifting demographics in Europe necessitate research on diasporic communities from Muslim-majority countries, particularly diaspora from former colonies living in the country of their former colonizers. This dissertation explores how they view language as a proxy for religious and national identity, particularly in a 'secular' nation like France, and how they view themselves vis-à-vis the majority French culture. This dissertation, therefore, provides new insight into our understanding of this community and the inner machinations of assimilation.

1.5 Overview of the Methodology

In order to fulfill the goals of the study outlined above, I launched an anonymous language attitude survey online that targeted 18 to 30 year old French men and women who were born in France but whose parents are Arabic speakers born in the Maghreb. I constructed an original survey that draws from a large body of literature on attitude questionnaires in order to avoid the pitfalls of their construction (Bentahila, 1983; Baker, 1992; Oppenheim, 1992; Garrett et al., 2003). It contains several question formats, both scalar and non-scalar, in order to vary the design and thereby tap into participants'

attitudes in a more covert manner. The majority of the questions are quantitative and close-ended, which lends itself to easier analysis; however, some open-ended questions were used in order to allow participants to share their attitudes in a less restricted manner. The survey was launched on Qualtrics, and was circulated on the Internet via an online flyer that was sent to various list-serves, organizations, Mosques and Facebook groups (both religious and secular), the latter generating the majority of responses. All survey materials were in French. The data was analyzed quantitatively, looking at percentages in order to understand the overall attitudes of the group, and running correlations to look for relationships between attitudes toward language, religion and culture. The open-ended qualitative questions and comment sections were used to help shed light on the quantitative results.

1.6 TERMINOLOGY

1.6.1 Classical Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic, and Darija

Before moving on to the research questions, it is necessary to give a brief history of the Arabic language and explain the differences between Classical Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic and dialectal Arabic, in order to help explain the distinctions made in these questions between different varieties of Arabic. It is further required to clarify the terminology that will be adopted throughout this dissertation and motivate these decisions before beginning the review of the relevant literature.

The first attestations of what is often referred to as Classical Arabic appeared in the 4th century AD (Owens, 2006). Classical Arabic (CA) refers to the dialect of Arabic

spoken in the Arabian Peninsula by the Prophet Mohammed and his tribe in the 7th century and is the language in which the Qur'an was written and recorded a century later (Sayahi, 2014). The first fixed version of the Qur'an appeared in the second half of the 8th century along with a codification of the grammar (Owens, 2006). The Hadith, or sayings of the prophet, and the Sunnah, the teachings and practices of Mohammed, were also recorded in this language. Because of its intimate ties to the advent of Islam and Islam's primary sacred texts, CA is taught in Qur'anic schools and is considered the only language that is capable of transmitting the message of the Qur'an.

While CA was preserved throughout the centuries, the spoken language changed, especially as it came into contact with other languages and was spread beyond the Arabian Peninsula. According to Versteegh (2001, p. 145), today there are five groups of regional dialects in the Arab world: 1) Arabic spoken in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia and the Gulf area), 2) Mesopotamian Arabic (Iraq), 3) Syro-Lebanese Arabic (Syria and Lebanon), 4) Egyptian Arabic, and 5) the Maghrebi dialects. These Arabic dialects are, for the most part, not written or codified and are acquired at home as the mother tongue. These dialectal varieties are different enough from one another as to make communication between them difficult, if not impossible. The dialectal Arabic spoken in the Maghreb is often referred to as Darija, a term that I have adopted.

In 19th century Europe, the educational system and the military apparatus began to modernize. With this came pressure on the Arab states to modernize as well. If the Arab states needed to modernize, so too did the language. "The vernacular dialects were considered too 'corrupt' to serve such a function and Classical Arabic had the high

standing needed to initiate a renaissance" (Sayahi, 2014, p. 23). This led to the creation in the 19th century of what is now known as Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) (Saadi-Mokrane, 2002). It is based on Classical Arabic, and is very similar to it. The main differences between the two are that MSA has a simpler syntax (Sayahi, 2014) and has made innovations based on Arabic roots to make up for gaps in the lexicon in order to make it capable of being a language used in science and technology.[7] Today MSA, also sometimes called Literary Arabic, is the academic written standard for the Arab world and is used in Arab diplomacy. It is the official language in 27 countries with nearly 300 million speakers worldwide.

Although there are differences between CA and MSA, many researchers opt to refer to them together as Standard Arabic (SA). They do so not in an effort to deny the differences between the varieties but because they acknowledge that these are more alike than dissimilar and are rarely distinguished in the mind of the Arabic speaker, "for them there is only one SA" (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 26). For this reason, Bassiouney refers to Standard Arabic throughout her work, encompassing both MSA and CA. Sayahi (2014) also adopts the use of Standard Arabic. While recognizing that differences do exist, he notes that the written Arabic of today has changed very little since codification in the early Islamic period. Sayahi further argues that both are included in the diglossic conception of the H language in Arab societies. It would be confusing to distinguish between them or to pretend that they represent two separate H varieties. Sadiqi (2003), too, does not distinguish between CA and MSA, opting to refer to them as Standard

[7] Aguadé (2012) notes that CA historically did borrow foreign words, especially throughout the Middle Ages. The resistance to borrowing foreign words is a relatively new phenomenon in Arabic and is due to a fear of linguistic colonization that set in after independence from colonial rule in the post WWII era.

Arabic as well. In fact, she argues that Classical Arabic "developed" into Standard Arabic. Bentahila (1983) makes a similar case, arguing that there are different labels used to refer to Arabic writing from different historical periods: pre-Islamic Arabic, Early Islamic Arabic, Middle Arabic, and today Modern Standard Arabic. He argues that MSA has in fact "undergone little change since the days of the prophet" (p. 133). He uses Classical Arabic to refer to all of these varieties, much as more recent authors use Standard Arabic to encompass them all. I follow Sadiqi (2003), Sayahi (2014) and Bassiouney (2009) and use the term Standard Arabic to refer to Classical and Modern Standard Arabic, unless needing specifically to distinguish the two.

1.6.2 Immigration Terminology

The term 'second generation immigrant' is often used to refer to someone who was born in a given country, but whose parents immigrated there. Similarly, the children of the second generation are referred to as 'third generation immigrants.' This is often done in referring to immigrants in France. This terminology has been contested as prejudiced because it labels these French citizens by their immigrant background (Freedman, 2004). It treats their origin as their defining quality, something that is not done for immigrants in France from central and eastern European countries. Mindful of this objection, I use these terms because they are helpful in distinguishing between immigrants, their children, and their grandchildren. It also follows the tradition in the linguistics literature, where it is common to talk about generations of 'immigrants' as a way of understanding language shift in a diaspora or immigration context.

It is further important to distinguish between types of second-generation immigrants in France. The classic second generation in this context are those whose parents immigrated to France at the end of the colonial era, and who grew up in France in

the 1980s. Their parents came to France prior to the cessation of foreign worker recruitment immigration, which was shut down in 1974. However, people from the Maghreb have continued to immigrate to France since that time, and are, by definition, first generation immigrants, despite the fact that they are not members of the classic first generation who emigrated in the 1960s. Their children, who grew up in the 1990s and 2000s, are, therefore, second-generation immigrants, which should be differentiated from the classic second generation who grew up in the 1980s.

1.7 Research Questions

I have organized the goals and purpose of this study into a list of seven research questions for the sake of clarity and procedural ease. I will refer back to these research questions throughout the methodology, results and discussion chapters.

RQ1. What traits or values do young second-generation North Africans associate with French, Standard Arabic, and Darija?

RQ2. What are the religious and cultural attitudes of this population?

RQ3. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward Islam?

RQ4. How are attitudes toward Darija and French associated with attitudes toward the Maghreb?

RQ5. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward individuals from other Arab countries?

RQ6. How are attitudes toward French and Darija associated with attitudes toward France?

RQ7. Are high levels of proficiency in a language predictive of positive attitudes toward that language and the culture associated with it?

1.8 Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The introduction chapter has acted as a guide to the dissertation by briefly providing a context for the study, the gaps in the literature that motivated it, the goals of the dissertation, the scholarly contributions that it makes, the methodology and terminology used, and the research questions it poses. Chapter two contains the literature review, in which I discuss language attitude theory in depth, the relationship between language and religion (specifically focusing on Arabic and Islam), the relationship between language and national identity (specifically Arabic, nationalism, and pan-Arab identity), and the use of language as an expression of identity. In Chapter Three, I discuss the history of French language ideology in order to contextualize French language attitudes and the connection between French, French culture and the French state. I go on to review the history of the relationship between France and the Maghreb, including language policies during and after the colonial era, the successive waves of immigration, and the current situation for the North African diaspora in France. Chapter Four offers a review of various methodologies for studying

language attitudes before discussing the specific methodology that I utilized in this study and how the data was analyzed. In Chapter Five, I present the results from my study, including the raw data from all of the quantitative questions and the correlations that were run. Qualitative data is presented when appropriate for clarifying responses to quantitative questions. Chapter Six contains a discussion of the results and goes into more depth in order to understand how they pertain to each of the seven research questions presented above, as well as the general aim of understanding how the community views itself in relation to French and North African culture and national identity. In Chapter Seven, I make my concluding remarks including a discussion of the limitations of my study, the contributions it makes, and the possibilities for future research.

2. Literature Review

In order to understand fully the nature of language attitudes, and all of their contributing factors, it is necessary to understand the components of language attitudes and the relationship of attitudes to beliefs and ideologies, language use and choice, proficiency, and attitude stability. In this chapter, I review the two main types of language attitudes and their relationship to covert and overt prestige, particularly in a diglossic or a minority language situation. I address language maintenance in the Arab diaspora in order to understand how Arabic is used in immigration contexts. It was further necessary to discuss how language can symbolize the culture with which it is associated, and the ways that women in particular use language choice as an expression of identity and to access the more liberating lifestyle that may come with a particular culture. I additionally discuss the language attitude literature in the Maghreb, in order to contextualize the attitudes of Maghrebi immigrant communities in France, and present the research that has been done on language attitudes in the diaspora.

One of the goals of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between language attitudes and religion, cultural identity, and national identity, particularly concerning Arabic and Islam, Arabic and Maghrebi national identity, and pan-Arab identity, all within a diasporic context. In order to do this properly, the relationship between Arabic and Islam must be established, as well as the relationship between Arabic and Arab nationalism.[8]

[8] The relationship between Arabic and nationalism is focused on more than French in the discussion of nationalism in this chapter. French will be explored separately and in more depth in Chapter 3.

2.1 Language Attitudes, Language Maintenance, and Language as a Transmitter of Culture

Language attitudes research is concerned primarily with the factors that underlie and affect attitudes, and how these attitudes influence or are predictive of behavior. This is particularly relevant to the study of language maintenance and language shift. If the contributing factors of language attitudes can be determined, and if attitudes are found to be related to language use, then there is thought to be a way to prevent language shift. However, not all language attitudes research is done for the sake of understanding language maintenance or supporting revitalization efforts. Many language attitudes studies in North Africa have had as their goal understanding the post-colonial effects of Arabization and the changing status of French in the country (Bentahila, 1983; Benrabah, 2007; Chakrani, 2010). Other studies look to attitudes as a predictor in language change (Benrabah, 1994). Regardless of the intent, a proper investigation into language attitudes must include an understanding of the determinants of language attitudes, their link to behavior, proficiency, stability, and diglossia, the relationship between language attitudes and language shift, and the role language plays as a transmitter of values and culture.

2.1.1 Defining Language Attitudes and What Influences Them

Attitudes are our "map of the social world" (Garrett et al., 2003, p. 3), which permeates how a person experiences the world and society and how that experience is filtered and expressed in behavior. They affect how we view every person with whom we interact, and how we choose to express ourselves. Choi defines linguistic attitudes more specifically as "an individual or collective expression towards language and any issues related to language; it is the act of responding to certain aspects of language, linguistic ideologies and linguistic use" (Choi, 2003, p. 82), highlighting the importance of ideology and language use in the formation of language attitudes. Choi further points out

that attitudes toward language may be an expression of something commonly related to that particular language, or one aspect of it, such as religion, or national identity.

It can be difficult to assign a clear definition to attitudes (Garrett, 2010), because they are often confused with opinions, beliefs and ideologies. Opinions, like beliefs, are cognitive components of attitudes. While opinions are easily expressed, attitudes are often dormant and less obvious, and the two may not match up (Baker, 1992). This can make attitudes more difficult to access than opinions, forcing the researcher to be more nuanced in his/her methodology in order not to confuse the two (Garrett, 2010). Language ideologies, on the other hand, precede and form language attitudes (Gafaranga, 2010), as they "represent broad, socio-cultural schemas that shape the development of intrapersonal attitudes towards particular language varieties and their speakers" (Edwards, 2009, p. 11). People are socialized into language ideologies, and these ideologies reflect their beliefs (Dragojevic, Giles & Watson, 2013). Language socialization occurs not only on the micro level at home but also on the macro level in the form of institutional language policies (Giles, Hewstone & Ball, 1983) and ethnolinguistic vitality (i.e., the degree of presence of the language in question in public) (Bourhis, Giles & Rosenthal, 1981). Ethnolinguistic vitality can be examined objectively, as in societal treatment studies (Garrett, 2010), or subjectively, by asking people what their perception is of ethnolinguistic vitality. Attitudes are thus formed by individuals based on the language socialization and connected language ideologies with which they are raised. These ideologies can create a power relationship in bilingual communities where one language, and its speakers, is viewed as superior, as is the case in France (Riley, 2011). Additional factors that can affect how people view languages and dialects are political ideology, race, socioeconomic level of speakers, religion, cultural identity,

education, and institutional backing (Bentahila, 1983; Alfaraz, 2002; Yagmur & Akinci, 2003; Benrabah, 2007; Chakrani, 2010).

2.1.2 Language Attitudes and Language Shift

For many researchers who are interested in language maintenance and language shift, understanding the link between attitudes and behavior is a key issue, as is the stability of these attitudes. Attitudes are made up of cognitive, affective and action-ready components (Baker, 1992; Garrett, Coupland and Williams, 2003; Edward, 2009), which may work in concert with one another. For example, an individual who is consciously aware of having positive attitudes toward a language (cognitive), and privately has subconscious positive emotional feelings about that language (affective) proceeds to behave linguistically in such a way as to reflect that (action ready) by speaking the language. However, it also may be that a person's cognitive attitudes, or overt rational attitudes, conflict with their affective and emotional covert attitudes, so that they may proclaim to feel one way about a language but privately feel another. This frequently occurs with attitudes toward code switching, which, although stigmatized and often viewed as "deficient" in bilingual communities, is commonly used (Ziamari, 2009). This demonstrates that negative outward attitudes toward a practice may conceal conflicting inner attitudes.

Garrett (2010) maintains that language attitudes affect language choice and that there is a strong relationship between attitudes and behavior in general, although he acknowledges that the relationship is not always clear. Oppenheim (1992) writes that "an attitude is a state of readiness, a tendency to respond in a certain manner when confronted with certain stimuli" (p. 174); however he too warns that there is not a one-to-one connection between the two. Other factors, such as topic, setting, or interlocutor may

change the calculus behind the decision to use one language over another.[9] Attitudes may also change in differing context (Davies & Bentahila, 2013).

Indeed, the relationship between language attitudes and language use is disputed within the language attitudes literature. Al-Khatib (2001), using a language attitudes and language use questionnaire, found that language shift depends in part on attitudes toward the dominant language. If this is the case, then language attitudes do have some kind of a relationship toward language use, even if it is not direct. Similarly, Mugaddam (2006) found that positive attitudes toward Arabic were a major contributor to its adoption by his Sudanese participants. Bentahila (1983) indicates that the function of the language in a society or a person's life may in fact affect attitudes toward that language, rather than the other way around. He argues that language choice is not arbitrary but that languages have different domains and the choice is made based on an interaction of factors. Ultimately, the differing roles of each language are correlated to some extent with the attitudes toward those languages. For example, in Morocco, French is used more in formal situations and is also attributed qualities linked to formality, while the reverse is true for dialectal Arabic.

Yağmur and Akinci (2003), however, found that language attitudes of first and second-generation Turkish immigrants to France did not parallel reported language use. Choi (2003) reports a similar finding for attitudes toward Guarani in Paraguay, although she maintains that "attitudes have a decisive influence on processes of linguistic variation and change, language planning, and the maintenance or loss of languages in a community" (Choi, 2003, p. 81). Ziamari (2009) used a questionnaire to ask Moroccans about their attitudes toward code-switching, as well as recorded conversations and

[9] This is not to imply that speakers are making rational, calculated decisions about language choice, or are even always conscious of the language that they choose to use (Al-Khatib, 2001).

debates between participants in a classroom, finding that there was a difference between how they felt about the linguistic practice and what they actually did, with most of them expressing negative attitudes toward code-switching but then engaging in it in conversation, showing a disconnect between attitudes and action. Similarly, Slavik (2001) found that there was a negative relationship between language use and positive attitudes over time for Maltese. Maltese was used less frequently over time but was held in higher regard. Edwards (2009), although acknowledging that an "attitude may be understood as a disposition to react favorably or unfavorably to a class of objects" (p. 83), also warns that there can often be a difference between professed attitudes and actions.

It is important to note that despite the debate over the causal relationship between attitudes and use, many language shift and language maintenance studies utilize a language attitudes and language use questionnaire, indicating that it is a useful indicator of whether language shift is occurring. What is more, even studies such as Choi (2003), which did not find a correlation between positive attitudes and high rates of use of a language, still claim that there is a relationship between the two.

Slavik (2001, p. 150) suggests that "while positive attitudes may not lead to language-maintenance efforts, negative attitudes almost certainly lead to a lack of such efforts." Perhaps there is a relationship between language attitudes and language use, but it is not the same everywhere. It is further possible that in some cultural contexts language attitudes will have more of an effect on language use than in others. Mugaddam (2006) found a positive correlation between positive attitudes toward Arabic and its use; however, positive attitudes toward ethnic languages did not have a similar effect, although they were seen as a symbol of ethnic group identity. In order to explore fully the link between language attitudes and language use it is necessary to understand the culture

of the people being studied, the history that they have with the languages in question, and the language ideologies associated with each language.

One of the problems with many of the arguments for and against the existence of a relationship between language attitudes and use is that the questionnaires used are often rudimentary, sometimes including only one or two questions on language attitudes, and often only permitting yes/no answers, thus forcing participants to express their attitudes in a binary manner rather than on a continuum. Furthermore, many researchers discuss language use and its relationship to language attitudes, but almost none engage in an effort to compare the results of questionnaires regarding attitudes and behavior with any kind of ethnographic observations, instead relying on reported language use (although see Gal, 1978b). There is no consensus on the relationship between language attitudes and language use, which is why continuing research on the topic is needed, as is the further refinement of the tools used to capture both.

While many language attitude studies have been concerned with the relationship between attitudes and language choice, few have discussed the connection between language attitudes and sociolinguistic variation and the role that investigating language attitudes can play in influencing what variables are considered factors in variation. One reason for this has been that the language attitudes field traditionally operated under the methodological umbrella of social psychology. This has changed in recent years and the field has innovated methodologically (Garrett, 2001). Garrett (2001) urges researchers in the two fields to work together more closely and argues that language attitudes are, in fact, "an essential component of sociolinguistics," (p. 626). Despite this, the two have struggled to integrate. If one can determine the factors that contribute to attitudes about language for a group or population, then those factors may be useful variables to examine in a sociolinguistic study on language variation for that group.

2.1.2.1 Language Maintenance in the Arab diaspora

Although attitudes do seem to be related to language shift, there are many other factors at play, with no primary factor being sufficient to explain the shift or maintenance (Fishman, 1964). Some of the main factors in determining language shift and language maintenance are group size of the minority language speakers and their demographic concentration (Al-Khatib, 2001; Mugaddam, 2006), proficiency (Fishman, 1964), domain (Abu-Haidar, 1994), status of their social contacts (Gal, 1978b), urban versus rural dwelling (Fishman, 1964), the language that mothers speak or value (Cheng, 2003; Cavanaugh, 2006), inter-marriage with exogenous group members (Al-Khatib, 2001; Mugaddam, 2006), degree of solidarity (Mugaddam, 2006), education (Cheng, 2003), participation in community activities (Slavik, 2001), institutional support and economic factors (Gafaranga, 2010) and knowledge of the dominant language prior to immigration (Slavik, 2001).

It is often stated that the language of a family who has immigrated is largely lost by the third generation (see Slavik, 2001, for an example). However, there is reason to suspect that this may not be the case for the Arab diaspora, and more specifically for the North African Muslim diaspora in France, based on the criteria above. Although Landau (1999) argues that religion is waning for some diaspora groups, this is less so for the Muslim Arab diaspora. Studies on Arabic-English bilinguals in America indicate that speakers are "not leaving Arabic behind" in part because of Arabic's status as the language of Islam (Jake and Myers-Scotten, 2002, 328), and the recent "revival of Muslim identity" (Rouchdy, 2002, p. 142). Arabic is needed to fulfill one of the pillars of Islam, prayer, keeping it present in the day-to-day life of many in the Muslim Arab diaspora. There may, in fact, be a renewed interest among second and third-generation Maghrebi immigrants in France in the language of their parents and grandparents, given

that many of the circumstances that usually lead to language maintenance discussed above are fulfilled by the North African diaspora in France.

Language loss often occurs when a community begins marrying exogenous group members at a high rate (Gal 1978a; Landau, 1999; Dzialtuvaite, 2006). The children of a mixed-language marriage are raised in a bilingual household and are part of two linguistic groups, thus weakening the strength of each of the languages in the child's life and identity. This often happens within immigrant communities. The children will eventually speak predominately the language of the parent from the receiving country. However, there is evidence to suggest that second and third-generation North African immigrants, particularly men, are marrying spouses from the home country (Selby, 2009; Boumans and de Ruiter, 2002), which may create a cycle of 'linguistic refreshing' whereby there is a continual presence of a native and/or monolingual Arabic speaker in the household. This will strengthen the spouse's Arabic, pushing him or her to speak Arabic more than he or she otherwise would. Thus, a second-generation man who speaks both French and Arabic, who marries a first generation woman, will have children who would be considered third-generation Arabic speakers via their father, and at the same time second-generation speakers via their mother. Mothers tend to have more linguistic influence on their children because of the tendency for women to stay at home and raise the children, especially in this community. Thus, their second-generation speaker status would 'win' over the father's third generation status, potentially creating a perpetual cycle of second-generation Arabic speakers in the North African diaspora in France.

Another factor in the maintenance of language in the diaspora is continual immigration. For the Arab diaspora, there has been steady immigration due to the instability in the Arab world (Rouchdy, 2002), whether economic or otherwise. A constant influx of immigrants ensures that there is always the presence of first-generation

speakers who have children who are second-generation speakers. This can be seen in the Arabic speaking community in Detroit, Michigan, where the new arrivals largely maintain their first language, which Rouchdy (2002) compares to Spanish-speaking immigrants in the U.S. The proximity of the Maghreb to France, and the numerous flights between the two, facilitates this kind of continual immigration, with many maintaining ties to the homeland by owning homes there as well. Furthermore, many in the Maghreb have at least some knowledge of French, which makes the transition easier and more likely, although this knowledge may also increase the chances of language shift.

Both language and religion aid in maintaining ethnic roots in the diaspora (Safran, 2008), which may slow the process of language shift in a community. The unique relationship between Islam and Arabic strengthens language loyalty to Arabic for the predominately Muslim Arab diaspora, especially in France where increased stigmatization and marginalization has moved youths to turn more strongly toward religion and to outwardly express it (Begag, 2007). This relationship has kept the Arabic language alive throughout the centuries, even during the Ottoman Empire (Dawisha, 2003), and remains the case today.

There are, however, other factors that may encourage language shift among certain members of the community, including knowledge of French prior to immigration, low levels of institutional support in the form of dialectal Arabic language classes (Oakes, 2001), and the fact that, in the Maghreb, French is the language of economic success and power (Sayahi, 2014).

2.1.3 Language Attitudes: Integrative and Instrumental, Covert and Overt

The study of language attitudes is often used to "establish the relationship between language choice and language status in a speech community" (Omoniyi, 2006, p. 134). According to Baker (1992) language attitudes can be broken down into two basic categories: instrumental and integrative. Instrumental attitudes include agreement with statements such as 'learning language X will advance my career,' or, 'make me a more knowledgeable person.' They are often utilitarian, pragmatic and individualistic. In Morocco, French is seen as an instrumental language because it provides better access to education, jobs, government, wealth and power (Chakrani, 2010). An integrative attitude "may concern attachment to, or identification with a language group and their cultural activities" (Baker, 1992, p. 32), linking language attitudes to positive attitudes toward culture. These types of attitudes are usually social, interpersonal and are identified as related to a particular group. For Baker's Welsh population, reminder of one's culture increased positive language attitudes, and being involved in cultural activities had a much larger influence on positive language attitudes than mass media. This indicates that the degree of cultural attachment is correlated with attitudes toward the language associated with that culture.

Positive attitudes toward a language indicate that people associate it with some sort of prestige, of which there are generally thought to be two types: overt and covert (Wolfram, 1997; Chakrani, 2010), with the former linked to instrumental attitudes, and the latter with integrative attitudes. Overt prestige is associated with the language which is standardized, state-sanctioned, used by people in positions of power, and generally considered the High (H) variety in a diglossic environment (Schiffman, 1997). It is the language that is associated with modernity and progress and status (Bentahila, 1983; Edwards, 2009). Non-standard dialects and languages usually have covert prestige and

their speakers are seen favorably in terms of solidarity by their in-group members (Dragojevic et al., 2013). A low overt prestige language can act as a powerful bonding agent for group identity, has social attractiveness, and evokes integrity, friendliness etc., all of which are traits of solidarity (Edwards, 2009). These language varieties, although stigmatized, "can also fulfill important social identity-enhancing, community-promoting, and bonding/solidarity functions for their speakers" (Dragojevic et al., 2013, p. 19).

Zahn and Hopper (1985) found that the factors that emerge as determinants of positive language attitudes are superiority, attractiveness and dynamism. While a language with overt prestige may be seen as superior, a language with covert prestige is seen as more socially attractive and dynamic. Others have found that the language spoken at home was the most predictive factor of language attitudes, more so than participation in optional minority language classes (Huguet, 2006). This contradicts Baker's (1992) study, which found that participation in Welsh cultural activities was the best predictor of Welsh language maintenance. It may be that in addition to universal causes for positive or negative language attitudes there are also culturally specific factors, so that for one culture, religious involvement may be a primary factor in language attitudes, but in another it may be education. The current study therefore tries to frame the participants and their cultural context in order to understand the specific factors that contribute to attitudes in this environment, and to highlight that some factors in language attitude studies may have been overlooked in previous research, such as religion.

2.1.4 Stability and Proficiency

Some researchers claim that attitudes are constantly shifting, even within a single conversation, and thus only discourse analysis is an informative methodology for understanding language attitudes (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Garrett et al. (2003)

acknowledge that there are varying levels of stability, and Baker (1992) argues that attitudes can "take 'U' turns parallel with sudden religious conversion" (p. 97), indicating how deeply attitudes run and how violently they can swing from one end of a continuum to the other. Baker (1992) also notes that they can change due to individual and social factors, highlighting that there are personal and community influences on language attitudes. Language attitudes can further become more complex over time (Edwards, 2009); however, Garrett (2010) argues that while attitudes do shift, a person's attitudes stay within certain bounds, are durable, and can be and should be studied in a generalizable way. Although there is disagreement on the stability of language attitudes, these authors all agree that they can be studied and explored, so long as one acknowledges that attitudes are not always constant.

A further theme in language attitudes research is the link between positive attitudes and degree of proficiency in that language. In this there is, again, little consensus. One of the main findings from Coupland et al. (2006) was that the higher the level of competency in Welsh, the higher the affiliation with Wales, Welsh, and Welsh culture, regardless of other factors. Baker (1992) agrees that the better a person's attitude toward a given language, the less likely they are to *decrease* in competency in that language. Proficiency also affects attitudes, although it is not one of the major determiners (Baker, 1992). There is a link between attitude and proficiency, but the direction of causality remains unclear, and indeed may prove to be bi-causal.

There is also evidence that positive attitudes can co-exist with very low levels of proficiency. Davies and Bentahila (1989) asked Moroccans what they consider their 'own' language to be and why. The results revealed that the language toward which one feels a strong sense of ownership and identity may not be the language in which one is most proficient. Indeed, one participant in Billiez's (1985) study of third generation

Algerian immigrants in France said “Ma langue c’est l’arabe, mais je ne la parle pas” (“My language is Arabic, but I do not speak it”) (Billiez, 1985, p. 52), indicating sense of ownership without proficiency. Lasagabaster (2008) similarly found that participants had very positive attitudes toward Basque even if their self-reported proficiency was low. Yağmur and Akinci (2003) also found that their second-generation immigrants in France had positive attitudes toward Turkish but reported low proficiency in the language.

There is not a definitive answer to this question, and further research in the area is needed. Unfortunately, most language attitude studies are not able to assess language proficiency due to time and access and must therefore rely on self-reports, which further complicates the accuracy with which researchers can say whether and how attitudes and proficiency are connected.

2.1.5 Language Attitudes and Diglossia

The participants in this dissertation come from countries where diglossia existed. Although this diglossic situation did not carry over into the diaspora in France, it is nevertheless necessary to briefly review diglossia to contextualize the language attitudes studies in the Maghreb, as well as provide a full understanding of language attitudes and how they relate to prestige. Classic diglossia is defined as a linguistic situation wherein there is a High (H) and a Low (L) prestige language where each has distinct functions with limited overlap (Ferguson, 1959). Arabic is considered to be the archetypal example of classic diglossia (Sayahi, 2014). Ferguson originally stipulated that there were nine ways in which the H and L varieties differ: function, prestige, literary heritage, acquisition, standardization, stability, grammar, lexicon and phonology (Ferguson, 1959), the primary feature being the use of the H variety for administration, education and religion (Sayahi, 2014). The H variety typically functions as the language of government.

It is written and codified and has been standardized, usually with the help of a language academy. The grammar is more complex than the L variety, if the languages are related. There are also usually large differences in their lexicon and phonology. The H variety is not learned as a mother tongue but is learned in school. The L variety is used in daily life and interactions and is the language of the home and the street. It is not written or standardized and has undergone and continues to undergo change, including in the form of lexical borrowings. It has, compared to the H variety, a simpler grammar and phonological system (Ferguson, 1959). This describes the situation of Arabic in Arab countries where Standard Arabic is the H language, and the dialect, such as Darija, is the L language.

In diglossic situations the H and L language are considered to have inherent qualities or faults based on language ideologies held by the speakers, although no language is actually inherently 'good' or 'bad', 'beautiful' or 'ugly' etc. The H language is imbued with positive attributes and status while the L language is considered unsuitable for anything other than daily tasks and the mundane. This labeling "reflects, first, language attitudes among users and, second, the superposed nature of the H" (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 27). The attitudes that speakers hold about each language perpetuate their H and L status, while the status of the languages (where it is used, who speaks it etc.) perpetuates the positive or negative attitudes held about each. Sayahi (2014) describes what he calls the diglossia paradox, wherein native speakers of the L language, both the educated and the illiterate, have strong negative attitudes toward it, and yet they transmit it to their children, thus perpetuating the diglossic community. This

is relevant only for diglossic situations where the L and H languages are related and there are no native H language speakers.[10]

2.1.6 Language as a Transmitter of Culture

Studying language attitudes can inform us not only of how people view a language, but also how they view the culture associated with that language. While language attitudes often indicate things about the function of a language in the lives of a given community, they also suggest transference of attitudes toward the community of speakers of a language onto the language itself. These attitudes can then lead to people making linguistic choices based on these attitudes (Garrett, 2001), as a way to symbolize membership in and attitudes toward a culture or society. For example, El Aissati (1996) argued that, for the Arab diaspora in the Netherlands, using too much Dutch could indicate "too much of an involvement in Dutch society" (El Aissati, 1996, p. 39). Using the language of the receiving country was, in this case, a way of symbolizing attachment to the values of Dutch culture, which are perceived by the speakers, and their parents, in this study as very different from their, presumably Muslim, values. Fishman (2006) wrote that "Resistance to and advocacy of either fundamentalism or modernization cannot but be reflected in the corpus of everyday speech" (p. 24), because changes in language practices are "ideologically loaded" and have meaning for both the individual and on a societal level (Rajah-Carrim, 2010, p. 35). Thus, language choice, as an extension of language attitudes, may be a very potent symbol of religious attachment or detachment when one language is strongly associated with a religion and the other is not.

Sefiani (2003) describes North African immigrants in France as using language to express their new identity that is born out of a conflict between two worlds: straddling the

[10] Joshua Fishman (1967) expanded the definition of diglossia to include linguistic situations where the L and H language are unrelated and there exist native speakers of both.

universalist society of France and the deeply traditional world of their parents and grandparents. Herder viewed the loss of one's language as the loss of one's identity (Edwards, 2009). If someone wants to lose the identity of their family, tradition, or religion, they may also abandon that language. The reverse is also true: if someone in an immigration context rejects the culture and values of the receiving country, they may also reject the language of that country, perhaps not in terms of language use, because that may prove impractical, but in terms of language attitudes.

There is also evidence to suggest that the language in which a person is speaking may subconsciously affect how they express their identity. Although the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis has often been purported to say that language dictates thought, a neo-Whorfian reading proposes that it only *influences* thought:

> An informal Whorfianism tells us that every language interprets and presents the world in a somewhat different way, that the unique wellsprings of group consciousness, traditions, beliefs and values are intimately entwined with a given variety. (Edwards, 2009, P. 254)

This indicates that there is a subconscious awareness of the traditions and values associated with a language for the speaker.[11] This proposition is supported by some work in language attitudes research. Bentahila (1983) gave his participants a series of sentence completion tasks at two separate times, once in Arabic, once in French. He found that his participants were much more likely to complete the sentences making reference to family, duty, patriotism and religion when using Arabic. When using French, the sentences were completed making reference to career success, liberation, and education.

[11] This is not to say that the language *inherently* carries any traditions and values. It only carries the traditions and values of the society that the speaker associates with that language.

Bentahila concludes that outlook and worldview change depending on the language mode in which one is speaking, arguing, "Moroccans are both bilingual and bicultural…[and] associate each [language] with different values and beliefs" (Bentahila, 1983, p. 49). Richard and Toffoli (2009) tested this theory further by giving a questionnaire in Greek and English to Greek-speaking Canadians. Their goal was to discover how language choice affects marketing, arguing that because "language is a carrier of values" (p. 997) participants will respond differently in each language, and thus language choice should be considered in advertising. They found that there is indeed a language effect and that this may pose a problem for researchers carrying out studies on ethnic identity if the subjects are bilingual. Garrett et al. (2003) also found a difference in responses between teachers who took a language attitudes questionnaire in Welsh versus English.

These studies suggest that language is a transmitter of culture and values, and thus the language a bilingual speaker uses can represent a choice, either conscious or unconscious, to identify in that moment with a particular set of values and beliefs and to embrace a particular ethnic identity (Edwards, 2009). It further brings out different aspects of their personality (Koven, 2007; Edwards, 2009). "A speaker's choice of code in a particular situation is part of that speaker's linguistic presentation of self" (Gal, 1978a, p. 4). This is not dissimilar to Keane's definition of voicing as the "linguistic construction of social personae" (Keane, 1999, p. 271). Although this dissertation does not explicitly examine language use, it does focus on language attitudes, which, as discussed previously, are related to language use. Attitudes toward language, therefore, may reflect cultural attitudes and cultural identity.

2.1.6.1 Women, Language and Identity

If language, as expressed via language attitudes, is a symbol and transmitter of culture, then women may use language as a tool to embrace a culture that offers them more liberties and reject one that is restrictive. Since Labov's New York study (Labov, 1966), women have been seen by linguists as quicker to adopt prestige forms, particularly in terms of pronunciation, especially women of lower middle class socioeconomic status. They have been thought to do this in order to put themselves at an advantage socially, due in part to the stigma associated with the speech of the lower classes. It is also an indirect way of gaining respect (Bassiouney, 2009), which can otherwise be difficult for women to access. Women tend to use more standard forms than men, regardless of other factors, and because they are more conscious of status, they also over-report how frequently they use them (Romaine, 2003). They use language as a way to "achieve status denied to them through other outlets" because traditionally women could not gain it via education or work (Romaine, 2003, p. 104).

In addition to sociophonetic variation, women also use language choice as a way of claiming status. However, it is not just status that women strive for in choosing a prestige form or code. In some situations it is also a way of rejecting conservative tradition:

> When we look at cases where women have led in shifts to more prestigious languages, we can see how those aspiring to be ladies had to escape both literally and figuratively from their status as rural peasants by leaving the land and their language behind (Romaine, 2003, p. 110).

This is precisely what Susan Gal found in her study on language shift from Hungarian to German in a Hungarian/Austrian rural community (Gal, 1978a). Her ethnographic and

questionnaire-based study reveals that language choice is used for stylistic and rhetorical reasons but also in order to signal social group membership. Gal found that women were shifting to German more often and more quickly than men, and that this choice correlated with other life decisions including marrying exogenously men who are workers rather than farmers. Peasant life is much less attractive to women than men because they have fewer opportunities in that life. The women in this study claimed not to want to marry a peasant man because the life of a peasant wife is seen as "particularly demeaning and difficult" (p. 11) compared to the choices they otherwise have. The peasant wife has strenuous farming chores, and often lives with the mother-in-law, whereas a worker's wife has regular house upkeep that may or may not involve working. Thus their language choice is part of rejecting a harder more restrictive life. Gal writes that young women are more willing to engage in this newly available life because they are "less committed than the men to the traditionally male-dominated system of subsistence agriculture and because they have more to gain than men in embracing the newly available statuses of worker and worker's wife" (Gal, 1978a, p. 2-3). Thus, not only are these women gaining status by choosing a more urban language, they are gaining a sort of freedom from a way of life that offered them fewer options and was dominated by men.

A similar phenomenon can be seen in North African culture where women use language as a tool for liberating themselves from traditional roles. In the Maghreb, women's roles are largely restricted to the private home sphere, while men freely access the public one (Sadiqi, 2003; Killian, 2006). The inequalities in the Maghreb extend to the linguistic realm. Women are "more easily interrupted and silenced in the family and in society" (Sadiqi, 2003, p. 63) and are not permitted to use certain taboo words, while boys are (Sadiqi, 2003, p. 84), another form of 'silencing.' In order to break from a place of 'silencing' women may choose to use French more than men as a way of having a

voice that is not so easily ignored. Women use language in order to gain respect, especially if they are denied it in other capacities (Bassiouney, 2009), which is what can occur in the Maghreb.

Gill (1999) discusses language in the Maghreb and the different connotations of French and Arabic for women. She found that Maghrebi mothers encourage their daughters to be bilingual in French and to get an education so that they can "evade the harshness of their own or of their mothers' life experience" (Gill, 1999, p. 130). French is the primary language of higher education in the Maghreb, and thus is seen as the gatekeeper of a better life. It is "the language of access to a 'public' life as opposed to a housebound existence in the service of the family" (Gill, 1999, p. 130). It is not uncommon for mothers to adopt prestige forms for the sake of giving their children more opportunities (Romaine, 2003). Beyond speaking French for oneself, marrying a French bilingual man in the Maghreb is perceived as meaning that he will be more open-minded and that women will not have to live the "old harsh, secluded lifestyle" (Gill, 1999, p. 130). Similarly, the women in Gal's (1978a) study advised their daughters not to marry Hungarian-speaking peasants, so that they could have a better life with a German-speaking worker. While for both men and women French is a way to access education, for women it is also a way to access life outside of the home sphere, which is where women are largely relegated in North African society (Killian, 2006). Women can use code choice in order to attain power and assert their identity (Bassiouney, 2009). Eid (2002) studied the use of SA and colloquial Arabic in the writing of female Egyptian authors and found that some women used a fusion of SA and colloquial Arabic in order to "distance themselves from the predominant, accepted traditional (male) discourse" (p. 204). However, one impediment to departing from these traditional roles may be stigmatization by other group members (Romaine, 2003).

The phenomenon of using language choice as a tool for gaining access to public life, and rejecting traditional roles is likely to be all the more potent for women who have immigrated to less a traditional society. Women who emigrate from the majority Muslim countries of North Africa to France are exposed to a culture where men and women have the same rights in the public sphere, and where the children of emigrants from the Maghreb have more freedom and independence (Ennaji, 2010). There is evidence that suggests that women in the Maghrebi diaspora in France may feel reluctant to acquiesce to the expectations of traditional North African Islamic society in the face of French society, which is secular and presents more material freedoms for women. Hargreaves (1995) describes it as a "deep reluctance" to accept traditional gender roles.

Billiez (1985) examines the difference in language behavior between third-generation immigrants in France from the Iberian Peninsula and from Algeria. She found that the Algerian girls used Arabic exclusively with their mothers, but at no other time, while the men used it much more broadly (supported by Ziamari, 2009). This may be because they do not want to use Arabic as a signifier in public, but would rather be seen as part of French society. One of the Algerian girls in the study reports that she intentionally uses French, not Arabic, when she visits Algeria with her family, as a way of rejecting the cultural tradition. This, combined with comments about not being able to go out in Algeria, but being anxious to do so immediately upon returning to France, indicates that these girls may be rejecting a tradition that is restrictive to women, by rejecting the language of that tradition. Similar attitudes were not found among the Portuguese or Spanish female participants. Mohamed El Manar Laalami's (2000) survey of Moroccans residing in France on their feelings of integration, found that 82.9% of women felt quite integrated compared to 67.1% of men (cited in Ennaji, 2010, p. 14). Furthermore, according to the Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques (INED)

women emigrants from the Maghreb were abandoning their native language faster than men (among men and women who had been in France the same amount of time) (Gill, 1999).

Women choose to use one code over another not only to access status and respect, but also because of how speaking in that language "feels" and the access it gives women to experience other identities. Koven (2007) studied second-generation Portuguese women in France, and found that they reported feeling more free in France and described how they were expected to be more socially conservative in terms of clothing and relationships with men when they visit Portugal. The participants described how they felt like a "different person" depending on whether they were speaking French or Portuguese. Speaking French allowed them to tap into another part of themselves. Language choice can affect or bring out different aspects of personality, as seen in responses to questionnaires and interviews, including level of ethnic affirmation (Edwards, 2009). Given the inseparability of language and identity (Joseph, 2004, p. 11) it is not surprising that a bilingual should feel different in their different languages.

> It has been pointed out that a speaker's choice of code in a particular situation is part of that speaker's linguistic presentation of self. The speaker makes the choice as part of a verbal strategy to identify herself or himself with the social categories and activities the code symbolizes…. because codes (in this case languages) are associated with social statuses and activities, changes in language choice can be used by speakers to symbolize changes in their own social status or in their attitudes towards the activities the languages symbolize. (Gal, 1978a, p. 4)

A young woman of North African descent living in France may feel more liberated when speaking French, and more constrained by traditional gender expectations when speaking in Arabic, which may affect language attitudes. Women's language attitudes toward

French in the North African diaspora may be overall more positive than their male counterparts because of an association of the language with French society, which offers them more opportunities than North African society. Group membership does not equal high group regard (Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner and Fillenbaum, 1960), there, just because women belong to the North African diaspora does not necessitate them having positive attitudes towards that group and its language. Despite the fact that a gender comparison was eliminated in this study, it is still important to understand how women express their identity via language given that the majority of participants in this study turned out to be women.

2.1.7 Language Attitudes Studies

Language attitudes research developed as a field of inquiry within sociolinguistics in the 1960s, focusing primarily on the linguistic situations found in Québec and in Wales, and on language revitalization and language policy. In the ensuing decades, language attitudes have been studied under the umbrella of the sociology of language and social psychology. There have also been similar studies done within perceptual dialectology; however, this field is more concerned with how participants classify various accents in terms of ethnicity or correctness. Their methodology may limit their questionnaire to two questions, rating level of correctness and level of pleasantness for multiple dialects (Alfaraz, 2002), or involve drawing dialect maps (Evans, 2002); whereas, language attitudes studies done within sociolinguistics or sociology of language usually have extensive questionnaires exploring more than pleasantness and correctness of an accent/language (e.g. Baker, 1992; Chakrani, 2010). In this dissertation, I focus on

reviewing language attitude studies from the fields of sociolinguistics and the sociology of language.

In the past few decades the language attitude research has expanded and now language attitudes are studied in many parts of the world, in particular countries once under colonial rule that have experienced the upheaval of independence and its linguistic consequences. Countries such as those in the Maghreb have seen language policy change in this transition, and thus linguists have explored how this change has affected language attitudes (Bentahila, 1983; Marley, 2004; Chakrani, 2010). Other countries in the post-colonial era, particularly sub-Saharan African countries, have used language attitude surveys in order to help decide what the new national language should be (Ferguson, 1975). Below, I review the language attitudes literature in the Maghreb, in France, and in two diaspora contexts.

2.1.7.1 Attitudes in the Maghreb

In order to understand the language attitudes of French individuals whose parents come from the Maghreb, it is first necessary to review the language attitudes held in those countries of origin. This will provide a context and background for the attitudes of participants in France, and for what the attitudes of their parents may have been before arriving in France. Because this dissertation does not explore attitudes toward Berber, this section will focus primarily on attitudes toward French and Arabic in the diaspora, although attitudes toward Berber will be noted when possible. Bentahila (1983) explores the language attitudes and reported language use in Morocco toward Classical Arabic (for our purposes Standard Arabic), Moroccan Arabic (or Darija) and French, in order to ascertain the linguistic situation roughly thirty years after independence.[12] In particular,

[12] His investigation did not include attitudes toward Berber.

he is interested in the effects of Arabization, and the resulting attitudes toward both a bilingual French/SA educational and government system and a monolingual SA system. Bentahila's widely cited study gives a thorough understanding of usage, attitudes, and the roles that each language plays in the home, school, work and public life of Moroccans.

Bentahila's (1983) participants view SA as the richest and most beautiful language, strongly associating it with Islam, Arab identity, and patriotism, and seeing it as the language that Moroccans ought to use above all others. SA is considered *religious* and pure while Darija is viewed as ignorant, not surprising given that it is largely an unwritten language and only recently has a Moroccan Arabic dictionary been written. French is deemed the language that is the most *practical*, *modern*, *useful* for studies, and able to keep up with the modern world. Again, this is to be expected given the role in government and education French played while Morocco was a French protectorate and its continuing role in higher education. Attitudes toward code switching were overwhelmingly negative, inciting feelings of pity and disgrace and evoking lack of identity, lack of confidence and lack of pride in nationality. Bentahila concludes that the overall feeling of Moroccans is that "each language has its own value and that each serves a useful purpose" (p. 35).

For language choice based on topic, Bentahila's participants chose French more for scientific and technical subjects, while they chose Darija for domestic and everyday ones. Interestingly, they also chose Darija slightly more for religious topics than SA, and chose both much more than French, indicating that the prestige that SA carries as the language of religion may be transferrable to the colloquial varieties. He also found that Darija is used almost exclusively in the home domain. This is to be expected because SA is a learned language that is not acquired naturally at home. The author ultimately concludes that Moroccans are both bilingual and bi-cultural. Gill (1999) supports this,

arguing that what has emerged is a sense of split loyalties. Bentahila (183) argues that for Moroccans, French and Arabic each represent a distinct culture with very little overlap. French is the language of France, modernity, education etc., while Arabic is the language of tradition, the home and everyday life. France represents status, while Arabic represents solidarity.

Because of rapidly changing politics and ideologies, attitudinal studies are likely to become outdated after twenty or thirty years (Davies & Bentahila, 2013). Chakrani (2010; 2013) updated Bentahila's work by doing a language attitudes study in Morocco more recently. He argues that today in Morocco there is no longer a clear status/solidarity divide between French and Arabic, as found in Bentahila (1983). Chakrani's findings indicate that French has begun to index solidarity, as has SA, and that Darija has growing status. All three languages are essentially competing for both status and solidarity, with no significant difference between SA and Darija for status traits. This indicates that Darija, once viewed as very low for status items, is gaining prestige, implying that there may be a transfer of the language ideology associated with SA to Darija. Chakrani also found that Darija was rated significantly higher for *modest* and *religious*, traits usually associated with SA because of its history with Islam. However, he concludes that the overall negative attitudes toward Darija found in Bentahila (1983) remain unchanged. When it comes to Berber, he found that it is used more often by the lower class than the upper class, and the increasing use of French in the home is having a negative impact on Berber, as well as Darija.

French was rated as more *open-minded* than SA or Darija. Chakrani (2010) explains that this is because, in Morocco, French is a gateway to modernity and other

cultures.[13] However, he does not explore what this inversely implies about attitudes toward SA and Darija as languages that are not *open-minded*, and why this might be the case. He further gives very little attention to the trait *religious*, which may in fact be connected to attitudes of open and close-mindedness. He notes that French and Darija are ranked as being more religious than SA, a surprising result, but does not explore it further. He is more concerned with the correlation between attitudes, reported language use and socioeconomic status (SES) (for a deeper analysis of this see Chakrani, 2013), and the state of diglossia in the Maghreb. He does touch on the association between patriotism and local identity noting, "Moroccans see in the desire to use [SA] in the home domain, the ability to instill moral values, given that the home and family represent the nucleus of Moroccan society" (p. 148). He does not, however, explore why SA is associated with moral values. In his follow up analysis (Chakrani, 2013), he again reinforces the association of modernity and open-mindedness with French, but is focused on the ideology of modernity as a new form of linguistic imperialism.

Benrabah (2007) examined language attitudes in Algeria for the purpose of understanding the effects of a staunch Arabization policy since Algeria's independence. He argues that, as feared in the 1960s, Arabization has only entrenched the modern/traditional dichotomy between French and Arabic. He studied adolescents ages 14 to 20, and found that SA was largely associated with sacredness, religion, values, richness, and closeness to God. French was associated with action, development, utility, liberation, and modernity, with 91.5% of participants choosing French as "the language which allows openness to the world" (Benrabah, 2007, p. 239). French was

[13] It is important to note that English has also gained prestige as a language associated with modernity and a cosmopolitan lifestyle. In Marley's (2004) study in Morocco, 67.8% of participants completely agreed that English is more useful in the world than French. Chakrani (2011) writes that English has begun to "dominate in media, entertainment, and the business sectors" (p. 169) in Morocco, and, together with French, gives "exclusive" access to a modern lifestyle (p. 172).

predominately associated with science and technology, and interestingly, was the language used most for courting and saying, "I love you." He argues that French is allowed to "transgress" language taboos, which cannot be spoken in Arabic, such as expressing emotions of love in a dating context.[14] One particularly notable finding was that the girls chose French as the most beautiful language significantly more than boys did, with boys choosing SA. According to him, this is due to a difference between choosing overt versus covert prestige, the latter based on national and/or local group solidarity and an association of Arabic with masculinity. He also investigated attitudes toward Berber, and found that 2.2% selected it as *the language that I like the most*, 1.3% selected it as the *richest* language, 1.7% chose it as the most *beautiful* language and 1.4% selected it as the most *useful* language. This indicates overall negative attitudes toward Berber, not surprising given the fact that the Berber community has largely been discriminated against in Algeria. It also might indicate that the population Benrabah examined did not come from Berber families.

We should expect the language attitudes in Tunisia to be somewhat different than in Morocco or Algeria because of the different history of colonialism and reaction to independence. Tunisia experienced far less conflict during the process of independence, and has been less tumultuous in the years since. For this reason, there has been less interest in terms of studying language attitudes, although may change in the wake of the Arab Spring. Walters (2003) suggests that Tunisia may be in a semi-postdiglossic situation because Tunisian Arabic varieties are taking on the H language role. Significantly fewer of the Maghrebi immigrants in France come from Tunisia than come from Algeria or Morocco (Tribalat, 1995). This makes those countries of higher interest

[14] It is not uncommon for speakers to use other languages or to code-switch in order to avoid cultural taboos.

in terms of establishing language attitudes for the purposes of this study, since the participants will mostly be of Moroccan and Algerian descent. For this reason, we will leave our discussion of language attitudes of the Maghreb and move on to a discussion of attitudes in France.

2.1.7.2 Attitudes in France

Numerous studies have examined the language use of second and third generation Maghrebi immigrants in France, mostly focusing on sociophonetic features. Several linguistic phenomena are associated with this population, including palatalization and affrication (Jamin et al., 2006), use of non-standard lexical items (Goudaillier, 1997), and shifting stress (Fagyal, 2004). Some of these traits are correlated with integration in 'street culture' (although affrication may be occurring on a more wide spread scale). Research has also been done on code switching among Moroccan Arabic-French bilinguals in France and Morocco, focusing primarily on syntactic structure (Bentahila and Davies, 1983; Nortier 1995; Sefiani, 2003; Ziamari, 2009).

Although a few studies have explored language attitudes, this has been done almost exclusively from the point of view of ethnic majority views in France, particularly in Paris (Paltridge and Giles, 1984; Oakes, 2001; Kuiper, 2005). This was done at first to assess the attitudes of those who speak the prestige variety, Parisian French, toward the low prestige regional varieties. As those regional varieties have largely leveled, the research has switched toward examining the attitudes of ethnic majority French speakers toward the French of ethnic minorities, by and large of Maghrebi origin (Stewart, 2012). The study of the language attitudes of North Africans in France toward French and Arabic has been largely left untouched. Those studies that do touch on this topic have done so incidentally while pursuing other aims, or have discussed attitudes qualitatively

without any data to back up their claims. They indicate that, in France, French symbolizes modernity while Arabic is associated with Islamic-Arab identity (Gill, 1999). This is, in part, because of language attitudes in the Maghreb where French, as the colonizing language, has been the language of higher education. French is also a symbol of membership to a higher socio-economic status in France and is more prestigious than Arabic, which is associated with tradition because of its historical relationship to Islam and to Arab nationalism, as well as its position as the language of the colonized and the language of immigrants. Although there is overtly a modern/traditional and high SES/low SES divide between French and Arabic, there is evidence suggesting that the covert prestige for Arabic in the diaspora may be quite strong.

Billiez (1985) compared observational and interview data of third-generation Iberian and Algerian immigrants in France and found that the Iberian group did not use Spanish/Portuguese outside of their Iberian network, while the Algerians frequently used Arabic in the public sphere. The Algerians viewed it as a marker of identity and a kind of secret code. Similarly, Abu-Haidar (1994) found that Algerian immigrants in France have a strong language loyalty toward Arabic, not because of its use as a means of communication but because it "has come to symbolize both communal allegiance and ethnocultural pride" (p. 54). El Aissati (1996) also found Arabic to have symbolic value for the Arab diaspora in the Netherlands, juxtaposed with Dutch, which was seen as embodying the values of Dutch society. Gill (1999) argues that language choice for the young Maghrebi diaspora is based on economic need for jobs, necessitating speaking French, as well as on their rapport with the Maghrebi-Islamic culture of their parents. Wernitz (1993, cited in Boumans and de Ruiter, 2002), used a questionnaire on language use and in-person interviews with first-generation male Moroccan immigrants to France who were pursuing higher education. She found that they viewed SA as the most

beautiful language and that their language choice between Darija and French depended on whether they wanted to express ethnic solidarity or present themselves as academically minded. Boumans and de Ruiter (2002) conclude that second-generation Moroccans most often speak Arabic at home with their parents, as well as when returning to Morocco. The language is "restricted to private and intimate situations" (p. 269). This contradicts Billiez's findings about use of Arabic as an identity marker outside of the Arabic community. It is possible that this disparity in results is due to the passing of time, but it also may be due to the use of different methods for reaching these conclusions. Regardless, further research is needed in order to understand how and where the Maghrebi diaspora youth are using Arabic.

Mohamed (2003) studied language and identity among young Maghrebis under the age of 17 living in France focusing on the effects that taking an Arabic course has on their social and psychological well-being.[15] He examined the attitudes of students, as well as Arabic teachers and social workers, in order to understand the children's place in the system. He used questionnaires and interviews to determine if there is a difference in identity and attitude between students who are taking a Standard Arabic course and those who are not. He argues that a sort of biculturalism/bilingualism, and a reinforcement of their culture of origin, will have positive effects on this marginalized population. Many of the questions that he investigates have to do with the social and family life of the children and parents, although he does touch on some questions of attitudes toward Arabic, Islam and the Maghreb.

Mohamed found that SA learners had more positive attitudes toward Arabic, their culture of origin and themselves and were more likely to make reference to their North

[15] Although published in 2003, the data from his book comes from research done from 1990 to 1993.

African identity. They see Arabic as an identity marker, which carries symbolic value, and as a carrier of the civilization and culture of the Maghreb and of Islam. Many chose to study it in order to read the Qur'an and know Islam. The boys in particular made comments about how Arabs should know it, such as, "un Arabe se doit absolument de la posséder" ("an Arab absolutely has a duty to posses it") or "c'est honteux de ne pas parler l'arabe quand on est fils d'arabe" ("it is shameful not to speak Arabic when one is an Arab son") (Mohamed, 2003, p. 97). He found that the young girls were the most distant and separated from their roots, and that attitudes toward Arabic depend on the family's attitudes toward Arabic and Maghrebi culture, and how often they go back to North Africa.[16]

Mohamed (2003) concludes that learning SA will help students with North African roots to do better in school, identify more strongly with their heritage, and have better social and psychological well-being; however, he does not take into account that the SA learners may be a self-selected group of individuals who began with positive attitudes toward Islam and SA and a strong Maghrebi identity, which then led them to pursue SA classes. His claim of causality is not well supported by the evidence he provides. There were further troubling, but not uncommon, problems with this study. For the most part, the author does not distinguish between SA and Darija, referring generally to "Arabic" in his study. At one point he acknowledges that they speak Darija but insists that SA is their "langue d'origine," impossible considering that SA is not learned as a first language by anyone. He further claims that the parents, first generation immigrants, do not speak "perfect Arabic" (p. 98) presumably because he views the dialect as inherently imperfect. It does not seem that he can assess these individuals' attitudes

[16] This contradicts an earlier statement he made that girls practice Islam more actively than boys. It is not clear to what this contradiction is due, possibly methodological problems.

toward Arabic and its connection to North African identity if he does not acknowledge dialectal Arabic as a language in its own right, and its place in their life and country of origin. Another major problem with his study is methodological. It is unclear what the materials were that he used to assess their attitudes. Sometimes he provides the question along with the participants' responses, but often he does not. He conducted in-person interviews and had some pen and paper tasks to make social and psychological assessments. It is not evident whether the language attitude questions were in an interview format or in a written questionnaire, and in what language these were conducted. The research was done by Mohamed, himself a first-generation immigrant from the Maghreb, which may have had a significant effect on how the participants responded. It is likely that these students would answer in such a way as to acquiesce to what they thought were appropriate answers given their interlocutor. The questions were also not scalar, which prevented any nuance in their responses.

Although Mohamed touches on many of the themes explored in this dissertation, he does not approach them systematically. He is also not working from a language attitudes framework. He is, in fact, approaching the topic from the vantage point of a social psychologist who is ultimately trying to determine whether bilingualism for young Maghrebis will have positive or negative effects in their education and social life due to psychosocial benefits, as opposed to cognitive ones. Furthermore, Mohamed's participants are under 18 and he does not explore their attitudes toward French or dialectal Arabic, restricting his analysis to SA, two major differences between his study and this dissertation. The data from his study was also collected in the early 1990s, and is no longer representative of second-generation young adults of Maghrebi origin living in France. As Davies and Bentahila (2013) point out, attitudinal studies need to be redone every twenty to thirty years because of quickly changing political cultural contexts.

2.1.7.3 Attitudes in the Diaspora

In order to understand attitudes in the Maghrebi diaspora, it is necessary first to explore how diaspora language attitudes work more broadly. Recent work in language attitudes has explored attitudes amongst diaspora groups and suggests that there may be a unique diasporic lens through which diaspora members view the language of their heritage. Here, I review a small sampling of this diasporic language attitude literature, focusing on the well-established language attitudes research groups in Wales, although there are other studies that look at the attitudes of immigrant communities (e.g. Slavik, 2001; Yagmur & Akinci, 2003). Coupland et al. (2006) used a questionnaire to study the language attitudes of North Americans of Welsh descent as well as those living in Wales and England with different migratory backgrounds (i.e., those who left Wales but returned, or those who recently moved to Wales from England etc.). In total they examined six different demographic flow groups. Their goal was to explore Wales and Welsh ethnolinguistics on a fine-grained level, specifically concerning globalization, flow, and migration, in order to improve understanding of social tensions within and outside of Wales. Their main finding was that there seems to be a specific diasporic lens through which the Welsh diaspora[17] in North America views their homeland and culture, and a "desire to affiliate more closely with Wales" (Coupland et al., 2006, p. 369) that is similar to the Welsh-born participants who had remained in Wales. Furthermore, those who left Wales and then returned later in life had the highest engagement with Welsh: "Movement out of Wales seems to have galvanised their ethnolinguistic feelings and stance" (Coupland et al., 2006, p. 370). Their research demonstrates that the group that is

[17] The authors use the term "diaspora" to describe the Welsh communities in North and South America. It is not clear why they choose to refer to them as a diaspora group rather than as immigrants. It may be because large numbers of Welsh settled in the communities that the authors studied as opposed to being scattered throughout the two countries. Regardless, in my discussion of their research, I repeat their terminology.

often studied and thought to have a monopoly on ethnolinguistic affiliation, those still living in the homeland, "[does] not always represent the highest values of Welsh ethnolinguistic identification" (Coupland et al., 2006, p. 371). Members of an ethnolinguistic group may have different attitudes, or degree of attitude, depending on where they live and the history of how they got there.

Garrett et al. (2009) expanded their study to include the Welsh diaspora in Patagonia with a different history of migration than the North American diaspora in order to investigate the nuances and effects of different diasporic experiences and histories on ethnolinguistic vitality and language attitudes. The Welsh who went to Patagonia claim to have done so because those who had gone to North America had "lost" their language, and religious and cultural values. The Patagonian group did not want to have to integrate in this way. Using the same methodology, they again found that the diasporic groups, particularly those in Patagonia, had higher perceived vitalities than those in Wales and identified with Welshness more than with the country itself. The two diasporic groups were more committed to supporting the Welsh language than the Wales group. The authors write, "the fact that commitment to a minority language is stronger 'abroad' than 'at home' indicates a particular lens through which language and cultural distinctiveness is viewed 'from afar.' The Welsh diasporic lens intensifies the image of Welsh and its attraction" (Garrett et al., 2009, p. 187). In both the 2006 and 2009 studies, the authors found that one of the factors of language attitudes was the ceremonial importance of Welsh. Interestingly for the Patagonia group, a religious thread emerged that did not emerge in the other two locales, indicating that not every diasporic group will have the same attitudes, or the same degree of attitudes, even for diaspora groups who speak the same language and come from the same culture. Attitudes vary depending on the motivation for migration and the history of their community.

Lasagabaster (2008) explored the language attitudes of adults of Basque origin (from Spain and France) living in the United States. He found, when comparing this data to his previous language attitudes study of people living in the Basque Country (Lasagabaster & Huguet, 2007), that the diasporic group had slightly more positive attitudes toward Basque. He argues that there seems to be a connection between positive language attitudes and being a diaspora minority language speaker and that this needs to be explored further. He notes that linguistic diversity has not gotten sufficient attention in the diaspora literature even though "ethnic groups have maintained their ethnicity and ties to their homeland, their own language(s) playing a key role in many cases" (p. 69). This supports the theory that there is a "diasporic lens" whereby these speakers have more positive attitudes toward the language of their country of origin than speakers in the homeland. Lasagabaster also found that low socio-economic status (SES) and links to the homeland play roles in the formation of positive attitudes in the diaspora. Most of the population of North African immigrants in France belongs to a lower SES (Hargreaves, 1990; Begag, 2007), indicating that there will generally be positive language attitudes toward Arabic and North African culture.

These studies demonstrate the tendency that diaspora groups have to identify strongly with their country of origin both linguistically and culturally, which may translate into a strong sense of national identity with the country of origin. Garrett et al. (2003) writes that "language is often…more than just a 'characteristic of' or 'a quality of' a community. It is able to enshrine what is distinctive in the community, or, we might even say, constitutes that community" (p. 12). Positive attitudes toward a language may become a defining aspect of a community with strong links to national identity, religion and cultural norms. It becomes necessary, therefore, to understand the specific

relationship between the language(s) in question, and the religion and national identity of the community, which is the task of the following two sections.

2.2 Language and Religion

There are relatively few studies in the field of sociolinguistics that explicitly explore the relationship between linguistic variation and religion. Yaeger-Dror (2014) points out that most studies that look at religion do so as a subset of ethnicity and do not single it out as worthy of attention as a sociolinguistic variable. It is often ignored with researchers focusing on SES or region instead. This can be seen in language attitudes studies such as Chakrani (2010) or Bentahila (1983), where the results reveal that religion is influencing language attitudes and choice, but there is no direct exploration of the matter. Although sociolinguistics has largely neglected religion, in the related field of the sociology of language, the last decade has seen an emerging interest in religion, led by the preeminent scholar on the subject, Joshua Fishman. Although many of the goals of the sociology of language differ from the goals of sociolinguists, namely looking at the role of language in society at large, rather than on the individual level of language variation, much can be gained by studying the former.

The basis of the sociology of language and religion is the fact that most religions have a language with which they are associated (Omoniyi & Fishman, 2006), and which may be an important indicator of religious identity (Rajah-Carrim, 2010). Oftentimes the language associated with a religion can change from country to country, although different religions are more or less flexible on this count (Spolsky, 2010). The importance of both as markers of identity (Edwards, 2009) makes religion an ideal variable to study in sociolinguistics and in language attitudes research. This is even more so given that

degree of orthodoxy and level of commitment to religion is correlated with linguistic choices (Yaeger-Dror, 2014) and linguistic variation (Baker-Smemoe and Bowie, 2015). Discussing variables in sociolinguistics, Bassiouney argues that religion is important in language variation and change only because it creates a close-knit community and unites its members (Bassiouney, 2009). Although this is true, it leaves out the importance that religion holds for many people beyond the community, at the individual level, for which language can act as a symbol.

The choice of the language used to express a particular religion is determined by the ideology of the religious community and the power of the language in that community (Pandharipande, 2006). Language ideologies refer to "the belief system that is prevalent in a specific community about language and language use" (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 201), and help to rationalize choosing the language to express that religion (Pandharipande, 2006), however subconsciously. If the language ideology includes a belief that there is one language that can best express a religion, then that language will gain significant importance in the community and the attitudes toward that language will also improve (Gafaranga, 2010). Thus, language attitudes will often carry the values of a community, and are associated with religiosity (Dragojevic et al., 2013). Once a language has been established as the language best suited to represent and express a religion, that language may then continue to hold prestige and loyalty because of its relationship to the religion. Indeed, once a language comes to be associated with a religion, it is very difficult for it to become disassociated (Safran, 2008).

Religious affiliation can be an important aspect of language maintenance in a minority language community (Baker, 1992). Dzialtuvaite (2006) found, for example, that for the Lithuanian diaspora in Scotland, religion played a strong role in maintaining Lithuanian identity and the Lithuanian language. The Amish community in America,

particularly in Pennsylvania, has managed to maintain German, even though it has gone far beyond the standard three generations in which language shift usually occurs for a diaspora group (Moelleken, 1983). This is also a community that is no longer receiving new immigrants from Germany and yet is producing new generations of native German speakers. Maintenance of German is strongly associated with the religious commitment of the community.

2.2.1 Arabic and Islam

The three major monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam have all had, to differing degrees, a language that was at one point strongly associated with the religion; however, none has had such a strong ideology and one to one association between language and religion as has Islam. For centuries, the Catholic Church insisted on the primacy of Latin both in the delivery of sermons and in the language in which the Bible was written. There was a strong and persistent ideology that Latin was the only language suited to communicate the Catholic Christian faith.[18] This was the case until the Council of Tours (813), which permitted priests to conduct their sermons in the local vernacular because there was a growing problem of parishioners no longer understanding Latin (Judge, 2007). During the Protestant Reformation (16th century), Bibles and religious pamphlets began to be printed in vernacular languages as well (Safran, 2008). Although Catholic masses were still performed in Latin until Vatican II (1962-65), the power of Latin as the primary language of the Catholic faith ended in the 16th century. Similarly, Judaism has long been associated with Hebrew, which was the sacred language of the religion and the religion in which the holy book, the Torah, was written. Despite the long historical association between the two, Judaism has had a long-established

[18] Latin was not, however, the primary language of liturgy for the Orthodox churches.

tolerance for multilingualism, with Yiddish taking on some sacred attributes in the 20th century (Spolsky, 2010).

The only one of the three monotheistic religions that has not changed its stance on the language that may be used in religious services is Islam, still requiring Arabic for religious services and for prayer. Pandharipande (2006), in his study of religious languages in Mauritius, found that while religions such as Buddhism and Christianity recognized new south Asian languages as codes for their religions, Islam did not. This highlights the fact that Islam stands apart from other religions in its belief and commitment to Arabic as the only appropriate language for the expression of Islam and the Qur'an. Spolsky (2010) writes that some religions are indeed less flexible in terms of their religious code, citing Islam and Arabic as an example. There is a uniquely strong relationship between the Arabic language, in particular Standard Arabic, and Islam, because of a language ideology that goes back centuries. Arabic is especially important and prestigious because it is the language of the Qur'an, the Islamic holy book, and the Hadith, the words purportedly spoken by the Prophet Mohammed (Suleiman, 2003). Both of these texts refer to Arabic as the language of heaven, the language chosen by God and the language of the Arabs (Suleiman, 2003). The entry for the Qur'an in the Concise Encyclopedia of Islam says:

> The substance of the Koran is completely wedded to its Arabic form. Because the Koran is what is called in Sanskrit *shruti* ("primary revelation" or God Himself speaking) – unlike much of the New Testament which is *smriti* ("secondary revelation") – and because of the nature of Arabic as a sacred language, a language capable of transmitting *shruti*, it is completely impossible to translate the Koran in its reality into another language. Translations are therefore unusable for ritual and liturgical purposes. The sound itself, of inimitable sonority and rhythmic power, is numinous and sacramental. (Glassé 2001, p. 267)

Thus, it is believed that there is something intrinsic in the language itself, which is uniquely and supernaturally capable of communicating the message of Islam. Religious services must be conducted in SA, which is, in part, why it is so widely maintained (Spolsky, 2010), as is the need to use Standard Arabic to fulfill one of the five pillars of Islam, prayer (Rouchdy, 2002). It is also the language in which the Prophet himself spoke. Thus, language, just like Mohammed's other life practices, are enshrined and emulated in the observing of the Islamic faith.

The fact that Standard Arabic has deep roots in the history of Islam helps to maintain the myth of the language and the strong ideology associated with it. The Prophet Mohammed specifically directed his people to learn Arabic (Suleiman, 2003). Indeed, throughout the Arabic intellectual tradition, theologians and historians have argued for the superiority of Arabic and its equivalency to being an Arab and to loving God and the Prophet. It is believed that the Qur'an is the "ultimate 'standard' of the Arabic language" (Joseph, 2004: 194). Not knowing it, or speaking it 'imperfectly,' has historically been seen as disgraceful because it was thought of as religious deviation (Joseph, 2004). There is a strong ideology of the importance of Standard Arabic in the history of Islam and the language is extremely powerful in diglossic Arabic language communities.

Religion should be considered an important variable in language variation because it is an element of personal, community and cultural identity. This is particularly true for Muslim Arabs: "Religion may be regarded in the Arab world as an essential part of one's identity, perhaps more so than in the west" (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 126). The relationship between language and religion is strongest in languages that are tied to an

ethnic community (Safran, 2008), which is the case the Muslim Arab community.[19] If religion is in general an important factor in language variation it is even more so in the Muslim community. In the Arab world, unlike in the west, there is a view that one is born into the religion of one's family and community, and thus separating from one's religion is impossible (Sadiqi, 2003; Bassiouney, 2009). If it is impossible (or nearly so) to disengage from Islam, it follows that it will be difficult to disengage from a language with which it is strongly associated, if not in use than in ideology and attitude (Safran, 2008). Given that language ideology precedes language attitudes (Gafaranga, 2010; Garrett, 2010), the strength of the connection between Islam and Arabic and the strong language ideology that Arabic speakers and Muslims hold, makes it an ideal language to research in terms of language attitudes. It further indicates that attitudes toward Arabic will be strongly influenced by level of attachment to Islam. The important question raised is whether this remains the case in the Muslim Arab diaspora.

There are few quantitative studies that intentionally investigate the relationship between Islam and Arabic; however, there are several that have incidentally found a relationship between the two. Davies and Bentahila (1989) explored, via a survey, which language Moroccans claimed as their 'own language' and why. They found that many participants selected Arabic, whether they spoke it or not, because of its symbolic value as the language of Islam. In Bentahila's (1983) language attitudes survey, the adjective 'religious' was chosen more often to describe Moroccan Arabic and 'Classical Arabic' (SA) because, according to the author, of the "close association between Arabic and Islam" (p. 62). He also found in sentence completion tasks that participants were more likely to complete a sentence with reference to Islam and duty when the task was

[19] It is important to note that there are also Arab Christian communities in the Levant dating back centuries.

performed in Arabic (whether this was SA or Darija was not specified). These trends of sentences being completed with reference to duty in Arabic reflect "traditional Islamic philosophy" (Bentahila, 1983, p. 43). If, when speaking Arabic, religion and tradition come more easily to mind, it would not be surprising to find that people who were seeking a more modern and secular lifestyle would choose French over Arabic.

One question that arises is whether the dialectal varieties of Arabic can take on any of the religious connotations of Standard Arabic. According to Joseph (2004), Muslims can signal themselves as full group-members with knowledge of the Arabic of the Qur'an, but they can also do this with whichever language is deemed the most proper language associated with the religion. Given that many people in the North African diaspora will most likely have little knowledge of Standard Arabic, dialectal Arabic may have taken its place as the language of Islam for that community. According to Bassiouney (2009) most Arabs do not distinguish between Standard Arabic and colloquial Arabic:

> The complexity of the situation arises from the fact that the native speakers of Arabic do not distinguish between MSA and [Egyptian Arabic]. For them there is only one [Standard Arabic]…they also use the term 'Arabic' to refer to the standard language and the colloquials of different countries. (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 26)

Although linguists distinguish between colloquial varieties of Arabic and Standard Arabic, speakers of Arabic view the latter as a "larger entity" which unites them. Davies and Bentahila (2013) support this, arguing that, although Arabic can be considered a classic diglossic situation, most Moroccans use the term "Arabic" to refer to all varieties. According to them the colloquial and the Qur'anic varieties constitute the same language. Chakrani (2010) found that in Morocco, dialectal Arabic was rated significantly higher

than MSA (SA for our purposes) for 'modest,' 'sociable' and 'religious,' further indicating that there can be a transfer of religious connotation from standard to dialectal Arabic. Belazi's (1992) language attitudes study in Tunisia found that Darija was associated with religion significantly more than French, suggesting that SA does not hold a monopoly on connoting Islam as far as varieties of Arabic go.[20] However, in Algeria, SA was rated significantly higher than Algerian Arabic as the language in which participants feel close to God, and the language of religious and moral values (Benrabah, 2007).[21] As a religious language, SA is thought to be particularly suited to influencing the secular varieties, i.e. colloquial Arabic, because it is still the basis of secular literacy and thus has an even greater influence on secular varieties (Fishman, 2006). Further research is needed in order to fully understand whether the religious prestige of SA can transfer to colloquial varieties in the Arab diaspora, which is one of the aims of the current study.

It is important to note that, although English is not a language that is considered sacred, nor is it connected to Islam in its history or in its texts, it *is* a tool used in today's globalized Islam. It is a lingua franca across the world for the digital Muslim community, and, according to Olivier Roy, together with Arabic, is one of the two primary languages used on websites aimed at a virtual Muslim community (Religioscope, 2004). While Standard Arabic is most closely associated with Islam and is consider the language of that religion, English plays an important functional and communicative role, especially for those living in the diaspora who may not have enough knowledge of Arabic to permit them to interact online with other Muslims. Studying attitudes toward English was outside of the scope of the current project, but it should be noted that it plays a

[20] However, SA was not an option in this attitudes study.

[21] It is important to note that the Arabization process and the colonial history in Algeria differs from Morocco and Tunisia, which may explain differences in attitudes toward SA and the colloquial variety.

supranational role as a language in which one can communicate with other Muslims on a global scale.

2.3 Language and National Identity

In the past few centuries, particularly since the French Revolution, language has become a primary symbol for the establishment of a nation and national identity. The German romantics of the 19th century popularized the idea of one nation one language with Johann Herder's philosophy of linguistic nationalism, which is described as one "in which ancestral language and national continuity are intertwined" (Edwards, 2009, p. 208).[22] Herder went so far as to say that a nation cannot exist without a shared language (Dawisha, 2003). Johann Fichte, another German romantic, argued that the boundary of the nation is the language (Joseph, 2004). It has been argued more recently that, in terms of nationalist ideology, language is more important and worthy than territory (Fishman 1972). This is especially relevant when considering that Herder and Fichte were writing in a pre-globalized world. Today, with the prevalence of migration, diaspora communities participate in a national identity from afar, one that is not restricted by or to territorial sovereignty but is connected by a language and culture that can be carried across borders via the technologies now available. This is what Laguerre describes as the digital diaspora:

> An immigrant group or descendant of an immigrant population that uses [information technology] connectivity to participate in virtual networks of contacts for a variety of political, economic, social, religious, and communicational purposes that, for the most part, may concern either the homeland, the host land, or both, including its own trajectory abroad. (Laguerre, 2010, p. 50)

[22] Herder's work expressed and fostered a philosophy that was at its core racist; nevertheless, his ideas were highly influential in the 19th and 20th centuries.

In the globalized Internet age, diasporic members can participate in a community online where the common denominator is national identity of the home country, ethnic identity or the language of the home country. This is how the Basque diaspora's digital nationalism plays out on the web (Oiarzabal, 2010). The North African diaspora in France similarly uses online groups on Facebook such as 'Tunisien(e)s en France' or 'Communauté maghrébine marseillaise' to celebrate a national or ethnocultural identity, with posts often in Arabic instead of French.

Traditionally, there have been two primary conceptions of nationalism: French nationalism and German nationalism (Joseph, 2004). The former is based on the belief that a nation is formed out of a consenting alliance between the state and the individual; a pact entered into willingly by both parties. Ethnicity and language technically do not matter, therefore anyone can enter this pact. Because this form of nationalism is founded on a contract with the state, a state government is required in order for the nation to exist. It is important to note, however, that language has come to be an extremely important symbol of French national identity (Gordon, 1978; Oakes, 2001; Weil, 2010), moving closer toward the German model. German nationalism is based on a shared culture, ethnicity and language rather than a contract between the individual and the state (Dawisha, 2003). Being German was traditionally founded on having German lineage, German nationalism being one of the precursors for the Nazi obsession with Arian ethnicity. One was either born German or one was not. A German could not, according to this theory, cease to be German even if he or she relocated and claimed another nationality. For this reason, ethnic identity is often associated with or seen as tantamount to a sense of national identity in many countries.[23]

[23] Throughout this dissertation I use the term 'national identity' when referring to my participants' attitudes toward the Maghreb. This term should be seen to embody and relate to a sense of cultural and ethnic identity, given that the majority of Arab states are based on this German model of nationalism. It is

In general, a sense of nationalism comes from believing that a group of people all share and participate in something that is greater than their individual differences. Fishman defines nationalism as:

> …the organizationally heightened and elaborated beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of societies acting on behalf of their avowed ethnocultural self-interest…it is clear that for such societally organized goal activity to occur it is first necessary for populations to become convinced that they possess in common certain unique ethnocultural characteristics, and that these similarities, over and above local variations and subgroup differences, are of importance to them. (Fishman, 1972, p. 5)

People search for a cultural product that they can use to bind themselves together in the process of nation building (Suleiman, 2003). Nationalist identity "involves romanticised yearnings for a past" (Edwards, 2009, p. 201), therefore, this cultural product is most ideal if it is rooted in the past. Having a shared history provides a sense of belonging in a nation and legitimizes and authenticates it. Language is the most suitable for this purpose, as it has no exact point of beginning or birth; it has seemingly always been present. It has become an important 'myth' for modern nationalism and is often linked with the concept of a glorious past: "The purported continuity of the language [is] the authenticating device for finding, claiming, and utilizing one's inheritance" (Fishman, 1972, p. 45). For this reason language is often sanctified and there is an attempt to keep it 'pure' and unchanging. One finds language academies in many countries, most notably France, where the Académie Française 'protects' the French language. This can also be seen with the preservation of the Arabic used in the Qur'an, despite the development of various other dialects of spoken Arabic.

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important to note, however, that one can have a sense of ethnic identity without feeling a sense of national identity with a particular nation.

Most national identities traditionally developed from a sense of religious consciousness, based on a belief that one's country has been chosen by God to succeed and that linguistic claims are legitimized by the connection with that religion (Safran, 2008). For the past two centuries the emphasis has shifted from religion to language in building the nation or ethno-nation. This can be seen in the replacement of the state religion with the state language in France after the French Revolution. Safran (2008) notes, however, that not all nations have moved beyond religion as a foundation, citing Turkey and Poland as examples. Certainly manly Muslim majority countries could be added to that list given that "most Arab countries are by definition Islamic (the same clause in the Constitution commonly declares Islam the religion and Arabic the national language)" (Spolsky, 2010, p. 15), revealing how closely the two are related and the legitimizing force that that relationship lends to a claim of national sovereignty. If language and religion are "the cultural materials used to shape a national identity" (Safran, 2008, p. 187-88), how much stronger will this be with a language so closely tied to the religion in question, as is the case with Arabic and Islam? Religion and politics are deeply enmeshed in the Arab world where "political factors are essential…and may be intertwined with religions in most cases" (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 105). The history of Islam was grounded in political goals and nation building, and as the language of Islam, Arabic is firmly bound to patriotism in the Muslim world and is the language of the "nation of Islam" (Joseph, 2004, p. 197). Standard Arabic is still seen as the only suitable language for interpreting the message of the Qur'an and is held up by most Muslim majority states as the national language.

SA was a unifying force for nationalism in the Maghreb after independence from France. Fishman (1972) writes that assertion of a strong national identity is often used to overcome a lost and fragmented identity. Indeed, language as a marker of cultural and

national identity is more potent in the postcolonial world (Gill, 1999), where colonial powers often imposed their own language on the native inhabitants. This was the case with France's linguistic policies in the Maghreb. One finds that Arabic was and continues to be used as a unifying symbol of national and pan-Arab identity in North Africa (Bentahila, 1983) and is seen as more authentic than French (Gill, 1999). In his language attitudes study in Morocco, Bentahila (1983) found that sentence completion tasks done in Arabic, as opposed to French, more frequently produced responses that made reference to nationalism and Arab identity:

> *FRENCH: My duty in society is <u>to study hard</u>.*
> *ARABIC: My duty in society is <u>to be worthy of my country</u>*
> (Bentahila, 1983, p. 42, my underlining)

Approximately 60% of Moroccans chose SA as the language that Moroccans ought to use, while 27% chose Darija, indicating that dialectal Arabic can participate in national identity in an Islamic country even if SA still holds the monopoly on this image. Only 8.04% of participants chose French. Participants also preferred reading materials written in Arabic because of a similar sense of patriotism. Chakrani (2010) found that Moroccans considered SA and Darija more 'patriotic' than French, concluding, "French does not have a role in the construction of national identity" (p. 130). He also found that participants primarily completed the following phrase "It is important for a Moroccan to use _____," with Darija, SA and Berber. It is not surprising that North Africans would have a strong association between Arabic and patriotism given that French is the language of their former colonizer. It is expected that Arabic would symbolize independence and would invoke a sense of national identity. Bentahila and Chakrani did

their surveys nearly 30 years apart, and although some certain results have changed, there is still a clear association of Arabic with Moroccan national identity. Although the present study focuses on a different population, this data indicates that French will most likely not be associated with North African identity for a population with roots in the Maghreb.

Suleiman (2003) argues that language and nationalism is an area that needs to be explored more empirically in order to "investigate how linguistic behavior and nationalism as movement or action interact with each other in the Arabic-speaking world." (p. 228). He further argues that there is a need to study the language attitudes of Arabic-speakers in order to gain insight into the relationship between language and national identity. This is precisely what the present study aims to do.

2.3.1 Arabism

In Muslim majority countries both Islam and Arabic are strong building blocks for, and symbols of, national identity; however, the relationship between Arabic and nationalism goes beyond the borders of an individual country and extends to a sense of pan-Arab identity, or "Arab consciousness," that has existed for centuries and is rooted in the Arabic language and Islam (Dawisha, 2003). It is important to discuss the history of Arab identity and its political arm, Arab nationalism, in order to highlight the importance that Arabic has played, and continues to play, in the ethnic and national consciousness of many in the Arab world. This is particularly relevant for a discussion of Arab identity in the diaspora, where individuals may feel alienated from the receiving country and turn not only to the culture of their country of origin, but also to their ethnolinguistic identity in order to find a sense of belonging. For these reasons, it is important to explore the roots of pan-Arab identity as well as Arab nationalism.

Modern Arab nationalism began in the early 20th century, most notably with the Arab thinker Sati' Al-Husri (1882-1968), whose goal was to politically unite all Arabic speakers under one sovereign state. According to Al-Husri, Arab nationalism was akin to German nationalism in that, unlike French nationalism, it had nothing to do with forming a pact between citizen and state, and everything to do with ethnocultural and linguistic heritage (Dawisha, 2003). This goal of a politically unified Arab state was not initially shared in the Arab world, but by the 1920s and 30s there was a growing sense in the Arabic-speaking Middle East that "beyond their immediate locale, they also belonged to a wider Arab fraternity, an all-encompassing Arab nation, based on a foundation of common language, culture, and 'blood ties'" (Dawisha, 2003, p. 83), placing language at the center of pan-Arab sentiments. Ethnicity, while essential in all cultures and societies, is more intertwined with nationality in the Arab world (Bassiouney, 2009), and, in this case, language is closely tied to ethnicity.

Arab nationalism reached its zenith in the 1960s led by Egyptian president Abdel Nasser, in a movement that has popularly become known as Nasserism. Nasser thought that "national identity is predetermined and has nothing to do with free will," so that it did not matter if an Arab rejected this identity, he or she was still an Arab (Dawisha, 2003, p. 72). Although the Arab nationalist movement was secular and largely based on language rather than religion (Dawisha, 2003; Bassiouney, 2009), most of the Arab nations that the movement was seeking to unify were made up of Muslims. Arab nationalism as a political movement was abandoned largely because of the defeat of the Arab coalition in the 6 days war in 1967, but also because of the animosity and suspicion of Shia and Sunni Muslims.

There persists a strong sense of pan-Arabism (Rouchdy, 2002), not as a political goal, but as an ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic group. The Arab nation is now an

ideological entity (Bassiouney, 2009) rather than one with territorial goals. Following Dawisha (2003), Arabism and Arab nationalism are distinguished as follows:

> The nation thus defined is: *a human solidarity, whose members believe that they form a coherent cultural whole, and who manifest a strong desire for political separateness and sovereignty*. Applied to the Arab world, this definition goes beyond the linguistic, religious, historical, and emotional bonds that tie the Arabic-speaking people to each other. For the purpose of conceptual precision, this cultural uniformity would be termed Arabism. But Arabism with the added element of a strong desire (and preferably articulated demands) for political unity in a specified demarcated territory—that is what will be termed Arab nationalism. (Dawisha, 2003, p. 13)

Arabism, as opposed to the failed project of Nasserism, does not have the political goals of a unified state, but refers to a pan-Arab ethnocultural identification based on language, history and religion. I will use Arabism interchangeably with pan-Arab identity, neither of which should be mistaken with political Arab nationalism. It is important, however, to note that even if the political goals have vanished, the legacy of Arab nationalism may still influence political leaders in Muslim majority and Arab countries, resulting in the continued use of SA as their national language.

Nationalism can exist without the physical boundaries of a country as an "imagined community" of the people who belong to that group (Anderson, 1991/2006), especially for a diaspora. Because the Arab nationalism movement was based on the German form of nationalism, which does not necessitate a state, the Arab diaspora may easily have a sense of pan-Arabism, without explicit political intentions. Rouchdy (2002) calls SA a common denominator for the Arab diaspora and an expression of identity evoking what she calls the "defunct term of 'pan-Arab' identity" (p. 143). Although the

political movement has died, Arabic remains "the unifying factor for the Moroccan nation-state, the Arab Maghreb and the Arab World" (Faiq, 1999 p. 145).

Although there have not been any studies that have intentionally examined the links between Arabic and pan-Arab identity, there are several that have produced results that support the claim that such a link exists. When asked what language Moroccans ought to use, the majority of Bentahila's (1983) participants chose SA, with one respondent commenting that this is "because we are Moroccans and Arabs" and another referring to it as the language of the Arabs (p. 32). Not only does SA symbolize patriotic national sentiments, it also invokes a sense of belonging to the ethnocultural group 'Arab.' Similarly, one interviewee in Chakrani's (2010) study in Morocco told him that children must be taught SA to preserve their identity as Arabs, and Riahi's Tunisian participants stated that they preferred books and films in Arabic and accused those who did not of betraying their Arab identity (Riahi, 1970, as cited in Gill, 1999, p. 127), thus demonstrating the power of a language in carrying ethnic identity, and the strength of language attitudes and ideology.

Davies and Bentahila (1989), in a study in which they asked Moroccans to indicate the language that they feel is their "own language," found that many speakers "strongly identified with Arabic as a symbol of their religion and of unity both within Morocco and with the other Islamic Arabic-speaking countries" (p. 286). A Berber-Arabic bilingual speaker who cited Classical Arabic as his 'own language' said "as an Arab and a Muslim I consider Classical Arabic my own language even though I am originally a speaker of Berber" (p. 285). If these participants claim Arabic as their language because of its identification with a broader Arab and Islamic identity, then it would follow that someone who did not want to identify with that world might not

choose that language as their 'own language' and might also choose to use it less frequently.

2.4 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I began by providing an overview of language attitudes, their components, relationship to use, role in language maintenance and shift (focusing particularly on maintenance and shift in the Arab diaspora), and stability. I also discussed the role language plays as a transmitter of culture and values, and how women use language as an expression of identity, as a tool for gaining social advantage and status, and, sometimes, as a way of rejecting conservative culture and traditional gender roles. I reviewed the major language attitudes studies done in the Maghreb, France, and in diaspora communities. Contextualizing the attitudes in the Maghreb specifically will allow for a comparison of the attitudes there and in the diaspora in France, as well help to understand the attitudes of the participants' parents' generation. This was followed by a discussion of the relationship between language and religion, focusing specifically on the special relationship that Arabic and Islam have had since the 7th century. I also explored the link between language and nationalism, concentrating on the connection that Arabic has had with national identity and Arab nationalism. In the following chapter, I discuss French language ideology (both its history and its status today), language policy in the Maghreb both during and after the colonial period, and the history and current standing of the North African diaspora in France today.

3. French Ideology, Language Policy in the Maghreb, and the North African Diaspora in France

In order to understand properly the language attitudes of the North African diaspora in France, it is first necessary to contextualize the topic with a discussion of French language ideology, and the linguistic policies during the colonial era and post-independence. French has long been praised and defended as the ultimate language of beauty and reason, an ideology that began in the 16th century and that still endures today. During the Revolution, it stood as a symbol of allegiance to the state and a foreswearing of loyalty at the communal level. Today, it is seen as the vehicle of French culture and has become an important symbol for citizenship and the assimilation of immigrants. France's language ideology manifested itself in its use as a tool to control North Africans and subjugate their cultural attachments during the colonial era. The post-independence reaction to this was Arabization, an attempt to reassert the Arabic language. These colonial and post-independence language policies shaped the language attitudes of North Africans, attitudes that may have been carried over into the diaspora in France, where language continues to be used as a powerful assimilator.

It is further necessary to contextualize the North African diaspora in France by discussing the history of their migration, and what life is like for them there today in terms of jobs, housing, language, marriage, religion and social conditions. This will shed light on how they view France and the French language, and will provide background for the participant selection portion of my methodology. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first is devoted to understanding the relationship between the French language and French national identity and culture. The second focuses on the history and relationship between France and the Maghreb, including the language and education policies during the colonial era and in the years after independence. The third section

examines the North African diaspora in France, both its history and its current situation today.

3.1 FRENCH, CULTURE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

3.1.1 Defense & Standardization of French

The defense and praise of French goes back at least to the 16th century. Writers like Joachim Du Bellay, who wrote the *Défense et illustration de la Langue Française* (1549), argued for the inherent qualities of French and the need to further cultivate it. He defended French as worthy of being a literary language on the par with revered Latin texts, encouraging people to write in it instead of in Latin (Calvet, 1998). Henri Estienne, another 16th century French language protectionist, condemned Italian borrowings as traitorous, claiming that Italy was an exporter of vices and assassination, as evidenced by borrowed words such as *charlatan* and *assassin* (Cowling, 2007). These kinds of attacks were largely motivated by the economic strength of what is today northern Italy and the influx of loan words caused by trade with this area (Oakes, 2001). This economic threat caused a reactionary strengthening of French identity in the 16th century, which would be seen again in the second half of the 20th century in regards to English.

The early insistence on the inherent qualities of French led, in the next century, to the formation of a language academy, the *Académie Française*, by Cardinal Richelieu in 1635, who based it on its Italian counterpart. Its mission was to provide stability and durability for the language by establishing a dictionary and grammar, in an effort to arrest language change, which was viewed as a kind of corruption. The *Académie* was also created in order to bring prestige to France in comparison to other European countries (Lodge, 1993). In addition to writing dictionaries and grammars, the *Académie* also

edited and scrutinized the works of writers like Racine and Corneille because writing was seen as the ultimate form of language, and therefore had to be protected. Vaugelas directed the first dictionary published by the *Académie*, and in his *Remarques* (1647) insisted on *bon usage* in spoken French, arguing for one correct way to speak the language. He asserted that good usage was how the "sensible" part of the royal court spoke, but also included some people who lived in the same city as the king. His criticisms were aimed at the masses, particularly the speech of the people in Paris, which he stigmatized heavily, as well as regional varieties (Lodge, 1993). In order to experience any kind of upward mobility in France it was necessary to have *bon usage*. For this reason there was a proliferation of guides instructing people how to get rid of their "regionalisms" (Lodge, 1993).

By the end of the 18th century French had become the language of international diplomacy (Lodge, 1993) and was considered a universal language of Europe because of its ubiquity among the elite and the educated, and in the universities (Calvet, 1998). Authors continued to extol it for its "intrinsic" value. It became a symbol for the "enlightened" French culture and patrimony. Antoine de Rivarol famously wrote in the 18th century that "what is not clear is not French" in his essay *De l'universalité de la langue française* (1784), and asserted that French was a fundamentally human and reasonable language (Lodge, 1993, p. 185). His writings also have strong nationalist undertones, unsurprising at a time when the German Romantics were beginning to write about language and nationalism. These authors defended French as a proxy for defending France and French culture, a practice that would continue into the 21st century. The defense and standardization of French that occurred from the 16th to the 18th century was the beginning of the myth of French. In order to have a cohesive nation and a strong sense of nationalism people need a common myth, culture and history (Suleiman, 2003;

Joseph, 2004). Language in general, and French specifically, was ideal for this task. It was perfectly situated to be used as a unifying tool during the French Revolution, and its 'inherent' qualities would help to justify the French civilizing mission for centuries to come (Balibar, 1985).

3.1.2 The Revolution, Language and Laïcité

With the French Revolution (1789) came linguistic assimilation under the new political ideology of equality and democracy. The Revolution was focused on a unified and indivisible republic where *communitaurisme* was forbidden: no loyalty to sub-national communities or groups would be tolerated, whether it be loyalty to religion, region or language. In the French vision of nationalism, nationality was based on a pact that a citizen willingly entered into with the state. The Jacobins believed that people had the right to direct and equal access to the state. Anything that came between the two violated the fundamental principles of the Revolution and created inequality (Safran, 1991). It was for this reason that the state separated from the church and imposed *laïcité* (official secularism). In order to have equal access to the state and its laws, everyone also needed to speak the same language. Therefore linguistic differences were rejected in the name of formal equality (Oakes, 2011). This concept, universalism, proposed that equality can only be obtained if everyone is exactly the same. It is the opposite of multiculturalism where equality is gained via an acceptance of all differences.

Based on the philosophy of universalism there was a call for linguistic unification in the form of assimilation to the Parisian dialect. According to Abbé Grégoire's extensive linguistic survey in 1784 more than half of France spoke a language other than French as their first language (S. Judge, 2002). Linguistic unity was such a preoccupation that Robespierre declared language "problems" a public safety issue because certain

counter-revolutionary actions were associated with certain languages (Schiffman, 2002). He declared that all other languages in France needed to be eliminated because of their inherent danger (Oakes, 2001). The drive toward linguistic uniformity was motivated by a fear of regional uprising. Unifying the regions linguistically was a way to unify them politically. It was an attempt to shore up the nation and unify political power. The democratization of language, therefore, was not only about freedom and equality of access but also about suppression of the minority regional languages (Oakes, 2001).

In 1793, the *Comité du salut publique* was created and slowly took on dictatorial power. Bertrand Barère de Vieuzac, the spokesman, is noted for saying that certain languages were the languages of counter-revolutionary principles, while French was considered the only language capable of expressing revolutionary sentiments (Salhi & Jeanjean, 2002), and of upholding the ideals of clarity, purity and democracy. French, it was again claimed, carried inherent virtue, while regional languages were seen as an impediment to the "modern, rational state," (Oakes, 2001). With the Law of 2 Thermidor, Year II (20 July, 1794), it was declared that all "public instruments" must be in French, and violation of the law was punishable by 6 months in prison or dismissal in the case of civil servants (Calvet, 1998). Speaking a language other than French in the wrong contexts became a crime.

Education was and remains the most effective way to change the linguistic landscape. The Law of 30 vendémiaire Year II (21 October, 1793) established state schools where children were taught French. The proposal of 8 pluviose Year II (27 January, 1794) decreed that French had to be taught in all communes where French was not previously spoken (Schiffman, 2002). The language policies of the Revolution were not immediately effective, mainly because education was not yet compulsory; however, it laid the groundwork for further education policies. The Falloux Law (1850) stated that

education must be in French (A. Judge, 2007) and Jules Ferry made education universal, compulsory and secular in the 1880s (Oakes, 2001). The consequence of these language and education policies was that by the end of the 19th century, all children were in school and were learning in French. Their maternal language, while still spoken in the home, was not tolerated in the schools.

The French Revolution undermined the political system in France by denying the legitimacy of the monarch's rule by divine law and replacing it with the nation-state (Fenet, 2004). When the monarchy was overthrown in 1789, a new concept of nation was born, one that equated the state with the nation.

> In medieval and early modern Europe the word 'nation' signified essentially 'nation as community', and was not automatically bound up with the state. During the eighteenth century, however, the notion of 'nation as association' appears to have become dominant, and in consequence there developed demands to make the 'nation' and the state synonymous and to cement the bonds of association within the 'nation' by means of a common language and shared ethnicity. (Lodge, 1993, p. 209)

While claiming that nothing, including language, should be a barrier to the state, the Revolution also paradoxically established the role of French as the symbol of French universalism, culture and patrimony, such that today not knowing French, or the 'correct' French, presents challenges in accessing the state and leads to accusations of a loss of French civilization. Today, accusations made by political parties, on the right and left, of anti-universalist sentiments among non-French speakers echo those made during the Revolution of the inherently counter-revolutionary nature of the regional dialects.

The universalist model that was established during the Revolution had lasting effects, not just on language use, laws and attitudes, but also on how the French understand the public and private spheres, and minority identity. The attempt to make all citizens equal before the law resulted in the denial of differences between individuals or groups. This includes the denial of minority community members. Since the Revolution, France has formally denied the existence of minorities within its borders because it goes against their concept of citizenship (Oakes, 2001). On January 6, 1978 a law was passed making it illegal to collect data on ethnicity, religion, political view etc. (Caubet, 2008), because the Republic is supposed to see its citizens as utterly equal (Kaya, 2009). There are, therefore, no official statistics on these categories in France (Caubet, 2008). However, the result of this 'blindness' to differences among French citizens on the part of the state is, in fact, discrimination. Minority ethnolinguistic groups are expected to assimilate and deny their ethnic or racial differences, all while racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious discrimination occurs. There is little recourse to these problems because the government does not recognize the differences for which they are being discriminated against in the first place.

A person must further keep any differences pertaining to their origin or religion separate from the national and political sphere, because under the Republic there is a separation of public and private life (Fenet, 2004) and a philosophy of *laïcité*, or secularism. The expression of religion in the public sphere is seen as encroaching on the freedom of others to engage with the state free from religious "harassment." Unlike in the U.S., where freedom of religion is meant to protect the individual from religious interference *from* the state, France protects the individual from religious interference coming *between* the individual and the state.

3.1.3 The reassertion and defense of French after the 30 *glorieuses*

After WWII, and the loss of its colonies where it had spread French via its *mission civilisatrice*, France ceded its place of prominence on the international scene as the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant post-war powers. France was shrinking on the global stage as a military, economic, cultural and colonial force. This was especially felt after the end of the *trente glorieuses*, the 30 years of economic prosperity that ended in the 1970s (Shelly, 1999). By the 1960s, the role of French as the language of diplomacy had diminished in the face of the new lingua franca of the cold war era, English (Havaşi, 2011). America had become an exporter of science and technology, as well as pop culture. French was losing its prestige as an international language, and it was felt that it was being "corrupted" by English borrowings brought in by way of American culture, (Gordon, 1978). René Etiemble's 1964 book *Parlez-vous franglais?* was one of the first books to openly discuss the threat of English to the French language (Gordon, 1978). Etiemble thought of himself as a modern day Estienne, protecting French from the threats of an outside language (Cowling, 2007). This new assertion of French was largely a proxy for feelings of international impotence. It was in this context that, in 1992, France added an article to its constitution making French the official language of the Republic.

France's identity crisis resulted in a reassertion of linguistic prescriptivism and protectionist attitudes (Oakes, 2001). Since the 1960s, France has created a series of committees and councils with the purpose of legislating and protecting French. The *haut comité de la langue française* was formed in 1966 by Charles de Gaulle, which was highly centralized and overseen by the Prime Minister (Gordon, 1978). Its aim was the "purification" of French, which led to a series of laws relating to language. In 1975, the *Loi Bas-Lauriol* was passed, making French compulsory in commercials, advertising,

contracts of employment, and consumer information. It also stipulated that if both an English and a French term were available the French one must be chosen (A. Judge, 2002). The *Loi Carignon* (1994) mandated that 40% of all the songs on private French radio must be in French or a regional language of France (S. Judge, 2002), a way of protecting cultural production via language.

One of the most significant pieces of language legislation was the 1994 *Loi Toubon*, which was used to combat the replacement of French with English in the media (Salhi, & Jeanjean, 2002). The law defined the French language as a "fundamental element of France's personality and patrimony" (Fenet, 2004, p. 40). It required that TV and radio programs be in French and that all manuals and consumer products include a French translation. The law also supported the role of French in education. It asserted that "the mastery of the French language […] is one of the fundamental goals of education" (article 11, paragraph II) (quoted in Oakes, 2001, p. 76), emphasizing the importance of the state producing good French-speaking citizens who have a thorough understanding of *bon usage*. The law also stated that children must learn two foreign languages (Oakes, 2002) to ensure that if students chose to learn English, they would have to divert their attention to an additional language. Not only did the *Loi Toubon* promote French in the schools it protected it against English. Non-governmental associations were established, including *Avenir de la langue française* (ALF) and *Défense de la langue française* (DLF), with the purpose of initiating civil suits for violations of the *Loi Toubon*, and to defend "the essential properties of clarity, precision, and harmony" of French (Shelley, 1999).

In addition to linguistic insecurity vis-à-vis English, France has also faced national and linguistic insecurity in regards to Europe, and the European Union (EU). From its inception, France has argued that French should be the lingua franca of the

organized states. It was successful in being linguistically dominant until the 1970s, when the U.K., Ireland and Denmark joined the EU (Oakes, 2002). In the 1990s, France changed its tactics and began to lobby strongly for a multilingual policy to make sure that French was not eclipsed by the spread of English (Oakes, 2002), while at the same time arguing that the number of official languages of the EU should be reduced to a "reasonable" number (incidentally this included French) (Shelley, 1999). France also has been active in setting up French language schools in EU member states (Oakes, 2002). Some have noted France's inconsistency in its support of multilingual policies outside of, but not within, France (Fenet, 2004).

The most significant conflict over language in Europe, came with the debate over The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, proposed in 1992 by the Council of Europe, which promoted the recognition of indigenous minority languages (S. Judge, 2002). This sparked an intense debate in France about the constitutionality of such legislation, because it created:

> …specific rights in favour of 'groups of speakers', both in the private and public domain. This is the essential problem, since France does not recognise the existence of groups within the state. This includes ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, and any other minority. (S. Judge, 2002, p. 94)

The Charter went against the core universalist principles of the Republic, which stipulate non-discrimination based on ethnicity or language (Oakes, 2001). Minority identities are supposed to remain in the private sphere. France's *Conseil Constitutionnel* found the Charter unconstitutional arguing that it implied that France is not made up of a unified French people and that it further contradicted Article 2 Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which states that "The language of the Republic is French" (S. Judge, 2002). Although

France supports the protection of minority languages outside of France, and has even argued that languages express values and are an important part of community-building, it is clear that this does not apply to languages within its borders (Fenet, 2004).

France's linguistic defensiveness has manifested itself in an effort not only to protect French at home but also to promote it in countries beyond France and the EU. This is what is called *le rayonnement du français* (Gordon, 1978). Organizations such as the *Alliance Française* were established to provide language instruction and cultural activities in order to maintain the prestige and knowledge of French. Beginning in the 19th century with one location in Paris, today there are 850 *Alliance Française* franchises in 136 countries with approximately half a million students per year learning French (alliancefr.org). France has further reached out to its former colonies, providing aid and education, especially in Africa (Parker, 2002).

The Francophone project emerged in the 1970s as an attempt by French-speaking countries, almost entirely former French colonies, to unite in order to have better international standing. France was at first wary of participating in the Francophone project for fear being perceived as colonialist, although eventually they joined the international organization. Margie Sudre, French Minister for Francophonie, described the project as a way to "give a political dimension to Francophonie," to prioritize education because of the "loss" of French and the presence of English, claiming that "French would not survive if it was defended only by its cultural and linguistic dimension: there must be economic and commercial exchanges" (Ager, 1998, p. 260). France's interest in the project was once again to promote itself as a global economic power and to protect itself from English hegemony in the US and the UN (Parker, 1998). French still had the strength to bind countries politically in a post-colonial situation where France no longer had direct political power. Both the *Alliance Française* and

France's humanitarian efforts are widely seen as an extension of the so-called *mission civilatrise* of the colonial era. This *mission* was the justification used by France, and other countries, for colonization in the 19th and 20th centuries. Many see France's efforts of *rayonnement* in the post-colonial countries as a kind of soft linguistic colonialism.

3.1.4 French and Citizenship

The French language also plays a central role in France's conception of citizenship, which is necessary to discuss in order to understand fully how France views immigration in general, and specifically where language fits into this. There are two legal bases for nationality: *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*. Nationality based on *jus sanguinis* (blood right) is founded on common ethnicity. German nationalism during the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries was based on being ethnically German (Oakes, 2001). Nationality based on *jus soli* (soil right) is a nation made up of people "united around common laws and rights" (Oakes, 2001, p. 12) rather than ethnicity. During the Revolution, French nationality was synonymous with being a citizen; therefore nationality was based on *jus soli*. After the Civil Codes (1803) were written, nationality became based on *jus sanguinis*; like inheriting a family name, one also inherited being French (Weil, 2010, p. 168-169). In 1889, new legislation was passed and *jus soli* was reasserted, in large part because after the Franco-Prussian war France needed to increase its population in order to increase those who were eligible for military conscription (Noiriel, 1996). In 1945, the Nationality Code was modified, and later ratified in 1973. It stipulated that denial of French nationality could be based on a "failure to assimilate" (Noiriel, 1996). In 1987, President Chirac formed the *Commission de la Nationalité*, which decided "for membership in the French nation neither birth in France nor descent from French parents is sufficient alone unless it implies that the person speaks French" as

well as has a "full commitment to [French] culture" (quoted in Safran, 1991, p. 232). Today, a child is a French national if one parent is French (*jus sanguinis*). If not, the child will become French at age 18 if he or she was born in France to non-French parents and has lived in France for five years starting at age 11 (*jus soli*). While French nationality has become based on a hybrid system of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*, it is also heavily dependent on assimilation to French culture.

There are a number of ways for an adult to acquire French nationality. One is to marry a French national, which accounts for a large percentage of naturalization requests. The other possibility is to apply alone, a long process that is "not particularly encouraged in France" (Weil, 2010, p. 232). The requirements for naturalization include that the individual demonstrate "his or her assimilation to the French community, in particular by a sufficient knowledge, according to his or her condition, of the French language" (articles 21-24) (quoted in Weil, 2010, p. 234). This highlights the importance of assimilating and becoming a 'good' citizen, and the synonymy of French culture and the French language. The importance of assimilation is founded on the Republican universalist philosophy of the French government, which is officially blind to ethnicity and rejects the existence of minorities (Fenet, 2004). Supposedly, if everyone assimilates there will be no grounds for discrimination and everyone will have equal standing vis-à-vis the state. In order to become a citizen, one must assimilate to the culture, and in order to do that, it is necessary to speak French.

In addition to knowledge of French, it is also necessary to have lived in France for five years before becoming a naturalized citizen. The only exception is if the applicant comes from a country where French is one of the official languages, in which case French must be their native language or they must have been in a school for five years where French was the language of instruction (Weil, 2010). Similarly, for children born in

France of non-French nationals not born in France, citizenship is conferred upon reaching majority, so long as the individual has spent five years in the school system (Weil, 2010). The requirement to spend five years in a French language school is part of the effort to ensure assimilation, given that French is seen as the primary vehicle for French culture and values (Schiffman, 2002, p. 79). The thinking is that if an immigrant has been taught in French he or she will presumably also have been instilled with the values and culture 'inherent' to that language. French education is meant to create a "bond of nationality" (Weil, 2010, p. 53), and, according to the *Loi Toubon* (1994), give immigrants "dignity" (A. Judge, 2007). A crucial aspect in France's efforts toward linguistic assimilation in the 19th century was making French the language of instruction, and making school attendance compulsory. History suggests that the school system is the best way to enforce language policies, therefore in order to linguistically and culturally assimilate its immigrant population, five years of French-medium schooling is required.

3.1.5 Language Ideology in France Today

Although knowing French may be sufficient to become legally French, it is not enough to be fully accepted in French society. *Bon usage* is still needed to gain access to high positions in government and in society (A. Judge, 2007) and to be considered a good citizen. While previously it was the regional dialects that were looked down upon as 'bad' ways of speaking, today the linguistic 'others' are speakers belonging to the lower socioeconomic class (Lodge, 1993) and to the immigrant population. This way of speaking is often referred to as 'urban youth vernacular' (Stewart, 2012), *argot*, or the *langue des cités*, referring to the language spoken in the multi-ethnic *banlieues* of major cities in France. These varieties of French include *verlan*, the practice of switching syllables (*arabe* becomes *beur*), and the use of loan words drawn from the languages

spoken by the speakers' families at home (Arabic, Berber etc.). They are also marked by phonetic variation (Jamin et al., 2006). Argot is by no means a recent phenomenon either in France or elsewhere. Goudaillier (2002) notes that all languages have had, have today, and will always have a *langue populaire*, that is juxtaposed with the standard variety.

The *langue des cités*, which draws lexical items from the speaker's own culture and language of heritage, acts as a sort of identity marker and can be a symbol of non-integration (Goudaillier, 1997). This variety of French is a solidarity language for many disenfranchised members of society, both of immigrant background and not. It is stigmatized by the majority French society (Stewart, 2012), making language one of the ways that the immigrant community is ostracized and alienated.

Language in France is the lynch pin of its society, culture and national identity. The French have very strong attitudes toward language and cultural integration, especially regarding North African Arabic-speaking immigrants and their descendants (Stewart, 2012). What is not as clear is how these descendants view their own and others' language(s) and what effect France's deeply imbedded cult of language has had on these attitudes.

3.2 France and the Maghreb

The language ideology of French was implemented not only within France, but also in its colonies, where it was used as a tool for culturally dominating North Africa. France's language and education policies in the Maghreb affected how North Africans viewed French as well as Standard Arabic and Darija, attitudes that may extend to the diaspora in France. These policies left an imprint on that society that would have repercussions in the Arabization efforts in the Maghreb post-independence. It is necessary to examine how the importation of French came about in the Maghreb and how

Arabization was implemented in order to understand the attitudes of the North African immigrant community toward France's staunch language ideology and toward Arabic as a symbol for national identity.

3.2.1 The Maghreb: Language Policy During the Colonial Era

France was a colonial power in the North African countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia from the 19th to the mid-20th century. Algeria became a French territory in 1848, and was officially considered a part of France, while Tunisia and Morocco were French protectorates coming under French rule in 1881 and 1912 respectively. Because Algeria was more entwined with France and came under its rule earlier, it had a very different relationship with France throughout the colonial period and in its fight for independence. Their separation was more violent and dramatic and has left bitterness in the collective French memory, more so than the independence of Morocco and Tunisia (1956), both of which separated from France more peacefully, relative to Algeria. In discussing the linguistic and colonial histories of these countries, more attention will be given to Algeria and Morocco than to Tunisia because the majority of North African immigrants to France have come from these two countries. While I distinguish to a certain extent the different histories and language situations of each country during the colonial era and during the post-independence Arabization movement, I often refer to them grouped together. I acknowledge that they have had different colonial and post-colonial experiences, but for the sake of time and space, and because of the broader similarities, I treat them chiefly as a whole.

3.2.1.1 The Linguistic Situation Prior to Colonization

Arabic came to the cities of North Africa in the 7th century with the spread of Islam and expanded further by the 11th century (Saadi-Mokrane, 2002, p. 50). Prior to its

arrival, the indigenous inhabitants of that area were ethnically Berber and spoke a Berber language (Bentahila, 1983). Most adopted Islam and many exchanged their native language for Arabic. In the 14th century, Spanish, Italian and Turkish were introduced to North Africa (Sayahi, 2014). And in the 19th century French and, again, Spanish came into the Maghreb as colonial languages.

3.2.1.2 Language and Education Policy During Colonial Rule

When France established itself in the Maghreb, colonial *fonctionnaires* needed to find a way to control and unify the colonies. The long tradition of uniformity via linguistic conformity, established during the French Revolution, proved an effective model. French language ideology was integral to its control of the colonies and for their unification under the French empire (Riley, 2011). The French wanted Moroccans to forget their own tradition and adopt the French lifestyle and values (Bentahila, 1983), which for the French meant accepting the French language. "For the French colonizer, it was necessary to cut to the quick the Arabic and Islamic roots of a conquered land in order to crush its core values" Saadi-Mokrane (2002, p. 44). Language and religion were closely related to the values of the community, and needed to be suppressed in order for the French to exert control over the region. Bassiouney (2009) argues that France in the Maghreb provides an archetypal example of Miller's quote: "Through language people can be controlled and political power exercised" (2003, p. 3). They were mostly concerned with replacing the prestige variety, SA, with French, and making it the language of bureaucracy and education; therefore, it was Standard Arabic, not Darija, that the French tried to eradicate (Sayahi, 2014).

As in the past, it was via the educational system that the French attempted to replace SA with French as the language of prestige, administration and national identity.

The colonizers used education as a tool for constructing language policies and ideologies, leading to the belief that persists today in the Maghreb that French is the language of modernity and SA the language of tradition and religion (Benrabah, 2007). The language policy of the colonial French in the Maghreb was based on 3 principles: "(1) limitation of schooling to Europeans and the elite of the native population; (2) maintenance and encouragement of the Arab/Berber ethnic division; and (3) overall restriction of the usage of the Arabic language" (Sayahi, 2014, p. 39). The education system had two types of primary schools. First, the European-modeled schools that were reserved for the French residents and for the children of upper class native North Africans. Second were the Franco-Islamic schools. These were subdivided into schools for different social classes (Bentahila, 1983). According to Sayahi (2014), the lower class primary schools were aimed toward industry and agriculture, with limited French exposure, while the primary schools for the upper class focused on French instruction, French culture and science, with very little Arabic instruction. These schools taught their students of Arab and Berber descent French culture and heritage, rather than their own. There was further an attempt to encourage division between Arabs and Berbers in order to destabilize the country and decrease the chance of a joined rebellion against the French. In Morocco, Berbers were sent to French-Berber schools where no Arabic was taught, based on a belief that Berbers were more assimilatable (Sayahi, 2014). This attempted division angered the Moroccan nationalists, resulting in the establishment of traditional Islamic schools as a reaction; these excluded French and focused on Islamic religious studies (Bentahila, 1983, p. 8-9).

In Morocco, the traditional schools were allowed to co-exist with the newly installed French system, whereas in Algeria the education and language policies were more aggressive. This is in part due to the fact that France's rule in Algeria was much longer than the other Maghrebi countries, and because it was considered to be an

extension of France, rather than a protectorate. France shut down and banned the *Medersas* (Arabic language schools) and Qur'anic schools where SA was taught (Berger, 2002b). This was a way to limit the learning of SA and make education only accessible through French schools (Bassiouney, 2009). They were reopened in the 1930s as the result of the budding nationalist Ulema movement led by Ben Badis (Berger, 2002b), although Arabic was declared a foreign language in Algeria in 1938 and was not allowed to be used in administrative and official documents, nor in schools (Gafaïti, 2002). This led to plummeting literacy rates by the time of independence (Sayahi, 2014). However, toward the end of colonial rule in Algeria Arabic was allowed as an elective in school (Berger, 2002b). Although the language policies of the colonists were the strictest in Algeria, all three countries of the Maghreb saw SA relegated to the religious and traditional domain and taken out of the school system to varying degrees. French became the language of education, government, and power, which had long lasting effects on the attitudes of North Africans toward each language.

During the colonial period French became a symbol of more than just the language of modernity. It was "above all the language of colonialism, segregation…religious intolerance, mass destruction, and the eradication of Algerian identities and their linguistic expressions, whether Arabic or Berber" (Gafaïti 2002, p. 24). The French language had come to represent colonial oppression and the suppression of North African culture and religion. This spurred the development in the first half of the 20th century of a strong sense of nationalism, particularly in Algeria, that was focused on Standard Arabic and the Islamic tradition in reaction to French hegemony (Bassiouney, 2009). According to Bassiouney (2009), Maghrebis began to associate SA with Islam and their personal identity, although there is evidence that this association existed long before France's colonial rule (see Suleiman, 2003). Nevertheless, Arabic became a symbol of

national identity and resistance to French rule in the minds of North Africans. As the Algerian nationalist activist Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani famously wrote in 1931, "Islam is our religion, Arabic our language and Algeria our fatherland" (Bassiouney, 2009, p. 215).

3.2.2 The Maghreb: Independence and Arabization

Since independence in the 1950s and 60s, a language debate has risen between Arabophones and Francophones focusing on the opposition of the two ideologies and cultures that they represent, which resulted in an effort to eradicate the use of French, viewed as a symbol of oppression:

> According to the 'Arabophones,' French is: the language of the enemy; the language of colonialism; the expression of Western culture; and the negation of Algerian national identity. Arabic is: the language of the Algerian nation; the recuperation of Algerian identity; the expression of the Algerian soul (the language of the Koran and Islam); and the crucible of the Arab-Muslim community to which Algeria belongs. (Gafaïti, 2002, p. 22)

Each of the North African countries embarked on a push for Arabization in order to make their countries Arabic-speaking in all facets of life, primarily the administrative state and the education system. It was an effort to revive the role and prestige of Standard Arabic after decades of suppression by the French. Rejecting French was a way of rejecting French domination and its values, while embracing Arabic was to embrace national identity, religion, and Arab identity. Saadi-Mokrane (2002) explains that the etymology of Arabization is a translation of *ta'arroub*, "to become Arab." Thus, the Arabization movement was not only about language and national identity but also about embracing Arab ethnicity. This caused conflict with the Berbers who are not ethnically Arab, and whose languages were suppressed not only under French rule but also under the post-

independence governments, especially in Algeria. Algeria pursued Arabization more aggressively than either Tunisia or Morocco in the name of nationalism, a political movement that took hold in the first half of the 20th century. The Arabic language was the symbol of a free Algeria and "total Arabization" has been the stated goal of Algeria's ruling nationalist party, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), since independence and is included in the constitution (Berger, 2002b). The objective of Arabization, according to the agenda set by the FLN in 1962, was to fight against "'the cultural cosmopolitanism and pervasive Westernization which has contributed to teaching many Algerians to disdain their national language and values'" (Saadi-Mokrane, 2002, p. 47). Algeria was trying to construct "a myth of a modern nation-state" (Gafaïti, 2002, p. 29), upon which it could build a national identity, based on an independent nation with a national language, Arabic, and a national religion, Islam.

In Algeria, Arabic was seen as "the only language that could express the authentic identity and culture of the people" (Gafaïti, 2002, p. 25). This was echoed also in Morocco and Tunisia, but perhaps not as forcefully. Although claiming to promote the language of the North African people, these countries chose Standard Arabic as their national language. Bentahila (1983) argues that the process of Arabization was simply replacing one foreign language, French, with another, Standard Arabic, because neither were languages acquired, or spoken, in the home. Arabization was enacted via the education system, following the French model (Saadi-Mokrane, 2002). The theory held by the Ministry of Education was that Darija speaking children, once Arabized in school, would be able to go home and "correct" their family's use of language in order to spread SA (Berger, 2002b).

The dialectal varieties were seen as illegitimate and unfit for the role of national language, despite being the languages spoken in the majority of homes. Proponents of

Arabization fought against the use of French because of its symbol as the language of colonization, but Darija and Berber were attacked because of Standard Arabic's supposed superiority and its status as a sacred language (Gafaïti, 2002). This attack against Berber was fueled also by long standing prejudices against the Berber peoples of North Africa. Although French, Darija and Berber were all targets of the Arabization movement, it was the minority Berber-speakers in Kabylia, in Algeria, who first resisted this post post-independence language policy via armed resistance in the 1960s (Benrabah, 2007). In the 1970s and 80s, when the Algerian government shut down Berber events, such as Tamazight poetry lectures, and abolished the The Circle of Berber Studies at Algiers University, riots erupted in Kabylia (Benrabah, 2007). It was the Berberophones who called for official recognition both for Tamazight and for Darija. Eventually, these protests became somewhat fruitful in the 1990s with the creation of various commissions and university departments on Berber language and culture (Benrabah, 2007).

It is important to understand this linguistic nationalist effort in the context of the pan-Arab movement of the 1950s and 60s, a movement based on the unification of all Arabic speakers. The Maghreb became independent at a time when Arab Nationalism was experiencing some international success (Berger, 2002b). Algeria co-opted this political movement for its own anti-colonialist purposes and made it about Algerian nationalism, whereas, Arabization efforts in other countries in the Middle East in the mid-20th century were about modernizing SA and making it a suitable standard language under which Arabs could unify. Arabization in the Maghreb was instead a political decision to combat "the encroachment of the French language and the continued political, economic, and cultural ties with France" (Sayahi, 2014, p. 51).

3.2.3. Language in the Maghreb Today

3.2.3.1 Standard Arabic and French

The Arabization movement has been somewhat successful in replacing French with SA as a language of prestige; however, because of the complicated relationship and history between French and the Maghreb this effort has not being totally realized:

> In North Africa the French language constituted, after independence, a problematic. It did so in the sense that in the three nations of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, leaders who had sought independence in order to reassert a national identity that was Arab were often reluctant to forfeit the French heritage which had become so deeply rooted in their midst, both for practical and for affective reasons. (Gordon, 1978, p. 147)

After independence, rather than declining, knowledge and use of French increased. The expansion of French post-independence was due to three things: the spread of education, immigration, and mass media (Sayahi, 2014). In post-colonial North Africa there was more access to public education than there was under French rule. With this increase in education came access to French. Today SA is taught in the primary and secondary schools; however, so is French. In Tunisia, it is taught beginning in the third year of schooling. By the tenth year of school math and science courses are taught in French and in the university most subjects, outside of the social sciences and humanities, are taught in French, including math, science, and business (Sayahi, 2014). The situation is similar in Algeria and Morocco. The boom in immigration to France after independence has also had an effect on the spread of French in the Maghreb. North Africans who immigrated to France return to the Maghreb, usually for summer visits, with an improved knowledge of French. Their use of French is a symbol of their status as someone who lives in a foreign country, usually at a higher standard of living. Media has also played an important role in

the proliferation of French. Today, North Africans have access to French via satellite TV, radio, and newspapers. Berger (2002b) argues that French has become democratized, in that it is now available to the masses, and today represents less and less the area's "subjection to colonial rule" (p.71). The younger generations are further removed from the memory of the violence of oppression of the colonial regime and the battle for independence. For them, French is just a language that will help them get a job (Davies & Bentahila, 2013), and gives them the ability to consume French media.

French is still used in a large portion of the industrial and economic sectors in Algeria, particularly as they pertain to oil (Gafaïti, 2002). It continues to be predominant in education and in administration because it is representative of socioeconomic prestige (Sayahi, 2014) and it was already established in these domains. Because French is the language still used for science, technology and business it is desirable and is seen as a necessary tool to access the job market (Davies & Bentahila, 2013), whereas, most North Africans do not have much use for SA unless they work in the Arabized public administration (Sayahi, 2014). Despite the increase in competency in French since independence, and its use in administration and technology, most Maghrebis do not have high levels of proficiency in French, in part because of persistent high rates of illiteracy and high school dropouts (Sayahi, 2014). Post (2015) found that the rate of French used by participants in a face-to-face conversation was 5.2%, while they used it almost twice as often when chatting online.

The Arabization efforts of the Maghreb after independence reinforced a dichotomy between French and Arabic, bolstering the idea that French is associated with Western culture and ideals and that Arabic is associated with tradition and religion, an attitude first established by the French. Arabization in Algeria was most forcefully promoted by Islamic fundamentalists (Bassiouney, 2009) who saw Standard Arabic as the

only language in which one can really be Muslim, further associating Arabic with conservatism. The Arabization laws and administrative rules had profound effects on the language attitudes of North Africans. Benrabah (2007) studied the attitudes of university students in Algeria in order to determine whether Arabization had been detrimental to the promotion of Arabic in technology and science and as a symbol of economic success and modernity. He found that Standard Arabic is associated strongly with religion and sacredness while French is associated with modernity and technology, the opposite of the outcome desired by the Arabization movement. Benrabah argues that this is because there is a more staunchly pro-Arabization stance in Algeria in contrast to Morocco, which eased into Arabization. However, it is important to note that French is still the dominant language used in business, technology and science in Morocco as well as in Algeria.

Despite these linguistic policy battles, and local efforts to recognize SA at the expense of dialectal Arabic as the language of the Maghreb, the fact remains that the native language of North Africans is still either dialectal Arabic or Berber. SA is not the native language of any person. It is a learned language, rather than a 'naturally' acquired one; therefore, the effort to have children 'correct' their parents' dialectal Arabic was always an unobtainable goal since SA is not regularly spoken at home. Although SA may be more prevalent than before independence, it is not the language of the home or daily interaction. Rather, it is the language of religious ceremonies and, in some cases, of education and administration. Nor is French a native language or the language of the home and family. It, too, is primarily used in administration and education, although there are some indications that it may be entering the home in Morocco via code-switching (Chakrani, 2010).

3.2.3.2 Dialectal Arabic and Berber

Today the North African countries speak primarily dialectal Arabic (Darija) and Tamazight as their native languages, and French and/or Standard Arabic as languages learned in school. Dialectal Arabic, or Darija, is the language used in the street and at home (Chakrani, 2010). It is not taught formally, used in official capacities or standardized, although Moroccan youths are very capable of communicating via Internet chat in Moroccan Darija in varying forms that are mutually comprehensible (Post, 2015). In recent years, Darija has been used more often in media and music, and in 2014 there was a failed push for it to be introduced into early education in Morocco (Al Jazeera, 2014). Although Darija has not traditionally represented national identity in the Maghreb, there is evidence that this may be changing as well. After the Arab Spring, which had its birth in Tunisia, Tunisian Arabic gained prestige as a symbol of Tunisian identity, in which there is newfound pride (Sayahi, 2014). The same change in attitude toward Moroccan Arabic is also occurring as Moroccans increasingly take pride in their country (Rebekah Post, personal communication). This indicates that SA is not the only language that can symbolize national identity in the Maghreb, despite its status, to the exclusion of Darija, as the national language of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria.

There is still a significant Berber-speaking community in North Africa, mainly in Morocco and Algeria (Bassiouney, 2009), although it is important to note, as Berger (2002a) has, that language in the Maghreb does not always correspond to ethnicity, thus there are many ethnic Berbers who only speak Darija, as well as many Berber speakers who are also speakers of Darija. The Berbers fought hard to sustain their language and culture in the face of persecution. It has recently been codified and was introduced into the Moroccan educational system in 2003 (Chakrani, 2010). However, the implementation of this language education policy change has been difficult in part

because it was a political move on the part of the Moroccan government, rather than a real effort to revamp the language education policy (Buckner, 2006). El Aissati (2011) found that teaching Tamazight has proven difficult because of a lack of materials, knowledge of the language by the teachers, and the timing of introducing the language in school. In the past two decades, Berber has expanded on the Internet, allowing for what Maddy-Weitzman (2011) refers to as an "'imagined' Amazigh community worldwide and the "construction of a 'landscape of group identity'" (p. 131). Berber became one of the official languages of Morocco in 2011 (Post, 2015), and a constitutional national language in Algeria in 2002, after decades of efforts to be recognized. According to Benrabah (2007), the very survival of Darija and Berber were a form of resistance to the Arabization movement.

3.3 The North African Diaspora

Now that the linguistic and cultural context of the colonial era has been established, it is necessary to give an overview of migration from the Maghreb to France, as well as describe life for the North African diaspora in France today. This section will discuss the history of migration and immigration today. It will also breakdown the diaspora context by exploring housing, employment, language, marriage practices, life in France for women, religion, France's reception of the North African immigrant community and the civil unrest that has resulted from living on the margins of French society.

3.3.1 History of Migration From the Maghreb

Despite the end of its colonial control in North Africa, France has maintained a close relationship with the Maghreb, which has manifested itself in large waves of

immigration to France. There was free movement between Algeria and France during the colonial period, allowing for large numbers of immigrants, particularly young men, to go to France for temporary work (Killian, 2006). Prior to World War II, immigrants to France came mostly from other European countries; however, after WWII, the trend in immigration shifted because the immigration office in France was unable to recruit enough migrant workers from Spain, Portugal and Italy, its preferred source of immigration (Hargreaves, 1995). The labor force needed replenishing after the losses from the war in order to aid in reconstruction (Kaya, 2009), especially during the economic boom of *les trente glorieuses*. France turned its recruitment efforts to its (former) colonies and emigration from these countries began to increase. In the 1960s Moroccans flocked to France because France needed them for economic reasons, and Morocco was willing to let them go in order to reduce low unemployment rates (Ennaji, 2010). It is important to note that before Algerian independence (1962), the majority of Algerians who migrated to France were from Kabylie, an ethnically Berber region, although their numbers dropped in the decades that followed (Chaker, 2004).

This migration was believed, by both those who emigrated from the Maghreb and by the French state, to be temporary (Oakes, 2001). For this reason, many still owned homes in the Maghreb and had family there to whom they sent back money (Ennaji, 2010). There was an expectation on both sides that the workers would eventually return to the Maghreb, so there was little concern on the part of France over assimilation in the 1960s and 70s. These expectations affected the services that were made available to the migrant workers.

> Still anxious to think of this migration as temporary, the government provided social services to children in public schools—including Arabic language classes

> and religious instruction—thereby encouraging the differences that became grounds for discrimination. (Scott, 2007, p. 68)

They provided these services for immigrants and their children, as a way to encourage their ties with North Africa so that they would be more likely to return. As Scott (2007) points out, these ties would be called into question in later decades as a sign of their inability to assimilate.

France halted labor immigration in 1974 (Freedman, 2004) because of an economic recession and because of the 1973 oil crisis in Algeria, which was associated in France with "Arabs" (Kaya, 2009). Freedman (2004) argues that this was also done because of a growing sense of xenophobia toward North African immigrants. Following this cessation of immigration, the laws changed to favor immigration only for educational reasons or for reunification (Killian, 2006). While France was encouraging immigrants to return to the Maghreb in the 1970s because of the economic slowdown (Scott, 2007), large numbers of women and children came to France to reunite with their husbands. There has also remained a steady stream of illegal emigration from the Maghreb (Kaya, 2009). Those who immigrated found work as manual laborers or in the service industry, which, for the most part, remains the case today. Men typically worked in factories, and women as domestic staff, cleaning homes, hotels and businesses.

3.3.2 Immigration Trends Today

Today, France is home to the largest Muslim population in Europe, a number estimated to be around 4.7 million (Pew Research Center, 2011). The majority of this number is made up of immigrants and their successive generations originating in former French colonies in North and Sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey, although they are predominately from the Maghreb. According to the 2010 census from the National

Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE, 2010), 8.5% of the 65 million people in France are immigrants, the top three countries of origin being Algeria (729,814), Morocco (671,225) and Portugal (588,276). 29.8% of the country's total immigrants come from the Maghreb (a minority coming from Tunisia) (INSEE, 2010).[24] Of these North African immigrants the majority is, at least nominally, Muslim, based on figures showing that almost all Moroccans identify as Muslim (Gray, 2005).

The ethnicity of North African immigrants in France is Arab or Berber, with the majority coming from the former ethnic group (Chaker, 2003). Although I am targeting the language attitudes of the Arabic speaking population toward Arabic and French, not Berber, it is nevertheless important to be aware of the significant presence of Berbers of North African descent living in France. Many Berberophones are also Arabic speakers, meaning that they too may respond to my survey, which targets Arabic speakers, rather than those who identify as ethnically Arab. It is often assumed popularly and by the French media that North African immigrants are all ethnically Arab, ignoring the Berber population, while officially the number of Berbers has been overestimated (Tribalat, 1995). As of 1992, approximately 28% of Algerian immigrants, and 22% of Moroccans, in France were Berber, fewer than previously thought (Tribalat, 1995). Because census data in France does not differentiate between Arab and Berber ethnicity when collecting data on immigration, it is difficult to know exactly how many Berbers are in France; however, Chaker (2003) estimates the number to be approximately 1.5 million, with 2/3 coming from Algeria and 1/3 from Morocco, an estimation that he sees as a correction of Tribalat's (1995) allegedly low numbers. The Berber population has a unique relationship with France. France has been the home of musical and cultural production for the Berber

[24] These numbers do not, however, reflect the large number of immigrants from North Africa who arrive in France illegally, which is thought to be much higher.

people because of their exclusion from North African society, and it was in France that the first Berber language novel was published, in 1981. Chaker (2003) notes that the Berber network and its associations in France are very committed almost to the point of militancy.

France has the highest proportion of descendants of immigrants in all of Europe (Bouvier, 2012). Because of the continuing waves of immigration from the Maghreb, there is a second-generation immigrant community, as well as third and fourth generations. According to the 2010 INSEE census, 6.6% of newborns in metropolitan France had two non-French, "étrangers," parents; 13.3% had one non-French parent. Fifteen percent of births between 2006 and 2008 were children with at least one grandparent who immigrated. In 2008, 11% of the population (3.1 million) of metropolitan France were the direct descendants of immigrants, the majority with one parent who was an immigrant (Breuil-Genier, Borrel & Lhommeau, 2011). Forty percent of them have one parent who was born in Africa, predominantly from the Maghreb. Their age ranges from 18 to 50, with half under the age of 30.

According to the *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration* the term "immigrant" refers to anyone born outside of France who did not have French nationality at birth and includes immigrants who have become French citizens. The label "immigrant" is a technical label referring to the status one had upon entry to France. Therefore, a person is counted as an immigrant for the rest of his or her life, regardless of their nationality. There are 3.8 million 'étrangers' living in France. INSEE uses the term 'étranger' for anyone who does not have French nationality. Thus a child of immigrant parents is a 'étranger' until he or she reaches majority and automatically becomes a French citizen.

3.3.3 Housing

Immigrant communities in France experience poorer living conditions than the rest of French society. In 1988, over 25% of non-French residents in France reported having no inside toilet and no bath or shower; 19% did not have hot water (Taïeb, 1998). These conditions are still described by some first generation immigrants (Killian, 2006). In the 1960s and 70s many migrant workers were living in shantytowns called *bidonvilles* that were built on the outskirts of large cities like Paris and Lyon because there was not enough existing housing to accommodate them. To help with this housing crisis the state built low-income housing called *habitation à loyer modéré* (HLM) in these areas, in what are called the *banlieues*. The HLMs are large concrete apartment complexes that are comparable to housing projects in the US. They are notorious for being run-down and dangerous: between 2005 and 2009 there were 48 deaths from three separate fires in HLMs that were attributed to their poor condition (Kaya, 2009).

Banlieue is a term that is usually translated as "suburb," although this is accurate only in the sense that the area is outside of the urban core. The *banlieues* are in reality much more akin to American inner cities. While in the U.S. those who live in the inner city are cut off from the wealthier suburbs, in France the immigrant communities are stranded outside of the city perimeter, typically at the end of the public transportation lines. Their physical alienation from the city centers mirrors their social alienation. It is here that the marginalized immigrant population lives, in poor housing conditions, and with inferior access to education. The *banlieues* are home to immigrants from many countries, but are predominantly inhabited by North and Sub-Saharan Africans who are largely Muslim or of Muslim heritage. Although immigrants are dispersed throughout France there is a high concentration of immigrants and 'étrangers' in the Ile-de-France area (Bouvier, 2012) and in Lyon, Grenoble and Marseille.

3.3.4 Employment

The economic situation of immigrants in France is bleak compared to non-immigrants. North African immigrants and their children belong largely to the lower socioeconomic level, tending to work in manual or unskilled labor, men in factories and women doing domestic work. This is particularly true for the earlier generations. Men who arrived from Algeria and Morocco before 1975 were almost all employed as blue-collar workers. Although these rates later dropped (Tribalat, 1995), the majority of North Africans still work in manual labor, with a minority working in professional jobs (INSEE 2010). One of the major impediments to getting white-collar jobs is that most immigrants from the Maghreb cannot read or write in French (Killian, 2006). Even if they were literate, many are in France illegally. The only work they can get is the kind that pays under the table, usually construction or factory work. In Killian's (2006) study of first-generation North African women in France, she found that almost all of her participants reported that they were repeatedly underpaid by their bosses who got away with it because of their illegal status in France.

The North African immigrant community also experiences high rates of unemployment, although not necessarily much worse than the economy that they left behind, and sometimes better. According to French census data, as of 2010, North African 'étrangers' had an unemployment rate of between 39-46%, compared to the 'non-étrangers' rate of 32%. The unemployment rate for immigrants in 2013 was 17.3%, which is 80% higher than the rate for non-immigrants (9.7%) (Kille & Wihbey, 2015). In Morocco, in 2013, the unemployment rate for people under 34 was 30% (Associated Press, 2013). The rate in Tunisia has ranged from 15-18% over the last few years with as high as 37% unemployment for people aged 15-24 in 2012 (Sana, 2014). In Algeria, the unemployment rate over the last 14 years has been an average of 15% (Trading

Economics, 2014). Today it is 9% according to the *Office National des Statistiques*, although the rates are much higher for people aged 15-24.

It is more difficult to get official data on adult children of immigrants because data is not collected on ethnicity. It is estimated, however, that "around 80 per cent of young people with immigrant roots between 20 and 29 years old are children of workers…almost twice that of young native French" (Kaya, 2009, p. 31). Based on data collected in 1992, Tribalat (1995) found that although children of migrants are doing better in general than their parents, indicating that social mobility does exist between generations, there is a particular jobs problem for youths of Algerian descent who struggle to get work. Concerning employment he writes:

> … alors qu'ils ont fait toute leur scolarité dans notre pays, les jeunes d'origine algérienne nés en France connaissent de grosses difficultés et la plus forte précarité. (Tribalat, 1995, p. 174)

> …even though they have completed all of their education in our country, the youth of Algerian origin who were born in France know great difficulties, the greatest of which is [job] insecurity. (Tribalat, 1995, p. 174)

He argues that the high level of unemployment for second generation Algerians is not explained by level of education, implying broader social problems. Regardless of level of education, more than half of youths of Algerian heritage aged 20 to 29 experienced more than a year of unemployment after leaving school. Based on the jobs of their parents, the poor economy in general in France, the negative view of immigrants, and the isolating housing situation, one can conclude that the majority of second-generation immigrants

are still struggling to get out of the lower socioeconomic level of their parents and to climb the social ladder.

3.3.5 Language

3.3.5.1 Language Practices of the first and second generations

In the Maghreb there is a classic diglossia situation where dialectal Arabic/Berber is the L language (depending on the person) and Standard Arabic is the H language. Although many Maghrebis have some knowledge of French, not many are literate. In France, the linguistic situation is quite different and it is no longer accurate to describe it as diglossic for the Maghrebi diaspora. The majority of the Arabophone population only speaks the L variety, Darija (Caubet, 2003), while approximately 1.5 million speak Berber (Chaker, 2004). Standard Arabic, the H variety, no longer has an active role in day-to-day life because it is not needed or used for administration and education, even if it is still used in religious services (often with a translation following it). Instead, French, a language that is standardized and written, is used for administration, work and official uses, while Darija or Berber is spoken at home, in the neighborhood and with family. It could be argued that this situation is closer to the diglossia described by Joshua Fishman (1967), wherein the L and H languages are not related but are used in different domains. However, as Fishman himself points out, diglossia is marked by the "stable maintenance" of the use of each language in different domains "rather than the displacement of one by the other over time" (Fishman, 1967, p. 29). Although Darija/Berber may be maintained or revived to some degree in France, the use of French and Darija/Berber in the public and private domains, respectively, has not been stably maintained, and so it would be inaccurate to call this situation diglossic.

The percentage of first-generation Algerians and Moroccans in the early 1990s who self-reported to have mastered French ranged from 39%-61% (Tribalat, 1995). Women reported being worse speakers of French than men and having a harder time making themselves understood in French. This is possibly because they were still generally restricted to the home sphere in France, as is the custom in the Maghreb (Killian, 2006). This gives them fewer opportunities to practice French. French is largely learned through the school system, so the longer a person has been schooled the higher their French proficiency will be (Tribalat, 1995). This will be much higher for French-born individuals, and much lower for those who immigrated later in life. In Gray's (2005) study of first generation Moroccan women in France she found that her participants reported speaking mainly in French, although they still used Darija or Berber with parents and older family members. 22 out of 25 said that they could speak Darija or Berber and 3 could speak/read/write in SA.[25] Killian (2006) did not intentionally explore language in her interviews, but the topic did come up. Her participants retained Arabic/Berber to varying degrees. They complained that language, i.e. not knowing French well enough, was a barrier to getting administrative tasks done and to making friends, resulting in a feeling of being socially isolated.

Because of reported high levels of illiteracy in Darija among Moroccans (60%) and Algerians (74%) in France, Tribalat (1995, p. 42) reports that it is difficult for first generation immigrants to teach Arabic formally to their children. (These participants were most likely referring to teaching SA, not Darija, to their children). Among immigrants who came to France as adults, 19% of Algerians and 26% of Moroccans speak exclusively Arabic or Berber with their children; 35% and 28%, respectively, speak

[25] These were also the women in her study who reported wearing a headscarf in public, indicating that attachment toward Islam as demonstrated in veiling may correlate with a desire to learn/speak the language most strongly associated with the religion.

exclusively French (Tribalat, 1995), although many reported speaking a mixture of French and Arabic/Berber with their children. Most of Killian's (2006) participants had tried to teach their children either Arabic or Berber but many found it difficult and were unsuccessful. In general, the older children spoke better than the younger ones because by the time the younger ones came along, the older ones had learned more French in school and spoke it more often in the home. Return trips to the Maghreb were also correlated with higher levels of Arabic/Berber proficiency. Of the five mothers who were not trying to teach their children Arabic, two were married to French non-Muslims. Killian compares two of these situations: in the first, both parents speak Arabic and Berber to one another and to their kids, who can understand and speak it but do not read and write it. In the second situation, the woman is a widow who remarried a non-Muslim French man. They speak only in French to their child. Additionally, she does not practice Islam and celebrates Christmas as a cultural holiday. This is noteworthy because along with Islamic/North African religious and cultural practices she has also rejected her maternal language, implying a connection between religious practice and language use.

Tribalat (1995) found that, 87% of second-generation Algerians in his study (what might be considered as the 'classic' second generation) declared French as their "mother tongue". It is unclear how they understood the usage of the term "mother tongue." Most of these participants would have been raised in homes with parents who were native Darija or Berber speakers, although he notes that language loss could potentially be swifter for Algerians because their parents may have known some French before coming to France (Tribalat, 1995). It is possible that by saying that French is their "mother tongue" they meant that French is now their dominant language. These second generation participants reportedly speak almost exclusively French to their own children. Mohamed (2003) found that most of the second-generation school children that he interviewed in

the early 1990s used Darija with their families and French at school. Of those who were taking Standard Arabic classes, more than half thought they had equal competence in Arabic and French. Again it is unclear whether the students understood him to be asking about Darija or SA, or whether they distinguish between the two, something that Bassiouney (2009) calls into doubt. It is also very common for second- and third-generation North African youths to code switch with French and Darija, usually inserting Arabic words or phrases into French sentences (Sefiani, 2003). However, this is done largely for symbolic reasons as a statement of identity (Liogier, 2002) and does not indicate whether they are competent Arabic speakers.

The data from Tribalat (1995) and Mohamed (2003) are from the early 1990s and, although useful for understanding the classic second generation in France, do not apply to the language use of the younger second generation in the 2000s. Today, Darija is estimated to be spoken by around 3 million people in France (Barontini, 2013). In 2008, the French research institutions INSEE and INED surveyed second-generation French men and women who were born between 1958 and 1990 about language transmission (Condon & Régnard, 2010). Although this may include some of the participants studied by Tribalat (1995) and Mohamed (2003), it also includes participants who reached maturity in the 2000s. For participants whose parents were both Arabic speakers from Morocco or Algeria, the majority reported being able to understand and speak Arabic (presumably Darija) well, although the numbers are much lower for writing and reading the language (most likely because Darija is not standardized). A similar trend in proficiency emerged for Berber speakers from Algeria. Barontini (2013) interviewed participants who were born in France or came to France before the age of 20, and whose parents or grand parents are from the Maghreb, about their language practices. The level of self-reported usage varied widely for her participants, not surprising given the range of

background, with some claiming to have retained nothing while others reported much higher levels of usage and proficiency. She points out that language transmission for this population does not occur in a linear fashion, but may depend on factors such as who they marry and how often they visit the Maghreb. One woman reported that her spouse helped her to improve her Darija. Barontini also found that Darija is more present today in the public sphere that it has previously been in France.

3.3.5.2 Arabic and Berber Language Classes and Status

The availability of Arabic language courses in the education system and its status in France is unstable. The Ministry of Culture recognized both Berber and the North African dialect of Arabic as a language of France in 1999 (Caubet, 2008); however, they failed to recognize that there are different dialects in each of the countries of the Maghreb. In the same year, dialectal Arabic was eliminated from the list of languages a student could take as an optional test on the baccalaureate (Caubet, 2008). Berber, on the other hand, has been an available option for oral examination since the 1970s, and since 1995 it has been an available option for written examination (Chaker, 2003).

There are opportunities for children to learn Arabic through the program *Enseignement des Langues et Cultures d'Origine* (ELCO). These language courses are primarily targeted toward immigrants of Maghrebi or Turkish descent and are available free of charge after school. Because ELCO courses are funded by the government of the country of origin, not the French state (Oakes, 2001), only the official state language is offered. For the Maghrebi governments this means Standard Arabic, not the dialectal variety spoken in the homes of these children. Although the purpose of these classes is to allow children to connect with their roots, they are teaching them a language that is somewhat foreign to them. Furthermore, the classes usually do not continue beyond the

French equivalent of middle school (Oakes, 2001). This demonstrates a kind of cognitive dissonance on the part of the French government in terms of how and where it wants to encourage children of immigrants to learn their maternal language. In addition to ELCO there are also Arabic classes available in some secondary schools, and via associations and private schools (Mohamed, 2003) or in the mosques and community (Selby, 2009). There are now some non-governmental committees devoted to promoting linguistic pluralism in France (Oakes, 2002), as well as new discourse, supportive of multiculturalism, on how to deal with the reality of immigration in France (Freedman, 2004), although these do not represent mainstream views.

Berber studies have also become increasingly popular over the past several decades. At the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, the number of students studying Berber has remained at a steady number of 100, permitting it to be classified as a "medium language" (Chaker, 2003). It is studied by second generation Berbers, as well as international Masters and Doctoral students, especially those from the Maghreb. Chaker (2003) argues that the relatively recent interest in Berber is due to the Berber cultural and linguistic movement in North Africa and the progress that Berber has made in being acknowledged by North African countries.

There has also been a recent effort to revitalize SA in France. There are a number of reasons why North Africans in France would want to learn Arabic, foremost among them being religion. Many of the women interviewed by Killian (2006) and Gray (2005) said that they wanted to learn Standard Arabic so that they could read the Qur'an in the original (the only version considered to be truly legitimate in Islam). Kaya (2009, p. 87) writes that young Muslim immigrants use "Islamic languages" for symbolic reasons, indicating that language use is motivated by their religion, although it is unclear what is meant by "Islamic languages." Billiez et al. (2012, p. 298) note that among the second

and third-generation North Africans there is a kind of "fetishization" of Arabic that is often associated with the home country. There is a desire to learn Arabic as a symbol of their identity and origin, in order to reclaim that history.

3.3.6 Marriage Practices

Understanding the marriage preferences and patterns of a diaspora group can be revealing in terms of how they identify with their community of origin in contrast to their country of residence and citizenship. They also influence the linguistic practices of their children and are a factor in language shift (Al-Khatib, 2001; Mugaddam, 2006). Dzialtuvaite (2006) found that second generation Lithuanians in Scotland who married outside of the community had children who in turn did not identify strongly with the Lithuanian community. Integration, which in the opinion of the French government is the goal for immigrants in France, depends on, among other things, attitudes toward mixed marriages (Ennaji, 2010). Selby (2007, 2009) did extensive interviews and ethnographic observations with first generation North African men and women. She interviewed women who came to France specifically to marry cousins who were French born. She found that second and third generation Maghrebi men want wives from North Africa because they symbolize cultural and religious purity and are seen as more ideal than French born women who, as one participant put it, "are too opinionated and aren't as respectful toward their families" (Selby, 2009, p. 6). French-born women of North African descent, on the other hand, are less likely to marry first generation men from their country of origin. This is reflected in the fear that first generation women in both Killian (2006) and Gray's (2005) studies expressed about marrying a Muslim man. One participant said that women who have moved to France have a tough choice: they want to marry a Muslim man because of religion, family wishes, or culture, but they fear that he

will be overbearing and have the oppressive attitudes common among Maghrebi men. Many said that their ideal husband would be a Muslim with western attitudes (Killian, 2006, p. 57). Gray's participants in France viewed fear as an integral component of marriage in Morocco. They described the life of Moroccan women as "marked by fear; fear of their fathers, fear of their husbands…" (Gray, 2005, p. 150). These women, having spent time in France are reluctant to live with a man who has a traditional North African understanding of marriage and the roles of man and wife, where the man presides over the marriage. This reluctance may also appear in the second generation. The opposite does not seem to be a concern for French born North African men, according to Selby (2009).

3.3.7 Life for Women in France versus the Maghreb

Because mostly women responded to the survey administered for this dissertation, it is important to look at how life differs for women in the Maghreb and in France, not only based on the laws in these countries, but also from the personal stories of the women themselves. In the Maghreb, as in most Muslim majority countries, family law, which deals with matters of marriage, divorce, property etc., is based on an interpretation of Islamic Sharia law. These laws have traditionally given more rights to men, although this has been changing in recent years. The dominant role of men in relation to women is largely based on the concept of *wali*, wherein a woman's father or brother must give consent for marriage, getting a passport, and opening a business (Gray, 2005). Tunisia was an early reformer of family law and promoter of women's rights. The Tunisian courts changed their Personal Status Code in 1958, abolishing polygamy, promoting education for women and advocating discarding headscarves (Gray, 2005).[26] Morocco, on

[26] There is a debate about whether the headscarf is a symbol of oppression for Muslim women. Muslim and non-Muslim women have taken both sides of the argument. In this case, it seems that at the time it was seen

the other hand, took 60 years to change its family law. The new Personal Status Code (2003) changed the legal age of marriage from 15 to 18, outlawed most cases of polygamy, outlawed repudiation, gave women the rights to ask for a divorce, gave women more rights of inheritance, and ended the need for the permission of the *wali* for marriage. Despite the legal changes to family law, the mentality has not been as fast to change. Women interviewed by Killian (2006) describe life in the Maghreb as being totally subjected to the wills of their father and brothers. They have to serve them both, often getting married just to get out of a bad home life situation in the hopes that their husbands will be better. Even girls who were highly educated were still expected to clean and cook, unlike their brothers, because they had to learn to be "good" wives.

Even though their backgrounds differed, all of Killian's 45 participants said they were constrained on where they could go in the Maghreb because public spaces were strongly restricted based on gender.[27] Gray's participants agreed:

> In Moroccan culture, as in most of the Arab world, the public and the private are two distinct spheres. They are two separate worlds for which the rules of behavior are different. The public refers to: the stress, men's place, where everything is up for grabs, and where it is every man for himself. (Gray, 2005, p. 69)

Women in Killian's study insisted that in the Maghreb women often do not even do the shopping. One woman repeatedly said that in the Maghreb "we don't go out." Their sexuality was also constrained: "Smoking, drinking, talking to boys, going to movies, and being out after 6:00 PM are acts that are disapproved of and can cause women to develop

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as a symbol of oppression for many Tunisians; however, over time things shifted and women who wore the *hijab* were discriminated against.

[27] It is important to note that in France, as elsewhere, there are also cultural and social restrictions on behavior in the public and private spheres, but these restrictions differ from those of the Maghreb.

bad reputations" (Killian, 2006, p. 48). One woman said, "a girl's virginity constitutes the honor of the family" (p. 49). If she loses it, the family loses their honor, which is why brothers in the Maghreb often take on the role of watching their sisters' movements, often being harder on them than their own fathers.

Sadiqi (2003) writes that the codes of honor and morality in Morocco "rest on girls' and women's good conduct: good upbringing, chastity, hard work, obedience, and modesty" (p. 60). This is because, according to her, the concept of 'self' is pluristic and part of the community, unless if you are a man, in which case actions and mistakes do not affect the family's honor. Sadiqi, a self-professed feminist and defender of Islamic society and its treatment of women, admits that although in political discourse men and women are considered equal, "women are still considered second-class citizens" (Sadiqi, 2003, p. 75).

Women's rights in the Maghreb today exist in the context of the history of the fight for independence from France. In Algeria, as well as Morocco, women played a large role in the battle for independence for their country. However, once independence was gained, they were again relegated to their traditional roles (Gray, 2005) and confined to the "domestic sphere." In Algeria, Sharia law was nationalized and "legal and political restrictions" were made on women (Berger, 2002b, p. 72). Many women felt betrayed because they had been welcome to participate in the public sphere for the purpose of obtaining independence from France, but once that had been achieved they were again denied access to that world. Women were also encouraged to wear the veil after independence, with a threat of violence by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) if they did not (Berger, 2002b). The FIS "called for control of women's activities along lines they associate with Islam" (Khanna, 2002, p. 110). The family law that the ruling FLN party put in place "reinforced what was constructed as *traditional* Islamic law, which

concerned, in particular, women's status and access to the public space" (Khanna, 2002, p. 110).

Interviews and questionnaires with first generation North African immigrants in France reveal a general sense of appreciation for the freedoms that they enjoy in France, while noting that sexism does exist there as well. One woman said that because she has lived in France all her life she knew that she had more rights than women in Morocco (Gray, 2005, p. 150). One of Killian's interviewees "firmly insists that women have more rights in France" (p. 75), referencing schooling, speaking freely and directing the family. Many of the women, especially those who immigrated in the 1970s and 80s, had seen first hand the low levels of education for girls in their home countries, and so were appreciative of the educational opportunities in France for themselves and for their daughters. Participants liked that they could enjoy city life and go out in the evenings to go dancing or to the movies without worrying about someone seeing them and chastising them. They also liked the cultural opportunities and the diversity of the country. Gray's participants felt that the laws in France protected them and allowed them to exert control over their lives. One woman said that if it had not been for the French legal system, she would have been married against her will and would not have been able to pursue a career (Gray, 2005, p. 173). An illustrative example was given by a woman from Killian's study who explained that when flying back to France from visiting Algeria she regularly sees women taking off the veil and putting on makeup. She describes them as being different women as they cross the border (Killian, 2006, p. 121).

Mohamed's (2003) interviews with second generation girls in the early 1990s reveals that there is a pull between the traditional lifestyle of the family and the secular

French lifestyle encountered in school and in popular culture.[28] Girls admit that they do not introduce their boyfriends to their parents, unless they are planning to get married, because their parents would not approve. They find strategies to compromise or deceive their parents in order to realize their desire for freedom but also to avoid rupture with their family. Begag (2007) writes that a cultural break from a Maghrebi family is extremely difficult, calling it "violent." Although it is hard for sons, "it is even more difficult for girls, for whom the expression of their individuality often results in open conflict with the father" (Begag, 2007, p. 78). Mohamed (2003) writes that:

> La confrontation avec les tabous de leur culture d'origine (marquée par le statut de supériorité de l'homme) et leurs propres désirs, accentués par la libération des moeurs du pays d'accueil et l'influence des mass-média, va les écarteler. (Mohammed, 2003, p. 57)

> Confrontation with the taboos of their culture of origin (marked by the superior status of men) and their own desires, accentuated by the liberation of the customs/morals of the receiving country and the influence of mass media, will tear them apart. (Mohammed, 2003, p. 57)

According to Mohamed, this tension between daughters and their families sometimes results in the families sequestering girls and forcing them to marry in the country of origin. Indeed, most of the narratives and books written by second-generation Maghrebi women deal with personal freedom in relation to their community of origin (e.g. Gray, 2005; Killian, 2006). Many women do seek out and find this personal freedom, but often times with strong push back from their families and painful ruptures. It is important to

[28] It should be noted, however, that in most immigration contexts, daughters are symbols of a family's honor and so their actions are often scrutinized more than the actions of sons in the family (Espiritu, 2003).

understand this tension when studying the linguistic and cultural attitudes of women in the North African diaspora, because language attitudes and language use can be a way to express these cultural choices.

3.3.8 Religion

The religion of the Maghreb is almost entirely Islam. In Morocco, over 98% of the population is Muslim (Gray, 2005). The current project is to understand the attitudes of the grown children of first generation immigrants from the Maghreb toward language, but also toward religion, in order to investigate the interaction between the two. To do this, it is necessary to understand how Islam is practiced in France. Although the focus is on the second generation, it is important to review how religion is and has been practiced over the last couple of decades by the first generation as well. Gray (2005) and Killian (2006) both conducted interviews with first generation North African women. Their responses cannot be generalized to the male population, or to the North African diaspora in general because the sample size was too small; however, their interviews do offer some insight into the contemporary experiences and views of immigrants from the Maghreb. It is important to note that almost all of these participants were highly educated which may influence their views on religion.

Killian (2006) found that one third of her participants did not actively practice Islam, although they all self identify as Muslim because, according to them, one is born Muslim and that cannot be changed. Gray (2005) found similar rhetoric from one woman who said that in Islam it does not matter what country or ethnicity you are from. She considers herself "first and foremost as part of the *umma* [community of Muslim believers]" (p. 77), demonstrating her devotion to religion over nation. The women in both studies practiced Islam to varying degrees, in terms of fasting, prayer etc., but one

common thread that emerged is that these women were practicing Islam in a more individualized and personal way, with little reliance on institutions in the community. They felt that they could renegotiate what Islam meant to them. They found a way to redefine what it means to be 'good' Muslim women, focusing more on the internal rather than on North African norms (Killian, 2006). This led the women in both studies to practice Islam on the weekends. Only two of Killian's participants veiled outside the house, but many of them wore traditional clothing and headscarves on the weekends at home. They practice what Killian calls "accommodation" whereby they adapt features of their religion to the French secular culture, e.g., praying to themselves rather than in the traditional fashion, which would draw attention to them. While approaching Islam from a more individualistic stance, they still wanted to learn more about it. Most of Gray's participants were trying to understand Islam better, even those who claimed to have rejected the religion. They learned about their religion via websites because, according to them, there are few resources available in France where one can learn about Islam. In this way, they participate in the Muslim community online, much like Laguerre's (2010) digital diaspora.

Tribalat (1995) did an extensive survey of religious practices of first- and second-generation immigrants (data collected in 1992), focusing on reported attendance of religious ceremonies and adherence to the dietary restrictions of Islam. He found similar behavior between first generation Moroccans and Algerians, noting that there was a relatively low attendance of religious ceremonies, as low as 11% for Algerians, 6% for women and 15% for men. Tribalat explains that the disparity between male and female attendance is due to the mosque being part of the public sphere, which in North Africa is largely male-dominated. Women, however, reported adhering to the Ramadan fast more often than men, although there were overall high levels of reported adherence. Tribalat

notes that it is easier for women to fast because, even in France, the cultural practice of restriction to the home sphere for women persists to some degree. Tribalat argues that following the food restrictions stipulated in Islam (e.g., refraining from consuming pork and alcohol) does not indicate levels of religiosity, because, according to him, they are largely being practiced as cultural not religious traditions. Even if the first generation is practicing Islam in a more individual way with less reliance on institutions, and is more focused on the cultural rituals than on the religion itself, this does not tell us about how or if their children, the second generation, practice Islam. It is sometimes the case that the children of immigrants will embrace their culture and religion of origin more than their parents, as a way of laying claim to an identity. Yağmur and Akinci (2003) found just this in their study of first and second-generation Turkish immigrants in France. The younger generation had more positive attitudes toward Islam than their parents' generation, although the relationship between attitudes and action is disputed.

Tribalat (1995) also looked at religiosity of second-generation Algerian immigrants in France. He found that the younger generation was less practicing than their parents. Second generation Algerian immigrants rarely went to their place of worship, half as often as their parents' generation, with one third saying they do not have a religion. Their rates of attendance to religious ceremonies were similar to the average French person's attendance. Eighteen percent of women and 10% of men said they practice regularly. Although they reported not going often to Mosques or other religious centers, two thirds of them reportedly fast during Ramadan and refrain from eating pork, and one half refrain from consuming alcohol (all practices required by Islamic law). They seem disinterested in religion based on their attendance to religious ceremonies; however, further investigation revealed that they practice Islam on a daily level in the form of adherence to food interdictions. Tribalat argues that the practice of these rituals is cultural

and not religious, based on the contradiction in responses. Another possibility that Tribalat does not explore is that Islam may be practiced differently in the diaspora than in Muslim majority countries. The interviews with first generation immigrants from the Maghreb reveal that Islam is being practiced in a more individual manner and that they rely less on institutions. Perhaps in the diaspora going to religious ceremonies is less important, and less available.

Mohammed (2003) also found that most of the participants that he interviewed in the early 1990s did not practice Islam and did not even know some of the basic prescriptions of the religion, although they understand it to be the religion of their country of origin and the religion of Arabs. He found that instead there is a symbolic attachment to Islam. Kaya (2009) also argues that Islam has symbolic value for Muslim youths but is not practiced.[29] Like Tribalat (1995), Mohamed (2003) found that girls practiced Islam more than boys, although he later contradicts this conclusion. It is important to note that girls may over report practicing Islam because there is stronger family and community pressure on them than there is on boys.

The data on the second generation from Tribalat's and Mohamed's studies, while interesting and certainly informative, is out of date. Data from the early 1990s gives us a picture of youths who grew up in France in the 1980s and whose parents immigrated in the 1960s and 70s. To assume that the sentiments and practices of this time would remain consistent is unrealistic. The shifts in global politics, specifically regarding Islam, have changed the global Muslim community and how they relate to one another and to the state, not only in France, but in America as well. GhaneaBassiri (2010) writes that the Muslim diaspora in America became more self aware and confident to organize and

[29] This is not backed up by any recent data.

congregate after the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979). It is possible that a similar phenomenon occurred following the increased scrutiny of Muslim communities in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Several authors argue that there is new interest in Islam among the Muslim diaspora youth in France. Referencing Cesari (1999) Gray writes that there is a "renewed Islamization whereby young French Muslims are looking for ways to assert their cultural and religious affinity which their parents' generation practiced in the shadows of the mainstream culture" (Gray, 2005, p. 46). Rather than trying to blend in and practice religion on the weekend, the children of Muslim immigrants are bold about their practice. This renewal in interest in Islam is reflected in the growth of mosques in France. According to the Minister of the Interior and Religion, there were 150 mosques in 1976, 900 in 1985, 1555 in 2001 and 2052 in 2011 (Guénois, 2011). This indicates that not all children of immigrants are trading in the religion of their parents for the secular French life, nor are they necessarily practicing religion in the private way that Killian's (2006) first generation participants are. In addition, individuals today can seek out information about Islam on the Internet and can participate in religious ceremonies online with a virtual community of believers in a way that they could not in the 1980s and 90s, which may increase their religiosity.

Begag (2007), himself a second-generation North African, writes about the shift in attitudes toward Islam from the 1980s to the 2000s. Whereas in the 1980s Maghrebi youth tried to hide their ethnicity and religion, attempting to blend into the French cultural scene, today they embrace it. The "self-denial" of the 1980s has been replaced with:

> …a reactivated identification with minority ethnic origins, and Islam has now emerged on the scene as a rallying point in the sociological construction of a significant number of young Arabs. Now you can see in the hoods [banlieues] bearded young men and not-so-young men holding Muslim prayer beads in their hands, wearing white or gray djellabas, and sporting brand-name American athletic shoes. Not only are today's young Arabs no longer ashamed of themselves. They make a deliberate, ostentatious display of themselves as a kind of provocation... (Begag, 2007, p. 32)

He observes that there is an embrace of Islam and Arab identity in the younger generation today that was not present when he himself was a youth. Scott (2007) supports this, noting that there was a more "visible and outspoken Islamist presence in France in 2003 than there was in 1989" (p. 35), and that in 2003 there were more of what she calls "hot spots": "schools in which young male militants were seeking ways to challenge secular values and practices" (p. 35). Two of Killian's (2006) first-generation participants found that there is a militancy in the second generation in France today. While noting that the second generation themselves are not necessarily strictly observant (some smoke and drink), they describe them as very judgmental of the behavior of the women interviewed. One woman reports that youth in her neighborhood approach her and criticize her for marrying a non-Muslim man who converted to Islam. Another woman reports them being very intolerant of people smoking or breaking the Ramadan fast (Killian, 2006, p. 154). Scott (2007) references French intellectual Olivier Roy who sees this rediscovery of Islam as similar to born-again Christians, charismatic Catholics, orthodox Jews or the New Age movement (p. 126). This renewed enthusiasm may reflect the "fetishization" of Arabic that Billiez et al. (2012) describe is happening in France. As enthusiasm for Islam increases, there may be a parallel increase in enthusiasm for Standard Arabic.

One argument for why there has been a renewed interest in Islam in France is because African immigrants and their descendants feel like outsiders of French society, in

large part because of France's anti-Islamic rhetoric and stance. They live physically and socially outside of the majority culture. In Melliani's (1997) study, a North African youth described feeling like an immigrant in France and in the Maghreb:

> Ces jeunes ne se sentent appartenir à aucune nation, ne sentent à leur place ni ici, ni là-bas, sont comme des citoyens de nulle part, immigrés de nulle part. (Melliani, 1997, p. 127)

> These youths do not feel like they belong to any nation, do not feel at home here or there, are like citizens of nowhere, immigrants from no where. (Melliani, 1997, p. 127)

Kaya (2009) calls the practicing of Islam in France an "Islamic parallel societ[y]" that is a result not of inherent conservatism, but as a reaction to their marginalized status (Kaya, 2009, p. 85). These individuals, according to Kaya, are not experiencing a true conversion, but are acting out as a statement against the state. In religion they are accepted and find a sense of belonging that is lacking in the dominant French society. Gray (2005) contrasts the experience of being Muslim in France with being Muslim in Morocco. In Morocco Islam is an "omnipresent reality," but in France it is "the faith of a disenfranchised minority" (p. 24). It is this minority status that drives them toward religion. Scott (2007) summarizes it in this way:

> For young peoples from impoverished immigrant communities, Islam seemed to offer a way out of the demeaning circumstances of a compromised French nationality. It could be a means of refusing both parental discipline and social pressure. Here was an imagined international community to which they could aspire, one which rewarded their discipline and purity and which aligned them

> with what seemed revolutionary forces, resisting the corruptions of secular, Western capitalism. (Scott, 2007, p. 137)

Rather than having to self-identify as the marginal minority population in France, they can instead identify with a large and established community of Muslims, even if they have only met a small number of its members. Religion for them is a resistance to the state because of the state's rejection of them. Scott (2007) notes, however, that this is not the case for people of a higher socioeconomic status, whose embrace of Islam is a call for integration and respect for religious and cultural differences, not a rebellion against the establishment.

3.3.9 Reception from France and the Affaire des Foulards

There is a perception in France that in the last few decades there has been a drastic increase in immigration and a fear that these immigrants are taking jobs away from French natives; however, the rate of immigration has, in fact, remained steady. The difference is that the demographics of the immigrants have changed over the decades. Whereas previously the majority of immigrants came from other European countries, today they come predominately from non-European countries, in particular Morocco and Algeria (Freedman, 2004).[30] In fact, the percentage of immigrants from the Maghreb jumped from 2% in 1946 to 39% in 1982 (Hargreaves, 2007). At the heart of this sense of an "invasion" of immigrants is the fact that the North Africans who are coming to France are predominantly Muslim. Immigration can be a source of tension in any country because of fear that immigrants will take away jobs or affect wages, a topic that is widely disputed. However, in France, the debate about North African immigration has largely revolved around concerns about Islam. The development of fundamentalist Islam in

[30] Portuguese is the largest European immigrant population in France, although there are fewer Portuguese there than North Africans.

various countries over the years has resulted in the fear that this will happen in France, which is historically catholic (Tribalat, 1995). This has been especially true since the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s when the discussion of immigrants shifted from economic fears to the danger that Islam allegedly poses to the French Republic (Scott, 2007). Ennaji (2010), who focuses on Moroccans but whose argument can be extended to all Arab immigrants and their descendants, argues that xenophobia toward Moroccans has risen since the attacks on September 11, 2001. According to him, Moroccans are used as scapegoats for problems in France, and that violence toward Muslims in Europe is on the rise as an expression of Islamaphobia. Islam too is seen as a scapegoat and is blamed for all of the problems that have arisen between the immigrant population and the French state. The narrative of the danger of immigrants makes it more difficult for migrant communities to incorporate themselves into society, and results in them affirming their "ethno-cultural and religious identities" (Kaya, 2009, p. 9). This in turn seems to confirm France's concerns over assimilation spurring them to continue viewing Muslim immigrants as unassimilatable.

The generally negative attitudes toward immigrants from Muslim-majority countries are evident in surveys and legislation both from thirty years ago and today. Although some believed that Muslims can be integrated, most people in France did not in the 1980s (Safran, 1991). In a 1989 poll, 50% of French people said that Maghrebi immigrants are the hardest to integrate into French society (Hargreaves, 2007), presumably because of the Islamic faith. These negative attitudes seem to have worsened in recent years. *Le Monde* reported on a poll from 2013 that showed that 74% of those polled thought that Islam is not compatible with the values of French society (Le Bars, 2013). In the more recent survey, these negative attitudes spanned the political ideological spectrum revealing that the cold reception of Muslim immigrants is not

restricted to membership in a particular political party, even if the far right Front National party is the only one to openly express its prejudices. It has been argued that Islam represents a barrier or impediment standing between the individual and the State, both for the Muslim and for those interacting with Muslims in public. Religious differences, it is thought, ought to be kept entirely in the private sphere, and remain unacknowledged by the state. Recognizing or granting rights to a particular group contradicts the universalist ideal of equal treatment before the law and the unity of the nation. The idea that there can be other identities alongside the French national identity is rejected by the Left, out of a fear of ghettoizing minorities, and by the Right, out of a fear of separatism and a loss of national cohesion (Safran, 1991).

In addition to negative attitudes toward Islam and doubt over whether Muslims can assimilate, the speech of the Maghrebi immigrant community, including the second and third generations, is stigmatized (Melliani, 1997). In order to solidify a national identity, a country needs an 'other' against which to juxtapose itself (Oakes, 2001), including a linguistic 'other.' Before the Revolution the linguistic 'others' were Italian speakers. During the Revolution they were regional language speakers. Today, the linguistic 'other' against which France can solidify its own linguistic and cultural identity are not only English speakers, but Arabic speakers or Arabic heritage speakers, largely from the Maghreb, who speak French with an accent and often mix it with Arabic words and phrases. They speak a variety of French, sometimes called *argot*, *langue populaire* or *langue des cités*, that includes *verlan* and other neologisms, that has become an identity marker for them and differentiates them from French majority society. This variety is highly stigmatized and is a point of tension between these communities. In order to tap into the attitudes of Parisians toward immigrant community language use Stewart (2012) asked people to rate how well one could learn "good French" in various neighborhoods

and cities in the Paris area, as well as to rate the reputations of these neighborhoods and ability to access city amenities within them. He found that participants thought it was harder to learn "good French" in the poorer immigrant-dominated neighborhoods. Their negative language attitudes toward neighborhoods correlated more with the reputation of the neighborhood than with actual access to city amenities. This study demonstrates that there is a strong stigmatization of the French spoken by the predominantly North African immigrant communities of Paris.

These negative views of Muslims have resulted in racism toward North Africans, fueled by the memory of Algeria's traumatic war for independence. According to the Open Society Institute (2009) Maghrebi youth are 7 times more likely to get stopped by police (Stewart, 2012, p. 188). Daily identity checks in the *banlieues* are common practice. Similar to the dynamic between police and inner city African Americans in the U.S., the Maghrebi youth-police relationship is based on resistance on the part of the Maghrebi youth, and targeting and abuse on the side of the police. This leads, as it did in 2005, to the easy escalation of routine interactions. Discrimination toward North Africans further manifests itself in job hiring. Job applicants with North African or Arab sounding names are significantly less likely to be called for an interview than those with non-Arab names (Gill, 1999). Killian's (2006) participants describe being discriminated against because of their names, so much so that they have given their children Arabic names that are easily pronounceable in French. A personal contact in France described how doctors with North African last names have trouble staying in business because people will not go to them, causing many to resort to changing their names. This has resulted in a tension between these communities that is based on ethnicity

3.3.9.1. The Affaires des Foulards

The antagonism between the French state and its Muslim immigrant community has been most pronounced in the ongoing controversy over the legality of girls wearing headscarves in public schools.[31] This debate is now commonly called the *affaires des foulards*. The first *affaire* occurred in 1989 when the headmaster of the Collège Gabriel Havez in Creil (a Parisian suburb) would not let three girls of North African origin come to school wearing headscarves. This provoked media attention and heated debates on both sides of the issue. The argument was that the schoolroom is a public space and a place where one "accesses" the state. Wearing religious symbols was viewed as inappropriate in this space, first, because it promotes the idea that everyone is not equal and the same before the state, that there are minority differences. This was deemed unacceptable for a country that does not acknowledge minorities. Second, it indicates that there are allegiances that come before loyalty to the state (*communitaurisme*), i.e., religion. The headscarf was being banned in the name of *laïcité* (secularism). This occurred during the bicentennial of the French Revolution, which fueled some of the public discourse about the need to protect French universalist values (Scott, 2007), which originated in the fight against the Catholic Church in the 18th century. The headmaster's decision was eventually overturned by the Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin, who received sharp criticism from the Right and the Left (Kaya, 2009).

Another *affaire* occurred in 1994 when François Bayrou, the Minister of Education, announced that "'ostentatious' signs of religious affiliation would henceforth be prohibited in all schools" (Scott, 2007, p. 27). These signs were taken as a form of

[31] The word used in French is *foulard*, meaning scarf, although the Arabic *hijab* is also frequently used when discussing the issue. While most Muslim women in France who wear the *hijab* are only covering their hair, not their face, in English language publications, it is common to see the word *veil* used instead. This is misleading because it makes it seem as though women are covering their head and face, which often provokes a stronger reaction.

proselytizing and were primarily focused on Islamic headscarves. Bayrou, in arguing his case, claimed that France is a Judeo-Christian country even though the girls were being barred from school in the name of *laïcité* (Killian, 2006). This resulted in 69 girls being kicked out of schools for disobeying the pronouncement, again provoking a flurry of public debate over the issue, with many teachers, feminists and intellectuals coming down on the side of the French government (Scott, 2007). However, the Council of State ultimately rejected Beyrou's pronouncement and left it to teachers and administrators to rule on a case-by-case basis. In 2003, the debate was once again revived when two sisters went to school in headscarves and were subsequently expelled. This time, the French government responded more resolutely. A law was passed in 2004 that stipulated that:

> In public elementary, middle and high schools, the wearing of signs or clothing which conspicuously manifest students' religious affiliations is prohibited. Disciplinary procedures to implement this rule will be preceded by a discussion with the student. (Scott, 2007, p. 1)

This law technically applies to all religions and includes wearing large crosses and yarmulkes; however, it is widely acknowledged that the law was focused on getting the headscarf out of schools. "Headscarves were deemed an intrusion of religion into the sacred secular space of the schoolroom, the crucible in which French citizens are formed" (Scott, 2007, p. 90). The school had to be "protected" at all cost because it is the root of universalism, where equality before the state begins and *communitaurisme* ends. It is where assimilation takes place. The headscarf thus became a symbol of the Muslim immigrant who is not assimilatable, and a reflection of France's inability to cope with its former colonial subjects in a post-colonial world:

> That the veil continues to be at issue in France's struggle to come to terms with its colonial past and its ethnically mixed population in the present ought not to be surprising. Drawing the line at wearing of the veil is a way of drawing the line not only at Islam but at the differences Arab and Muslim populations represent, a way of insisting on the timeless superiority of French 'civilization' in the face of a changing world. (Scott, 2007, p. 89)

Even though it is no longer a colonial power, France still asserts its dominance over its North African population by insisting, as it did during colonial rule, on the suppression of its religion in public and the need to accept 'French' values of secularism. France at once says that in order to be properly French one must abandon religion and cultural identity when entering the public sphere, while also saying that these are a people who can never fully become French, leaving North Africans in a confusing and uncertain position.

The reaction in the Muslim community in France to the headscarf ban has not entirely been one of resistance, nor is the response homogenous. In 1989, a survey revealed that 45% of Muslims agreed that the headscarf should not be worn in school (Scott, 2007), although it is not clear if these were first or second generation Muslims. This reflects the responses from Gray's (2005) participants (Moroccan women in France) who largely supported the concept of *laïcité* and were "ambivalent" about the headscarf ban. It is important, however, to note that Gray's participants were highly educated women, who may not be representative of the Muslim immigrant population in France. Gray further observed that in the HLMs in the *banlieues*, many girls are pressured by their brothers and peers to wear the *hijab*, and are threatened with violence if they do not. Women who work in centers for "filles en difficulté" said that the new ban helps these girls, by giving them an excuse not to wear the headscarf to school (Gray, 2005, p. 159). This indicates that even in the *banlieues* there is resistance to wearing a headscarf among young girls. Gray reports three primary reasons that girls wear the *foulard* in France:

personal choice, pressure from family and friends, or to avoid violence. More recently, in 2003, only 14% of Muslim women polled reported wearing the *hijab* ("Sondage exclusif," 2003).

While acknowledging that many women do not wear a headcovering, Gray (2005) argues that more and more women are donning the *hijab* due to an increasing feeling of alienation. While it is not clear whether that number has actually increased after the passing of the 2003 law, it is widely thought that the most recent headscarf *affaire*, rather than being a force for secularization, has instead become a rallying point for Muslim identity. The headscarf debate, and the broader debate that the republic is under threat because of this symbol of Islam, has actually helped to reinforce the community of Muslims as they rally behind the *hijab* as a common value, even if they do not all wear it (Scott, 2007). Veiling has become a sign of rebellion against the establishment, comparable to how western youth used to wear a Che Guevara shirt as a symbol of anti-establishment sentiments (Gray, 2005). The headscarf ban struck a nerve that enhanced Muslims' feeling of being singled out and excluded from the dominant culture and society, and has lead many in the community to find solace and solidarity in their religious identity (Begag, 2007, p. 76).

A large part of the tension between the French majority society and the North African community in France rests in the troubled history between the two communities stretching back to the colonial era. There is a sense in which this community is still seen as colonial subjects and is largely rejected by the majority society. France's staunch secularism and official blindness to ethnic and religious differences further complicates the position of immigrants in France. If, as suggested above, the North African youth in France are turning toward religion as a reaction to French society, this suggests that their

religiosity, and perhaps their language and cultural attitudes, might differ if they lived in another diasporic setting such as Canada or Belgium.

3.3.10 Civil Resistance

This sense of being singled out and rejected by French majority society because of their alleged 'unassimilatablility' has led to an increase in the tension, which has expressed itself in a reassertion of North African cultural and religious identity (as discussed above), strained loyalties, and violent reactions. In 2005, in the *banlieues* of Paris, riots began that brought to national and international attention the precarious condition of France and its marginalized population of immigrants and their descendants. Police officers were chasing two youths in the *banlieue* of Clichy-sous-Bois, which ended in the accidental death by electrocution of the young men in a power station. Their deaths sparked protests and riots not only in the Paris area but also in cities across the country. Every night dozens of cars were torched and people took to the streets. The animosity between the police and the residents of these neighborhoods had boiled over. According to Kaya (2009), the 2005 riots were caused by "two centuries of colonialism and racism, compounded by recent poverty and exclusion" from society, rather than because of cultural differences and Islamism (Kaya, 2009, p. 81). The high rates of unemployment, poverty and isolation in the deteriorating *banlieues* played a significant role in the confrontation, as did the colonial history between France and the Maghreb and the violent wars for independence. Whereas Beur protestors in the 1980s were peaceful (for example the marche des beurs in 1983, which was meant as a parallel to the 1963 March on Washington), Kaya (2009) argues that today they are radicalized and more similar to Malcolm X than to Martin Luther King. Although it is important to note that

there had been riots in *banlieues* in the previous two decades, they had always been fairly localized, and never before had they spread across the country as they did in 2005.

This civil resistance and unrest has its root in the rejection of the North African population from mainstream France. Begag (2007) argues that the "integration policy" in France has been unsuccessful, and that both the right and the left have failed to protect the rights of the immigrant population. They have neither been integrated fully into French society, nor does the government acknowledge their differences. Migrants and their children see the French model of universalism as exclusionist (Kaya, 2009) because it denies their ethnicity and ignores their history:

> Despite their European citizenship, many [Moroccan] migrants find it hard to integrate into European society because they are often required to make compromises with the host country. These compromises have pushed many migrants to espouse a minority discourse. They celebrate their cultural specificity and marginality and struggle against all forms of segregation. (Ennaji, 2010, p. 16)

The French state is so determined for there to be officially one unified people of France, and it upholds this narrative so vehemently, that it ends up pushing people to define and separate themselves based on their ethnicity and religion. "The inability to fully join in the dominant cultural landscape may encourage immigrants to reinforce the boundaries that separate them from French people" (Killian, 2006, p. 84). This narrative is woven into the educational curriculum. Begag points particularly to the failure to educate the public about the colonial period and the violence and injustice done against Muslims in Africa, referring to a kind of "historical amnesia" (Begag, 2007, p. 30). It glosses over the history of the Maghreb and its North African citizens. Even though fifty years have gone by since the first wave of Maghrebi immigrants came to France, they and their

descendants are still being rejected because of what Begag calls the "ghosts of the colonial period." They are still seen as colonial subjects, as the descendants of "natives." They are French citizens who are not accepted as such because many in France feel in a sense that now the former French colonial subjects are colonizing France.

The second and third generations of immigrants in particular feel their loyalty pulled in two directions. Mohamed (2003) describes them as growing up between two cultures: that of their parents' heritage and that of French society. Although there are major problems with unemployment and living conditions in the *banlieues*, which have been one of the causes for rioting, Maghrebi youths who make it out of the *banlieues* often struggle with being shunned by their former friends. They are given a hard time for studying at the university and are insulted by being called "French" (Begag, 2007). Other insults include "pig eater" and "token Arab," as though engaging with the dominant society is a betrayal, not just of their friends, but also of their religion and ethnicity. The children of immigrants are torn between these two cultures and have lost their identity because they are accepted by neither (Ennaji, 2010). This may be why we see an increased embracing of religion and North African culture among the descendants of Maghrebi immigrants. They are staking claim to their existence and to belonging to the culture of the *banlieues*.

More recently, another, more extreme, expression of this resistance has emerged. Since the summer of 2014, with the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a self-proclaimed Muslim caliphate, there have been approximately 1800 French and Belgian men of North African descent who have joined the fight with ISIS (Ruthven, 2015). It has been argued in the news that they have done this both out of a sense of religious devotion and duty, as well as in an effort to seek out belonging in ISIS because they are denied acceptance at home (Claudet, 2014), that it is yet another way of resisting

French society. This has brought a renewed discussion about radical Islam into the national discussion about immigration. This was elevated even further with the murders of more than a dozen cartoonists at the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo over drawings of the prophet Mohammed (January 2015), an attack that was perpetrated by French citizens of North African heritage under the banner of al-Qaeda. It is important to note that all but three of the participants who took the survey for this dissertation responded prior to the Charlie Hebdo incident.

There are undeniable problems in terms of the relationship between France and the North African diaspora in France. The descendants of African immigrants, who are French citizens, are excluded from the dominant narrative of French national identity and French patrimony. This exclusion extends both to the religious and linguistic domains. One aspect of the resistance to French society that has not been discussed is in what ways language attitudes, and by extension language choice, are involved in constructing this differentiation, and how they act as expressions of resistance to the French state. This topic is particularly relevant given the role that language has played throughout the history of France as a tool for colonization and assimilation, and as a symbol of national identity and citizenship. Investigating the language attitudes of the marginalized North African diaspora will provide insight into how language acts as a proxy for feelings of alienation, and will help to improve our understanding of this volatile situation and the repercussions of France's legacy of language policy and language ideology.

3.4 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have reviewed the history of French language ideology in order to contextualize the language policies that were implemented in the Maghreb during the

colonial era, the reactionary Arabization movement post-independence, and the linguistic situation that the North African community in France faces today. I further discussed the history of migration from the Maghreb and what the lives of this immigrant community are like today in terms of housing, language, marriage, work, religion and their acceptance by French society. This provides a context for the selection of the population of second generation North African immigrants that will be presented in the following chapter. In the following chapter, I review language attitude methodology before discussing the specific methodology employed in the data collection for this dissertation.

4. Methodology

The primary goal of this dissertation is to assess the language attitudes of second-generation North African immigrants living in France, and to understand how these attitudes are related to attitudes toward religion, national identity and proficiency. In order to achieve these goals I constructed an original language attitudes questionnaire, which also includes questions on proficiency, religion, culture and national identity. There are a number of ways to investigate language attitudes, including interviews, societal treatment studies, matched guise technique and questionnaires. Although I use a questionnaire in the current project, it is important to understand the other approaches to assessing language attitudes, both their advantages and their drawbacks, in order to motivate this choice. In this chapter, I present these alternative methodologies and argue for why I have chosen to use questionnaires, before moving on to a presentation of the methodology used for this study.

4.1 Methods for collecting language attitudes

Interviews or oral surveys are sometimes used to assess attitudes, although they are not as common in the language attitudes field (see Hogan-Brun & Ramonien, 2005, however, for an example). They typically consist of a pre-determined set of questions asked by the researcher who notes the responses with scales and rubrics (Oppenheim, 1992). One of the primary benefits of this methodology is that it allows the researcher to ask follow-up questions in order to clarify a participant's response, or to rephrase a question when necessary. It also allows for the notation of things like facial expression and body language of the participants, providing additional information (Oppenheim, 1992). Despite these benefits, interviews are prone to a number of difficulties including

social-desirability bias where the participant answers questions based on what he or she perceives as socially acceptable (Garrett, 2010), and interviewer bias, where the respondent replies based on what he or she thinks the interviewer would say. These can seriously affect the responses that a participant feels comfortable giving. The ethnicity, gender, age, socioeconomic status, and language of the interviewer may also affect responses (Garrett et al., 2003), resulting in inaccurate reported attitudes. Interviews are time-consuming, in terms of conducting, analyzing, and transcribing them (Agheysi & Fishman, 1970). They are furthermore not as likely to be comparable to other studies because they are fluid and unpredictable. For these reasons, I chose not to use interview methodology, especially because of the effects my position as a western woman might have had on their responses.

Societal treatment studies focus on the attitudes of society as a whole rather than on individual attitudes (Agheysi & Fishman, 1970; Garrett et al., 2003). This approach often uses books, newspapers, cartoons etc., in order to extract and analyze the language attitudes of the society (Garrett, 2010). Because of its reliance on texts, it is most useful in providing insight into historical and institutional attitudes and in examining official language use and language policies (Giles, Hewstone and Ball, 1983). It is related to the field of institutional language socialization, which explores the effect that official policies and institutions have on habituating individuals, particularly immigrants, into using the language sanctioned by the state (di Lucca, Masiero & Pallotti, 2008; Jacquemet, 2011; García-Sánchez, 2011; Riley, 2011). Language socialization looks at the results that language attitudes and policies produce, while societal treatment studies look at the attitudes that are inherent in the policies. Both the societal treatment and language socialization approach can help to provide context for the language attitudes held by individuals. Although this is not my primary methodology, I used aspects of the societal

treatment to present and contextualize the linguistic situation in France and in the Maghreb in chapter three.

The matched guise technique (MGT) was developed by Lambert et al. (1960) in an effort to indirectly access language attitudes. The MGT involves a participant listening to the same speaker reading the same paragraph in multiple languages, while being told that a different person is speaking each language. In this way, participants supposedly make judgments based solely on the language, not the speaker. Often 'filler' speakers are included in order to distract the participants from the similarity in voice quality (Bentahila, 1983). The chosen passage is emotionally neutral in order to minimize its effect on the respondents' views of the speakers, although whether a text can truly be neutral is debatable. Typically, the respondent fills out a questionnaire regarding their attitudes to the 'different' speakers. The MGT has been expanded to assess not only attitudes toward different languages but also toward different accents, dialects and code switching (Bentahila, 1983; Zahn & Hopper, 1985; Garrett, 2010), often juxtaposing high and low-prestige varieties. In accent and dialect studies, the same speaker will 'put on' multiple accents (Garrett et al., 2003). The benefit of the MGT is that it allegedly accesses privately held beliefs about language without the participant being aware of it, thus tapping into covert, rather than overt, attitudes (Giles & Billings, 2004), while it has been argued that questionnaires can only access overt attitudes of which people are consciously aware (Garret et al., 2003; Giles & Billings, 2004; Garrett, 2010).

There are, however, several drawbacks to the MGT. One is that it is not clear whether the attitudes of the listener is based on his or her own views on language or whether the speaker is expressing different aspects of his or her own identity when speaking in different languages, as suggested by Koven (2007). Koven had second-generation female Portuguese immigrants in France tell un-scripted personal stories in

Portuguese and French to bilingual Portuguese-French listeners, in order to understand the fluid identity of bilinguals. She had the listeners describe the personality of the speaker when speaking in each language. Rather than examining language attitudes, she studied what 'side' of their identity these women express in each language and what the participants pick up on. This raises questions about the MGT because it indicates that it is not just a matter of the listener's attitudes toward the language, but also the experiences that the speaker has had in each language and how their personality has developed differently within each. Therefore, the MGT may not be isolating language attitudes as thoroughly as has been thought.

Further problems with the MGT include salience perception problems, accent authenticity and style authenticity (Garrett et al. 2003). MGTs that test attitudes toward accent rather than language, are questionable because it seems improbable that a single individual could successfully produce ten authentic accents, as described in Garrett (2010). They would inevitably begin to lose their authenticity, which would affect the listener's reaction. Davies and Bentahila (2013) make two useful observations about the drawbacks of the MGT. The first is that MGTs create artificial situations in which people may give stereotyped answers and assess speakers in a way that they never would in a real-life scenario (p. 101). The second is the specific problem of attempting to do an MGT comparing Standard Arabic (SA) and dialectal Arabic, because while dialectal Arabic is spoken as a native language, SA is not. It is highly formal and would not sound like spontaneous speech. It would "evoke entirely different contexts and motives as well as possibly different personalities" (p. 100) reinforcing Koven's (2007) participants' comments about feeling like a "different person" in either of their two languages. For these reasons, I do not employ the MGT in my study. Despite the claims that the MGT is a better assessor of 'true' attitudes, there are serious problems with the methodology in

general, and more specific ones that would affect this study because of the languages in question.

4.2 Questionnaire Methodology

In this section, I examine attitude survey methodology including a review of how surveys are designed and constructed, how the questions themselves are formed and what scales of measurement are used. I do this in order to present the rigor with which surveys can and ought to be constructed, and to contextualize my own methodology. According to Barker (1992), one of the greatest failings in language attitude studies is the rarity with which researchers make reference to previous research, particularly non-linguistic attitude theory. Without drawing on this research methodology researchers may repeat the methodological mistakes of the past, such as using non-scalar questions, or scales with uneven intervals, leading to results that are not accurate or clear. Not only do they spend unnecessary additional time recreating materials that are already available in the literature, such as format and question formation, they do so without understanding the nature of survey methodology and the study of attitudes. Unfortunately, many language attitudes researchers have done exactly this (see Galindo, 1996; Marley, 2004). These studies insufficiently reference previous language attitudes literature and attitudes surveys, and do very little in the way of introducing the construction of their surveys. To avoid such missteps, I will go into some detail discussing attitude assessment and survey construction.

Oppenheim (1992) warns that an improperly designed survey can lead a researcher to draw conclusions about causality that are either inaccurate or only provide part of the picture. The function of a questionnaire is measurement; therefore, it is

necessary to know what is being measured by having an operational statement for each variable being tested and to know what type of instrument to use with it. Oppenheim emphasizes the need for a methodical process when designing a survey which includes the following: 1) identify general and specific aims (hypotheses), and statements of the variables, 2) write a literature review, 3) have a clear conceptualization of the study, 4) make design decisions, 5) identify hypotheses to pursue, 6) design the research instrument, 7) pilot the work, 8) make a decision about the sample, 9) select the participants, 10) do field work, 11) process the data (coding etc.), 12) do a statistical analysis, 13) test the hypotheses and 14) write the research report—i.e., draw whatever conclusions possible. Although it is easy to make generalizations based on surveys, if they are not well designed then conclusions drawn from them may not be valid. The above process is meant to break down the design in order to circumvent potential pitfalls, although Oppenheim does admit that depending on time and resources some of the steps may be omitted, including pilot work. I have used this list as a guideline for my own questionnaire methodology.

4.2.1 Question Formation

How a question is worded and formed is important for ensuring that participants are able successfully to complete the questionnaire and answer in a way that is sincere and honest (Baker, 1992; Oppenheim, 1992; Garrett, 2010). Questions that are loaded or prime the respondent to answer in a certain way must be avoided. Oppenheim (1992, p. 128-30) gives a list of rules for question formation including: a) keep length under 20 words, b) avoid double-barreled questions (two questions wrapped in one), double negatives and proverbs (which people may be unaware of), c) include "don't know" or "not applicable," response options, d) use simple words, e) be aware that people use

words differently and that some words are ambiguous, f) do not use leading questions or loaded words, and g) use an even number of positively and negatively worded answers. He also advises the researcher to give adequate instructions especially for a self-administered questionnaire and to make the process attractive, with a consistent format. Many other researchers have expressed similar concerns (Garrett et al., 2003; Dillman, 2008). It is important to keep in mind that attitudes are emotional and therefore questions should not be too rational or clinical and one should not shy away from creating exciting questions that discuss fears, hates, hopes, etc. (Oppenheim, 1992).

Attitude surveys usually contain a section on background information including age, gender, birthplace, etc. Oppenheim (1992) notes that these factual questions may seem simple but are quite difficult to form and are subject to social desirability bias, although this is usually more of a risk for non-factual questions. It is necessary to use delicate wording in order to minimize how intrusive personal questions appear. Promising anonymity can help to mitigate these effects. The section on personal information should generally be given at the end of the survey because it may be off-putting for participants to divulge personal information such as job, marriage, age, salary, etc., unless the survey is long and there is concern that some participants will not finish all of the materials, in which case it can be moved up.

4.2.2 Types of Questions

It is necessary to pay attention not just to the formation of the questions but also to the response possibilities (Oppenheim, 1992). There are two types of questions that can be constructed in a survey: open-ended and close-ended. Open-ended questions do not have a structured response field, so that the participants may answer the question in any way they choose. Close-ended questions offer only a limited number of possible

answers, such as yes/no, multiple choice or scalar responses (Agheysi & Fishman, 1970). Open-ended questions are more spontaneous and can give detailed insight into the attitudes of the participants; however, they are labor intensive and difficult to score and analyze. The response also may not really answer the question that was asked (Agheysi & Fishman, 1970; Oppenheim, 1992). Close-ended questions are less spontaneous and can lead to bias if formed poorly; but, they are time-efficient, do not require the participant to write extensively, are easier to analyze and are easier to compare between groups (Oppenheim, 1992). Language attitude researchers tend to use closed-ended questions because of the ease of administration and analysis, some using them exclusively (see Bourhis, 1983; Landry and Bourhis, 1997). However, most researchers opt to use a combination of closed and open-ended questions (Garrett et al., 2003), with an emphasis on the former.

4.2.3 Scalar v. Non-Scalar Questions

Close-ended questions can be either scalar or non-scalar. Most language attitude studies use scalar questions because of their nuance in capturing degree of attitudes, although some do a combination of both in order to approach a topic from multiple angles. Baker (1992) emphasizes the need for scalar responses rather than a single item in order to give the survey internal reliability, and Oppenheim (1992) has pointed out the insufficiency of binary questions and the importance of using scales because they are more objective, comparable and truly are measurements. Linear interval scales allow for statistical analysis because they employ the use of integers.

The main type of scale used is the Lickert scale where participants are given a question or statement and asked to rate the degree to which they agree or disagree (Baker, 1992). This technique allows for more specific questions about attitudes and

hypotheticals. An example from Baker (1992) is the phrase "Welsh is a language worth learning" (p. 141). The scale may be a 5, 6, or 7-point scale, depending on the researcher (Bourhis, 1983; Baker, 1992). Whether a scale should contain an even or odd number has been debated because there is doubt as to whether there can truly be a 'neutral' attitude that rests at a mid-point on the scale (Garrett, 2010). That said, most studies use either a 5 or 7-point scale.

Non-scalar questions in language attitude studies usually involve asking participants to either assign adjectives to a language or ask them which language is the most useful, modern etc. Bentahila (1983) gave participants 10 adjectives and asked participants to indicate which they associated with French, SA and Darija. He then asked them pointed questions such as "what language do you find the most beautiful?" (p. 31). These questions have a limited number of responses, and so are closed and quantitatively analyzable, but are not scalar. This is a methodology used across the language attitude field that makes studies easily comparable, and provides a general understanding of how languages are viewed and with what they are associated.

4.2.4 Language of the Questionnaire

For language attitude surveys of two or more languages it is important to consider the language of the survey materials and whether it should be made available in both. Several researchers have offered all or part of their materials in two languages, including Bentahila (1983), Chakrani (2010), Garrett et al. (2003), Garrett, et al. (2009) and Post (2015). Choosing which language to take the questionnaire in may be an important indicator of language attitudes, because it allows participants to express a preference. However, Garrett et al. (2003) found that the language in which their participants chose to take the questionnaire was reflected in the self-reports of language proficiency,

indicating that rather than measuring preference it may just measure proficiency, which is more easily assessed with direct questions in the questionnaire. It may also be impractical to offer the questionnaire in two languages when one language is not commonly written, like dialectal Arabic, or when a population has low levels of literacy in one of the two languages. Bentahila (1983) was only able to offer part of his survey in both French and Moroccan Arabic, because of "problems of translation and terminology" (Bentahila, 1983, p. 30).

Beyond practical concerns, there is a more profound reason for refraining from offering survey materials in two languages. The language in which a survey is taken may actually affect the attitudes of the participants. Richard and Toffoli (2009) compared responses to an attitudes survey taken in Greek and English by Greek-English bilinguals arguing that because "language is a carrier of values" (p. 997) participants are expected to respond differently in each language. They found a significant language effect and warn that this may be a problem for researchers carrying out studies on ethnic identity. Garrett et al. (2003) also noted that there was a difference in language attitudes between teachers who took a questionnaire in Welsh versus those who took it in English. Bentahila (1983) tested language and worldview by asking participants to complete a series of sentences both in French and in Arabic, and found very different results. The Arabic sentences often ended in reference to religion, family and cultural values, while French sentences did not. These studies bring into question whether the results of an attitude survey administered in two languages are really comparable. Therefore, for a reliable analysis, the researcher should control for language.

4.2.5 Drawbacks of Questionnaires

There has been concern that language attitudes questionnaires may not sufficiently explore the complexity of attitudes (Giles et al., 1983) because they tap directly into overt language attitudes, rather than covert attitudes (Garrett et al. 2003; Giles & Billings, 2004; Garrett, 2010). They are thought to have a "high degree of obtrusiveness" (Garrett et al. 2003, p. 24) because of their direct nature. According to researchers such as Garrett (2010) and Giles and Billings (2004), the MGT is much better at accessing true language attitudes; however many authors who critique questionnaires in this manner then go on to use them, Garrett being an obvious example. He criticizes the "direct" approach (2003, 2010) and yet uses it as the sole methodology in his study of the Welsh diaspora (Garrett et al., 2009). If questionnaires are by nature "obtrusive," then they should be insufficient without the MGT or other supplementary tools, and yet this is not the trend that has emerged in the field.

Some argue that the ideal way to assess language attitudes is to use multiple methodologies: the MGT, questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, etc. (e.g. Bentahila, 1983; Chakrani, 2010). However, few researchers within the field have discussed the use of multiple techniques within a questionnaire, for example, using varying question formats to target similar attitudes or by simply creating nuanced questions. Researchers have assumed that it is not possible to construct indirect and nuanced survey questions that access covert attitudes; however, the sentence completion task that Bentahila (1983) employs in studying worldview is highly nuanced and instructive about language attitudes. Stewart (2012) used a questionnaire to investigate the language attitudes of Parisians toward the speech used in the *banlieues* by asking them about where the best French can be learned, rather than where the best French is spoken. His methodology indirectly assessed language attitudes. He specifically designed it to get around the

apprehension of participants in a previous study toward expressing negative attitudes toward the language used in the *banlieues* (Stewart & Fagyal, 2005). These studies demonstrate that questionnaires can investigate covert attitudes and do not have to be blunt instruments.

Survey questions can easily be poorly formed and prime the respondent to answer in a certain way or may contain multiple questions wrapped up in one (double-barreled questions) (Garrett et al., 2003). As discussed above, these problems can be avoided by careful construction of the questionnaire. Another drawback of written surveys is that it limits the pool of possible participants to those who are literate (although this would also be a problem with the MGT). Other problems with surveys include social acceptability, acquiescence bias, and characteristics of the researcher's ethnicity, gender, age, SES, and language use affecting the way participants respond (see also Oppenheim, 1992; Baker, 1992; Garrett, 2010). These concerns are valid whether one is using the MGT, a questionnaire or an interview. These drawbacks should not deter investigation of language attitudes via surveys; however, the researcher should take care to note the possible influence of these factors, and try to mitigate against them to the extent possible. One way to do this is to launch the study online and make the results anonymous.

Online surveys have their own particular drawbacks. First, they are only able to attract participants who have Internet access and are comfortable using an online tool such as a survey. These participants may tend to have a higher socioeconomic level, although this is less and less the case as the prevalence of smart phones expands.[32] Second, the researcher is unable to monitor the participants while taking the survey. This

[32] As of 2012, 83% of French people were Internet users (had access to the Internet at home), ranking 10th in the world for access and usage (Internet Live Stats, 2014). The growth of low cost smartphones has grown in recent years, including from the French company Wiko, which offers smartphones for 70 Euros (Economist, 2014). In 2014, 49% of France was using a smart phone (On Device Research, 2014).

could lead to participants taking the survey while watching a movie or listening to music, which may result in them being distracted while answering or having these mediums influence their responses. They may also ask the opinions of others around them rather than answering for themselves. A third drawback is that, while the anonymity of the questionnaire may solve other problems, it makes it impossible to conduct follow up interviews with participants in order to clarify their answers or dig deeper into interesting results. To address this, researchers can provide room for participants to comment after each question.

4.3 METHODOLOGY

The questionnaire methodology reviewed above was taken into consideration in the construction of the survey used for this dissertation. In the following section, I review the methodology used for this project including the research questions that were posed, the research materials, the method of distribution of the survey, the target respondents, and the analysis of the data.

4.3.1 Research Questions

The goal of this dissertation is to examine the language attitudes as well as the cultural and religious attitudes of second-generation North Africans living in France and to explore whether and how these attitudes are related. In order to explore this I have constructed the following research questions to guide my investigation. For Research Questions 3-7 I include hypotheses, in order to motivate one-tailed statistical testing:

RQ1. What traits or values do young second-generation North Africans associate with French, Standard Arabic, and Darija?

RQ2. What are the religious and cultural attitudes of this population?

RQ3. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward Islam?

Hypothesis: Based on the centuries old association of SA with Islam, it is expected that attitudes toward SA and attitudes toward Islam will be positively correlated. No predictions are made on the association of attitudes toward Islam and Darija.

RQ4. How are attitudes toward Darija and French associated with attitudes toward the Maghreb?

Hypothesis: Because Darija is the native language of many North Africans, it is predicted that attitudes toward Darija will be positively correlated with attitudes toward the Maghreb. There is no predicted direction of correlation for attitudes toward French and the Maghreb.

RQ5. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward individuals from other Arab countries?

Hypothesis: Based on SA's role in the Arab nationalism movement, it is expected that attitudes toward SA and pan-Arab identity will be positively correlated. No predictions are made concerning the directionality of significance for Darija and pan-Arab identity.

RQ6. How are attitudes toward French and Darija associated with attitudes toward France?

Based on the literature indicating that language attitudes are often substitutes for attitudes toward the culture most closely associated with that language, it is expected that attitudes toward French will be positively correlated with attitudes toward France. There are, however, no expected outcomes for the direction of correlations for attitudes toward Darija and France.

RQ7. Are high levels of proficiency in a language predictive of positive attitudes toward that language and the culture associated with it?

Hypothesis: Based on previous research that found links between proficiency and language attitudes (Baker, 1992; Coupland et al., 2006), it is expected that proficiency in a given language will be positively correlated with attitudes toward that language. Because of the association of cultural attitudes and language attitudes, and the link between language attitudes and proficiency, it is expected that proficiency in a language will be positively correlated with attitudes toward the culture most closely associated with that language. Therefore, it is predicted that a) proficiency in French will be positively correlated with attitudes toward French, b) proficiency in Darija will be positively correlated with attitudes toward the Maghreb and c) proficiency in SA will be positively correlated with attitudes toward the Maghreb (SA is associated with Maghreb as its national language).

4.3.2 Research Materials

In order to study the language attitudes of the North African diaspora in France and answer the research questions presented above, I constructed an original language attitudes questionnaire that draws from the language attitudes literature including, but not limited to, Bentahila (1983), Baker (1992), Oppenheim (1992), Garrett et al. (2003), and Chakrani (2010). I followed the guidelines of the authors above in order to create clear and concise questions and avoid the pitfalls of questionnaires described earlier in this chapter. I used both closed and open-ended questions: the close-ended questions are mostly scalar and allow for more easily analyzable data while the open-ended questions provide insight into the thoughts and views of the participants toward language and culture outside of the statistical analysis. The scalar questions are also able to truly measure attitudes (Oppenheim, 1992), which is preferable to questions where participants are simply asked yes/no questions. Questions were carefully constructed in order to avoid confusing, leading, or double-barreled questions. In addition, attitudes were measured in more than one format in order to capture more nuanced responses. For example, rather than only having participants select adjectives that they associate with a given language, they were also asked statement agreement questions to assess their attitudes. Finally, the order of the sections of the survey was carefully selected in order to ensure that the most critical sections were at the beginning in case of participation drop-off. The survey was reviewed by the Office of Survey Research at the University of Texas at Austin.

The questionnaire was made up of the following six sections presented in the order in which they appeared:[33]

1. Language proficiency

[33] The complete survey can be found in Appendices A and B.

2. Traditional language attitudes

3. Attitudes toward language, religion and nationality (close-ended)

4. Personal Information

5. Attitudes toward language, religion, and nationality (open-ended)

6. Language Use

In the first section, the participants were asked to rate how well they speak and understand French, Standard Arabic, Darija and Tamazight on a scale of one to five where one equals 'not at all' and five equals 'perfectly.' I included Tamazight in case some participants had a parent who was of Berber descent, which could produce an interesting follow up analysis. I chose not to ask about reading and writing in order to keep the survey as short as possible and because I am more concerned with the languages that they use in daily interactions with people. It should be noted that this is a limited evaluation of proficiency that is based on participants' own self-assessments. There is some debate about whether or not individuals are able to assess accurately their own proficiency. MacIntyre, Noels and Clément (1997), for example, found that participants who expressed anxiety about language performance tended to underestimate their level of proficiency while less anxious participants overestimated their proficiency. However, it is notable that Garrett et al. (2003) found that the language in which their participants chose to take a language attitudes questionnaire was reflected in their self-reports of language proficiency, indicating that self-assessment can *sometimes* be a helpful indicator of actual proficiency.

The second section contained more traditional language attitude questions drawn from previous studies (see Bentahila, 1983). The participants were given a list of 29 adjectives and were asked to check as many as they felt applied to French, SA and Darija

(each language was presented separately). After being prompted for each language, participants were given the option to comment. I selected ten of these adjectives for the next set of questions where the participants were asked which language was the most, for example, *beautiful*. Of the ten adjectives, six were deemed positive (*beautiful*, *moral*, *modern*, *cool*, *practical* and *fun*), three were neutral (*religious*, *traditional* and *modest*), and one was negative (*boring*). Given that not all of the adjectives listed in the selection task could be included, these ten were chosen because they were considered the most informative and the most important, despite not making up an equal number of positive/negative adjectives. *Fun* and *cool* indicate solidarity language attitudes, while *modern* and *practical* indicate instrumental language attitudes. *Religious* and *traditional* pertain to the research questions on religious and national attitudes. Relatedly, *moral* and *modest* were used because of their associations with religion. *Boring* and *beautiful* indicate positive and negative prestige. Some of these adjectives were also chosen based on the superlative adjectives used in Bentahila's (1983) study in Morocco for the sake comparability. Participants were allowed to select French, SA or Darija. After each superlative adjective question participants were again given the option to comment on their choice. The goal of this section is to understand the attitudes of participants toward each language in a format that is comparable to other language attitudes studies that have been performed in North Africa. In the second section, participants were also asked what language they considered their 'own' language and why, following the methodology of Davies and Bentahila (1989). Participants were allowed to choose from French, SA, Darija and Tamazight and were given space to comment.

The third section was made up of a series of nineteen statements having to do with religion, North African identity, French identity, pan-Arab identity and language, for example, "I prefer to marry someone who speaks Darija." Participants were asked to rate

their degree of agreement for each statement on a one to five scale where one equals "completely disagree" and five equals "completely agree." They were provided room to comment at the end of this section. The goal of this section is to understand in more detail how the participants view religion, national identity, and language. Simply asking, "are you a practicing Muslim/Christian/Jew?" would provide less nuance than a scalar question stating, "religion should be a part of children's education." Furthermore, by asking multiple questions about each topic a fuller picture of the attitudes of the participants can be obtained.

The fourth section presented questions on background information, mostly in the form of close-ended questions with multiple-choice answer options. I asked about where they live, where they were born, level of education, what line of work they and their parents are in, whether they were married, with whom they lived, as well as several other questions.

The fifth section, similar to the third, is aimed at capturing a more nuanced report of the views of the respondents toward life, culture, religion and national identity, although this section was made up of open-ended questions. Participants were asked to complete a series of sentences in any way that they wanted to. For example, "A good Muslim speaks…" Sixteen sentences were presented to the participants in this way. In the results and discussion chapters, I will only discuss the results from this section in so far as they a) reflect attitudes toward language, religion or national identity or b) shed light on the responses to the close-ended questions from the other sections. Therefore, not all of the sixteen sentences will be discussed.

The sixth and final section was on language use. Respondents were asked a series of scalar questions about how often they use French, Darija or a mixture of French and Darija in various settings and with various people, as well as for doing and

communicating certain things. However, this data will not be discussed in this current analysis for two reasons. First, the original purpose of looking at usage was to compare between genders. As was discussed in the introduction, a gender comparison was not possible, making an examination of usage less of a priority for the current study. Second, due to the length of the survey, and the placement of this section at the end, many participants did not reach it. The language use section was deemed the lowest priority and was put at the end in anticipation of a low completion rate. A more thorough piloting process before launching the survey may have helped to avoid this problem in one of the following two ways: a) moving the section toward the first half of the survey, or b) shortening the survey overall. Moving the language use section toward the first half would have meant de-prioritizing other more important sections on language and cultural attitudes. In future surveys, I will be more sensitive to the length of the survey in order to improve the chance of participants completing all sections.

The survey was written in French and proofread by two native French speakers to ensure authenticity. The survey was administered in French, rather than SA or Darija because most participants would not have been literate enough in SA to take it in that language. Even if I had found participants who were literate in SA, it would be a self-selected group who may already have had relatively positive attitudes toward SA because they had chosen to study it. It would also not have been feasible to administer the survey in Darija because it is a language that is primarily transmitted in the diaspora verbally from one generation to the next and does not have a standardized written form that would have been accessible to all participants. Even if some participants could read and write in the language, many would not, which would have significantly narrowed my participant pool. It was further deemed preferable to offer it in only one language because of concerns that surveys done in different languages are not comparable because the

language in which participants take the survey affects how they respond (Richard & Toffoli, 2009).

The survey was made completely anonymous in order to reduce the risk of researcher bias, where the participant responds in the way they think the researcher would prefer. Although the participants still could have answered in a way they think would be acceptable to a researcher from the US, it minimized this risk. The anonymity also allowed for more freedom on the part of the participants to respond honestly without any chance of their identity being detected. This was especially important given that the survey asks questions about religious and cultural views, something not usually done in France.

The survey was designed to last between twenty to thirty minutes, a length that may have discouraged completion of the survey. Because this is the primary data for a dissertation it was deemed preferable at the time of construction to ask more questions at the risk of receiving fewer completed responses. I therefore had anticipated a high drop out rate for the survey, not only because of the length, but because this often occurs for surveys (personal communication from the Office of Survey Research at the University of Texas at Austin). For this reason, I structured the survey to have the most important questions at the beginning, so that if participants quit, I would still get responses to the most desired questions, those specifically targeting language and cultural attitudes. Ideally, of course, the survey would be a length that would encourage a high rate of completion. The survey was given to a colleague who shares a similar profile with the target population for the study in order review the materials. She provided feedback for both content and flow of the questionnaire.

4.3.3 Distribution of the Survey

The questionnaire was administered online via the survey software Qualtrics from September 2014 to March 2015, with all but three people responding between September and December 2014. The target population has access to technology and media in a way that no other generation before them has, which makes an online distribution not only feasible but also preferable because it expands the pool of participants one can access. The online format was also useful because I wanted the survey to 'snowball' and get passed on from person to person. In order to facilitate this, I created an online flyer that could easily be pasted into an email or posted to social media. The flyer explained the goal of the survey and the profile for the participants I was targeting and included the link to the actual survey. They flyer can be found in Appendix C.

The flyer was also meant to motivate people to want to participate in the survey. Oppenheim (1992) suggests that in order to do this it is necessary for participants to feel like they are contributing to something important and meaningful. They also need to understand how they are helping the researcher. I described to potential participants how this project was meant to give a voice to a population in France that is often under-studied and is in need of representation. I also explained that their participation would not only contribute to a better understanding of languages in general, but specifically of *their* language(s), in order to give them a sense of ownership and of duty in helping in this exploration. I made sure to include that they would be helping a doctoral student, in the hopes that this would cause them to sympathize with my position and engage the survey. The text of the flyer was proofread by a native French speaker to ensure authenticity before distribution.

I used a number of methods in order to find participants for the survey. I began by reaching out to sociolinguists who specialize in working in France particularly in the

banlieues with the second and third-generation North African population. I emailed individual researchers as well as circulated the flyer on two list serves: Paris Linguists and Réseau Francophone de Sociolinguistique. This method did not produce any results so an alternate strategy was engaged. I found groups on the social media site, Facebook, with names that indicated their members would fit the profile of my target participants, such as "les musulmans de Montpellier" or "communauté algérienne en France." I targeted religious and secular groups equally in order to avoid only recruiting participants who identified with Islam, given that religion and language is one of the main interactions explored in this study. I emailed the administrators of these groups, explained my research to them, and asked them to repost the link to the flyer on their site. Many of the administrators were excited about the work I was doing and were very willing to share the link on their group's page. Their endorsement of the survey certainly helped to encourage members of these groups to read the flyer and begin the survey. I would suggest to the group administrators that they post the link to the flyer with a caption saying some variation of:

> Voulez-vous répondre à un sondage pour aider à une meilleure compréhension des attitudes envers l'arabe et le français? Si oui, cliquez sur le lien pour en savoir plus !
>
> (Would you like to take a survey to contribute to a better understanding of attitudes toward Arabic and French? If so, click on the link to find out more!)

I also contacted a number of Mosques and secular community centers located in neighborhoods with historically high numbers of North African families as well as in major metropolises. By using these methods to find participants I was trying to avoid only getting participants who were highly educated, and instead find people from

different socio-economic levels. Based on responses to the question about how they heard about the survey, the social media campaign was the most successful method for getting respondents.

There are, of course, drawbacks to canvassing for participants on social media. One of these is that there may be unforeseen consequences to reaching out to the administrators of Facebook groups. Because I was messaging Facebook members with whom I was not friends, sometimes multiple people per day, Facebook was alerted and they shut down my ability to message users who were not my friends for one month. I changed tactics and began friend requesting the administrators before messaging them. I eventually received notification from Facebook that I should only be messaging people whom I knew in real life. This was an unanticipated speed bump in my data collection. In the future, researchers should start well in advance of launching the survey to begin fostering an online presence that would encourage natural interaction with the target population and with people who might know members of the target population. Another drawback of canvassing on social media sites in the manner that I did is that the people participating in these groups may already identify with North African or Muslim identity given that they are going out of their way to associate with other people with similar backgrounds on this medium.

4.3.4 Respondents

The target population for this study was the 'new' second generation of North African Arabophone immigrants in France. Because of the very different linguistic histories of Arabic and Berber-speaking North Africans, and because I am studying attitudes toward French and Arabic, but not Berber, I tried to limit my research to Arabic speakers to the extent possible. They also have a different history of immigration in

France because of their different ethnolinguistic heritage. Berber-speakers in France do need to be studied, but it was outside of the scope of the current project to try to find an even number of Arabic and Berber speakers. Despite this attempt to focus on Arabophones, it is very likely that Berber-Arabic bilinguals will respond to the survey, which is why Berber was included in discussions of previous literature and history in Chapters 2 and 3.

With every wave of immigration from the Maghreb there is a new first generation of immigrants, and subsequently, when they have children, a new second generation. There are, therefore, multiple second generations living in France. My research is focused on the population of second-generation North Africans who are between the ages of 18 and 30. These are the most recent wave of the second generation who has reached maturity. They are voters and in the work force and represent the contemporary North African voice in France. It is important to understand how this group views themselves and their position linguistically vis-à-vis the French state and French cultural patrimony because it can act as a sort of litmus test of the relationship between France and the descendants of its former colonies. In order to target this group, I advertised for people ages 18 to 30 who were born in France, but whose parents were born in North Africa and were Arabic speakers.

Most studies on language attitudes, especially those in the Maghreb, have collected data from highly educated individuals (Chakrani, 2010; Benrabah, 2007), because this is a population who is guaranteed to be literate, is easy to contact and is easier to convince to participate in a study. Researchers are more likely to have contacts at universities, which allows for access to students and which provides institutional credibility to the researcher. Unfortunately, this means that only a slice of the population gets studied because those with a university education are literate and tend to belong to a

higher SES, or if they did not upon entering school, they most likely will after receiving their degree.

For these reasons, I tried to collect data from participants from a range of SES levels, by not going through the university to find participants. However, I was unable to avoid focusing exclusively on the literate population because of the nature of written surveys. Doing oral interviews was not considered an acceptable alternative out of concerns of interviewer bias. Because I am investigating the attitudes of a highly marginalized population that is predominantly ethnically Arab and of Muslim heritage, my position as a white Western woman could cause problems were I to interact with them in a face to face manner. I was concerned that participants would either have been too timid to meet me and answer questions openly, a problem that Killian (2006) encountered, or that they would have answered questions according to what they thought I viewed as socially acceptable in terms of the majority French culture.

4.4 Analysis of Data

The data from the survey was analyzed in three ways. The first was to gather the percentages of responses to questions about language proficiency from section one of the survey, language attitudes from section two and responses to scalar questions on cultural and religious identity from section three. This is the primary method of analysis used in most language attitude surveys (Bentahila, 1983; Chakrani, 2010; Benrabah, 2007). Following this procedure allows for comparison between studies and also provides a basic understanding of how languages are viewed by the population being studied.

The second method of analysis was to examine the qualitative open-ended sentence completion questions from section five and the comments from throughout the

survey in order to look for trends in responses, particularly those that refer to religion, language, North African identity or attitudes toward France. I also looked for responses that could shed light on the quantitative answers from the rest of the survey.

The third method of analysis was to run correlations to look at the relationships between a) religious attitudes and language attitudes, b) national identity and language attitudes, and c) proficiency and language attitudes. I used a Pearson's product moment correlation to run the correlations. Analysis of the data in sections one and three was straightforward because the majority of questions were either scalar or multiple-choice. However, in order to analyze the questions from section two, where participants were asked to select adjectives to describe each language, the responses needed to be coded as either positive or negative, as seen in Table 4.1. Not all of the adjectives were used in the dichotomy because they did not always fit. For example, 'religious' may be a positive attribute to one person but a negative one to someone else, depending on whether they themselves are religious. In addition to the adjectives with which I provided the participants, they sometimes wrote in their own. When possible I assigned these as positive or negative as well. It could be argued that the decision of which adjectives were deemed positive/negative is arbitrary; however, for the most part the dichotomy is clear. This methodology follows in the language attitude tradition of categorizing responses into different domains for the purpose of analysis, such as solidarity traits versus status traits (Bentahila, 1983; Chakrani 2010). In this way the analysis can be more nuanced, and go beyond raw percentages of responses. Of course, when making these decisions there is a certain amount of risk of subjectivity that must be accepted.

Table 4.1 Adjective Selection Coding

POSITIVE	**NEGATIVE**
Practical	Dead
Moral	Not useful
Rich	Obsolete
Flexible	Close minded
Beautiful	Boring
Modern	Ugly
Alive	Impolite
Necessary	Absurd
Prestigious	Poor
Cool	Severe
Proud	
Educated	
Intelligent	
Free	
Funny	

The relationship between religious attitudes and language attitudes was tested by running correlations between the scalar responses to statement agreement questions about religion with a) the scalar responses to statement agreement questions about language, and b) the number of positive and negative adjectives selected to describe each language. To test the relationship between national identity and language attitudes, I similarly ran correlations between the scalar responses to statements about France, the Maghreb and pan-Arab identity with the scalar responses to statements about language as well as the number of positive and negative adjectives selected to describe each language. The same method was again used when testing the relationship between proficiency and language attitudes. One-tailed tests were used for correlations for which there was a hypothesis on the direction of significance. These hypotheses were stated with the relevant research question. Two-tailed tests were used for the correlations for which there were no

hypotheses concerning direction of significance. Two-tailed tests are indicated with an asterisk next to the p-value.

4.5 CONCLUSION

In the language attitudes field there are multiple ways of assessing attitudes including interviews, the MGT, societal treatment studies and questionnaires. Each method has its own specific goal in terms of prioritizing certain aspects of language attitudes, as well as its own benefits and drawbacks. For the purpose of this study, questionnaires were the most appropriate given my status as a Western woman and the anonymity that an online questionnaire could provide to participants being asked sensitive questions about religion and national identity at a time when tensions are running high in France. The survey was carefully constructed using previous language attitudes studies as a source and guide. It was then distributed via social media to groups that identified as part of the North African diaspora in France, both secular and religious. The data was analyzed 1) in terms of raw numbers and percentages, 2) qualitatively, and 3) by running correlations. In the next chapter, I discuss the response rates and the background of the population before moving on to a presentation of the results from these analyses.

5. Results

In the previous chapter, I reviewed the types of methodology commonly used in the assessment of language attitudes and motivated my choice to use a questionnaire. I presented my methodology, including participant selection, questionnaire design, data collection and analysis. In this chapter, I present the results from the questionnaire, including the background information of the participants, the raw data from the questions on language attitudes, culture and religion, and the results of the correlations. Where appropriate and illustrative I make reference to the comments left by participants or to the qualitative responses from section five. The results of the questionnaire are presented according to each of the research questions that are repeated below for convenience.

RQ1. What traits or values do young second-generation North Africans associate with French, Standard Arabic, and Darija?

RQ2. What are the religious and cultural attitudes of this population?

RQ3. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward Islam?

RQ4. How are attitudes toward Darija and French associated with attitudes toward the Maghreb?

RQ5. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward individuals from other Arab countries?

RQ6. How are attitudes toward French and Darija associated with attitudes toward France?

RQ7. Are high levels of proficiency in a language predictive of positive attitudes toward that language and the culture associated with it?

5.1 PARTICIPANTS

A total of 119 people opened the link to the survey. Out of these 119 respondents, 48 (40%) completed the survey up through section three.[34] By section four, the background section, participants begin to drop out, with an acceleration in dropout in section five, which consisted of open-ended questions. A 40% completion rate was not unexpected, given the length of the survey. Participants who completed the survey took between 20 minutes to an hour and a half to complete it, although the majority took between 20 and 40 minutes. It is not clear whether those who took an hour or longer were actually engaged in the survey the entire time, or whether they left their computer and came back to it later.

The goal was to find a balanced number of male and female participants in order to have an accurate and generalizable picture of the language attitudes of the second-generation North African population in France. It was also desirable so that I could look for correlations between attitudes and gender, given that women may have more positive views toward French because of its association with the material freedom available to women in France as compared to the Maghreb. Unfortunately, out of the 48 participants who completed the survey through section four, only five were male, making a gender comparison impossible. The male respondents were, therefore, eliminated from the

[34] These participants sometimes skipped individual questions. The reason for this is unclear but will contribute to varying total response numbers in the data.

correlations in order to make the results from these analyses cleaner. I will be able to draw clearer conclusions if the correlations are done solely on the female participants, rather than on a group of *mostly* women where I would not be able to make inferences about women in the North African diaspora in France in general.

In addition to the 48 people who completed sections one through four, 17 people answered only portions of these sections. While these additional participants are not included in the correlations because their response pattern was erratic, they are included in all tables showing the raw responses for questions from sections one, two, three and four. The five male participants were also included in these tallies. For these reasons, the tables for raw percentages will vary in number of participants. The correlations will have between 39 and 43 participants because participants skipped some questions.

5.1.1 Background of Participants

All but 4 of the 48 participants who reached the background section were born in France. These four participants, who were born in North Africa, were included in the analysis not only because of the low number of participant responses overall, but also because it was not clear at what age they came to France. They rated themselves as highly proficient in both French and Darija, indicating that they either began learning French early in North Africa before coming to France, or that they came to France as young children and learned French through the French education system and with friends. Rumbaut (2002) defines people who immigrate before the age of 18 as members of the "1.5-generation," because they are neither fully part of the first generation nor the second. Thirty-nine participants stated that their parents were born in the Maghreb (Table 5.1). Of the five who selected 'other,' two left comments explaining that one parent was born in the Maghreb and one in France. Four participants selected 'France' as the place of their

parents' birth. The average age of respondents was 25. Because of low completion rates I accepted one 33 year old.

Table 5.1 Parents' Place of Birth

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
France	4	8%
Algeria	17	35%
Morocco	15	31%
Tunisia	7	15%
Other*	5	10%
Total	**48**	**100%**
***OTHER:**		
Algeria and Morocco		
France/Tunisia		
My father in Tunisia and my mother in France.		

When asked what city they reside in (Table 5.2), the majority of respondents reported living in either the Lyon or the Montpellier areas. Only two came from Marseille and four from the Paris area. The other nine lived in different cities throughout France, with one living in Spain.

Table 5.2 City of Residence

CITY	NUMBER
Lyon (and surroundings)	16
Marseille	2
Montpellier (and surroundings)	15
Paris (and surroundings)	4
Other:	9
Total	**46**

Participants were also asked with whom they live (Table 5.3). Fifty percent said that they reside with their parents, although it is not clear if they have not yet moved out

or whether their parents have come to stay with them and their family.[35] Of those who did not report that they lived with their parents, the majority live with their spouse.

Table 5.3 With Whom Participants Live

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
My parents	24	50%
My Spouse	15	31%
My Friend(s)	2	4%
My Grandparents	0	0%
Alone	5	10%
My Friend/Girlfriend	1	2%
My children	1	2%
Total	**48**	**100%**

Participants were also asked whether and how often they go back to the Maghreb to visit family (Table 5.4). This was done in order to understand how strong their ties are with their parents' country of origin. Only one participant reported never going to North Africa. Forty-seven percent said that they go less than once a year and 51% said that they go one time a year or more. Of those who reported visiting the Maghreb, the majority reported that they speak Darija while visiting there, with French coming in second (Table 5.5). Five participants reported speaking Tamazight while in North Africa indicating that some of the participants may have at least one parent of Berber origin or that they are visiting an area where Berber is often spoken. The reported frequency with which family from the Maghreb visits the participants in France is much lower than visits to the Maghreb (Table 5.6). Sixty-three percent said members of their family who live in the Maghreb never visit France. Only 22% said that family comes once or more per year.

[35] This is consistent with a 2011 poll that found that 48% of young people ages 18-29 living in European Union member states lived with their parents, or the parents of their spouse (Eurofound, 2014).

Table 5.4 Frequency of Visiting the Maghreb

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
Never	1	2%
Less than once a year	22	47%
Once a year	14	30%
More than once a year	10	21%
Total	**47**	**100%**

Table 5.5 Language(s) Spoken When in the Maghreb

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
French	13	27%
Dialectal Arabic (Darija)	29	60%
Standard Arabic	1	2%
Tamazight	5	10%
Total	**48**	**100%**

Table 5.6 Frequency of Family Visiting from the Maghreb

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
Never	29	63%
Less than once a year	7	15%
Once a year	6	13%
More than once a year	4	9%
Total	**46**	**100%**

The majority of participants (61%) said that they are neither married nor engaged (Table 5.7). This is consistent with data from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe that found that the average age of first marriage for men and women in France in 2010 was 30 and 31.8, respectively. Of those who are married or engaged, 42% said that their spouse/fiancé was born in North Africa and 47% said that he/she was born in France (Table 5.8).

Table 5.7 Number of Participants Married or Engaged

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
Married/Engaged	19	39%
Not Married/Engaged	30	61%
Total	**49**	**100%**

Table 5.8 Spouse or Fiancé's Place of Birth

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
France	9	47%
North Africa	8	42%
England	0	0%
Spain	0	0%
Netherlands	0	0%
Other	2	11%
Total	**19**	**100%**

Participants were also asked whether they were religious, and if so, what religion they belonged to. As displayed in Table 5.9, only 1 of the 48 participants who reached this portion of the survey claimed not to be religious. Of the 47 who are religious, 45 participants identified religiously with Islam. The two who did not, identified as Christian.

Table 5.9 Religious Identity of Participants

ANSWER	RESPONSE	(CHRISTIAN)	(MUSLIM)	%
Religious	47	(2)	(45)	98%
Not Religious	1	-	-	2%
Total	**48**	**-**	**-**	**100%**

The results for years of schooling for the 48 participants who completed the background section of the survey can be seen in Table 5.10. Although there are some

individuals who are highly educated (19% had their master's degree), there are also several who have not gone beyond high school (19%). It is important to note that many of the participants were between ages 18 and 22, and may still have been in the process of completing their education at the time of taking the survey. Therefore, this data does not necessarily indicate the highest level of education they will attain.

Table 5.10 Years of Schooling

ANSWER	**RESPONSE**	**%**
Middle School	1	2%
High School	9	19%
Some years in College	10	21%
College Degree	19	40%
Masters Degree	9	19%
Doctorate	0	0%
Total	**48**	**100%**

Forty percent of respondents were currently students when they took the survey (Table 5.11). This is unsurprising given that 33% of participants were between ages 18 and 22, and that the average age of university students in France is 21.5 (Rey-Lefebvre, 2011). The rest of the participants are somewhat distributed in terms of occupation, although there are none who worked as doctors, engineers or in computer science, jobs that would indicate being on the high end of the SES spectrum in France. However, there were three people who reported being in middle management positions, and one who is a translator and professional writer.

Table 5.11 Employment of Participant

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
Student	19	40%
Computer Science	0	0%
Medicine	0	0%
Engineering	0	0%
Education	2	4%
Manual Labor	2	4%
Executive/Middle Management	3	6%
Homemaker	4	8%
Bureaucrat	5	10%
Unemployed	4	8%
Other*	9	19%
Total	**48**	**100%**
***OTHER:**		
Office worker		
Skilled shipping worker		
Office worker		
Translator, professional writer		
French language teaching aid in England		
Maternity leave		
Sales clerk		

Participants were also asked about their father and mother's employment, the results of which can be seen in tables 5.12 and 5.13 respectively. More than 50% of participants said their fathers worked in blue-collar jobs or were out of work. None had fathers who were doctors or engineers or were in education. Fifty-two percent of participants' mothers were homemakers. For families where the mother also worked, most worked in childcare and house cleaning, although one did work in computer science.

Table 5.12 Father's Employment

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
Education	0	0%
Computer Science	0	0%
Medicine	1	2%
Engineering	1	2%
Manual Labor	25	52%
Executive/Middle Management	3	6%
Homemaker	0	0%
Bureaucrat	3	6%
Unemployed	2	4%
Other*	13	27%
Total	**48**	**100%**
***OTHER:**		
Retired		
Crane operator		
Retired		
He has been dead for seven years		
Landlord/Proprietor		
Artisan baker		
Retired		
Storekeeper		
Social worker specializing in social integration and professional development of handicapped individuals		
Military		
Retired		

Table 5.13 Mother's Employment

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
Education	2	4%
Computer Science	1	2%
Medicine	0	0%
Engineering	0	0%
Manual Labor	4	8%
Executive/Middle Management	2	4%
Homemaker	25	52%
Bureaucrat	4	8%
Unemployed	2	4%
Other*	8	17%
Total	**48**	**100%**
***OTHER:**		
Retired		
Childcare provider		
Caretaker (in-home)		
Childcare provider		
Administrative assistant		
Maid		
Maid/domestic help		

The results for languages spoken can be seen in Table 5.14. Participants were allowed to choose as many responses as they wanted. Seventy-five percent claim to know Darija, and a surprisingly high number of participants claimed to speak Standard Arabic (35%). Forty-two percent of participants said they speak other languages in addition to those listed, generally English and/or Spanish. Despite my efforts to avoid Berber speakers, several participants did claim some proficiency in Berber in addition to other

languages (10 out of 48). These participants were included in the analysis because they may have been the children of one Berber and one Arabic speaking parent. One notable anomaly is that only 47 of the 48 participants included in this table claim to speak French. Clearly the one participant who claimed not to speak French was able to take the survey, leading me to conclude that a) she assumed that it was a given that she speaks French and that I was asking what other languages she speaks, b) it was just an accident that she did not select it, or c) someone was with her translating the survey for her. In any case, she was able to complete the survey.

Table 5.14 Languages Spoken by Participants

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
French	47	98%
Darija	36	75%
Standard Arabic	17	35%
Tamazight	10	21%
Other	20	42%

Participants were asked to rate themselves on a scale of one to five in how well they speak and understand French, Darija, Standard Arabic (SA) and Tamazight, as seen in Tables 5.15 and 5.16. The mean for speaking and understanding French was very high (4.61 and 4.87, respectively), which is not surprising given that these students were, for the most part, raised in France and went through the French school system. The second most spoken and understood language of the participants is Darija (3.26 and 3.67 respectively), followed by SA and then Tamazight. A moderate to low level of knowledge of SA is reported, which is unsurprising given that language classes are available in some Mosques and universities, although it is not as prevalent or available as

it is in North Africa. It is worth noting that the responses range from 65 to 68 total participants for these questions. It is not clear why a participant would rate their proficiency in French and Darija, but not in Standard Arabic and Tamazight. It is possible that these participants either did not understand the format, or did not rate themselves in the languages that they do not speak/understand.

Of the four participants whose parents were born in France, all rated themselves at high levels of comprehension of Darija. For speaking Darija, two responded *well* or *perfectly*, and the other two responded *not at all* or *not well*. This indicates that having parents born in France does not necessarily imply low proficiency in Darija.

Table 5.15 Self-Rated Proficiency in Speaking

QUESTION	NOT AT ALL	NOT VERY WELL	SOME WHAT WELL	WELL	PERFECTLY	TOTAL RESPONSES
French	1	0	2	18	46	67
Darija	10	14	10	16	18	68
SA	31	15	7	9	3	65
Tamazight	44	8	3	7	3	65

Table 5.16 Self-Rated Proficiency in Comprehension

QUESTION	NOT AT ALL	NOT VERY WELL	SOME WHAT WELL	WELL	PERFECTLY	TOTAL RESPONSES
French	1	0	0	5	61	67
Darija	7	11	6	16	27	67
SA	19	21	14	9	4	67
Tamazight	43	5	6	5	7	66

5.2 RESULTS

The results of the survey will be presented based on how they pertain to each of the seven research questions. Any additional findings are reported at the end of this section.

5.2.1 Language Attitudes

The first results that I present are those pertaining to the first research question, which concerns basic language attitudes:

> *RQ1. What traits or values do young second-generation North Africans associate with French, Standard Arabic, and Darija?*

The results in this section come from questions from sections two and three of the survey and include all participants who completed each question. This number ranges from the 44 to 66. In Table 5.17 the results from the question "what language do you consider your 'own' language" are presented. The majority of participants chose French as their own language (73%); however, some also chose Darija (20%). Based on the follow up question of 'why,' most participants appear to have chosen their 'own'

language based on the language that they know the best, which for these participants was French. However, for those who chose Darija, the reasons given had more to do with family, identity, and their origins, rather than proficiency. These results, and the comments that participants left, will be considered in more detail in the discussion chapter.

Table 5.17 Participant's 'Own' Language

ANSWER	**RESPONSE**	**%**
French	48	73%
Tamazight	3	5%
SA	2	3%
Darija	13	20%
Total	**66**	**100%**

Tables 5.18-20 display the results from the adjective selection task for French, Standard Arabic and Darija respectively. Participants were allowed to choose as many adjectives as they wanted and were also given room to leave comments. French is most widely seen as *necessary* (52%), *rich* (43%), and *practical* (43%), all fairly perfunctory adjectives, in the sense that the language is necessary and practical for daily life in France. French was also described as *educated* (29%), not surprising given that it is the language of education in France, as well as *alive* (29%), and *beautiful* (29%). There were only four comments concerning this task, some of which indicated confusion about how adjectives could be applied to a language.[36] Some of the additional adjectives that were selected to describe French included *useful*, *stupid*, *arrogant*, and *difficult*.

[36] In a future study, this confusion could be mitigated by instructing participants to answer the question like a free association talk, indicating that I would like them to assign adjectives that they *associate* with the language, rather than adjectives that *describe* the language, given that languages do not have inherent qualities.

Most of the responses for Standard Arabic were positive (Table 5.19). Seventy-one percent of participants chose *religious*, 68% found it to be *beautiful*, and 57% viewed it as *rich*, all of which follows from the strong relationship between SA and Islam and the centuries of accompanying language ideology. Other adjectives that were selected by over 40% of participants were *interesting* (48%), *necessary* (43%), *traditional* (43%) and *prestigious* (41%), overall a very positive view of the language.

The top three adjectives selected for Darija were *practical* (61%), *traditional* (52%), and *necessary* (50%) (Table 5.20). Darija may be practical and necessary for communicating at home where Darija is predominantly spoken, while it is traditional because it is the language of their heritage. Other adjectives that were selected were *free* (30%), *cool* (26%), *fun* (26%), and *flexible* (26%), indicating that Darija is a language in which the second generation feels comfortable and informal. The two additional adjectives that were added were *useful* and *spoken*.

Table 5.18 Adjectives Selected to Describe French

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
Dead	1	2%
Obsolete	1	2%
Religious	1	2%
Ugly	1	2%
Impolite	1	2%
Not Useful	2	3%
Severe	2	3%
Fun	2	3%
None of these	2	3%
Modest	3	5%
Boring	3	5%
Absurd	3	5%
Moral	4	7%
Poor	4	7%
Traditional	5	9%
Cool	6	10%
Proud	6	10%
Other	6	10%
Flexible	7	12%
Modern	9	16%
Close-Minded	9	16%
Free	10	17%
Intelligent	12	21%
Interesting	15	26%
Prestigious	16	28%
Beautiful	17	29%
Alive	17	29%
Educated	17	29%
Practical	25	43%
Rich	25	43%
Necessary	30	52%
Total: 58		

Table 5.19 Adjective Selected to Describe Standard Arabic

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
Obsolete	0	0%
Not Useful	0	0%
Impolite	0	0%
Severe	1	2%
Boring	1	2%
Ugly	1	2%
Close-Minded	1	2%
None of these	1	2%
Poor	2	4%
Dead	2	4%
Absurd	2	4%
Modest	2	4%
Fun	3	5%
Flexible	5	9%
Other	5	9%
Cool	6	11%
Free	7	13%
Moral	8	14%
Modern	9	16%
Proud	14	25%
Practical	19	34%
Alive	19	34%
Intelligent	20	36%
Educated	21	38%
Prestigious	23	41%
Traditional	24	43%
Necessary	24	43%
Interesting	27	48%
Rich	32	57%
Beautiful	38	68%
Religious	40	71%
Total: 56		

Table 5.20 Adjectives Selected to Describe Darija

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
Close-Minded	0	0%
Dead	0	0%
Absurd	1	2%
Prestigious	1	2%
Severe	1	2%
Ugly	2	4%
Impolite	2	4%
Boring	2	4%
Obsolete	2	4%
Intelligent	2	4%
Other	2	4%
Poor	3	6%
Educated	3	6%
Not Useful	3	6%
Proud	4	7%
Moral	4	7%
None of These	4	7%
Modest	5	9%
Religious	6	11%
Modern	8	15%
Beautiful	10	19%
Interesting	11	20%
Rich	11	20%
Cool	14	26%
Fun	14	26%
Flexible	14	26%
Free	16	30%
Alive	18	33%
Necessary	27	50%
Traditional	28	52%
Practical	33	61%
Total: 54		

After completing the adjective selection portion of the language attitude section, participants were asked which language was the most X, where X represents an adjective. Table 5.21 shows the responses for “Which language is the most beautiful?”, with SA

receiving by far the most votes (82%). Many of the comments that accompanied this response made reference to the sonority and richness of the language. Two people made reference to it being the language of the Qur'an. One participant said that they did not see a difference between SA and Darija, one praised SA for being a universal language and another called it the "la vrai langue arabe" ("true Arabic language").

Table 5.21 The Most Beautiful Language

ANSWER	**RESPONSE**	**%**
French	7	13%
Darija	3	5%
SA	45	82%
Total	**55**	**100%**

SA was also chosen as the most *moral* language (Table 5.22), although by a slightly smaller margin. Two people argued that SA is moral because of its connection with the Qur'an, one noting that it is sacred because it is the language of the revelation of Islam's holy book. Of the eight comments that were left, four either said that a language cannot be moral or expressed hesitation about labeling a language in this way. One participant responded this way to several of the superlative adjective tasks. She is cautious about assigning some types of adjective to a language (e.g. *modern*, *modest*, *traditional* etc.) because she is aware that languages do not have inherent qualities.

Table 5.22 The Most Moral Language

ANSWER		RESPONSE	%
French		10	20%
Darija		6	12%
SA		34	68%
Total		**50**	**100%**

French was considered the most *modern* language (Table 5.23), with Darija and SA tied for second place. One notion that came up more than once in the comments for this question was the idea that French is more modern because it is a more 'recent' language than Arabic, as opposed to it representing modernity in a cultural sense. The comments from those who chose Darija mentioned that it is innovative, or used for new fashion trends and music.

Table 5.23 The Most Modern Language

ANSWER		RESPONSE	%
French		30	58%
Darija		11	21%
SA		11	21%
Total		**52**	**100%**

Darija was selected as the *coolest* language over French and SA by a margin of at least 20% for each language (Table 5.24). Only those who selected Darija left a comment. One said that it has fewer grammatical rules and is more "subject to evolution." While others said that it has phrases that are not translatable into French, is fun, and is playful.

Table 5.24 The Coolest Language

ANSWER		RESPONSE	%
French		11	23%
Darija		23	49%
SA		13	28%
Total		**47**	**100%**

Although *practical* was widely chosen to describe French, SA and Darija in the adjective selection tasks, French came out clearly as the most *practical* language with 69% of the participants selecting it (Table 5.25). This is not surprising given that it is required for school, work and interacting with the state, and is used on a daily basis.

Table 5.25 The Most Practical Language

ANSWER		RESPONSE	%
French		38	69%
Darija		8	15%
SA		9	16%
Total		**55**	**100%**

SA was chosen by 85% of participants as the most *religious* language (Table 5.26), an expected result given that SA is the language of the Qur'an and the Hadith. Of the two participants who chose French as the most religious language, one was Christian. Fifteen percent of participants chose Darija, instead of SA, as the most religious language, indicating some possibility for the dialect to take on some of the religious associations of the standard variety. Only people who chose SA left comments, all of which cited SA's relationship to the Qur'an. One comment in particular gave more detail on the topic:

> C'est une langue, qui même si on ne peut la comprendre, on la connaît, on la parle surtout lors de la prière ou de la lecture du Coran. Par exemple en Turquie, il ne

> parle pas arabe, mais beaucoup connaissent la Fatiha, la récite en arabe, sans forcément comprendre l'arabe.[37]
>
> It is a language that, even if you cannot understand it, you know it, you speak it especially during prayer or the reading of the Qur'an. For example, in Turkey, they don't speak Arabic, but many people know the *Fatiha*, the recitation in Arabic, without actually understanding Arabic.

This participant emphasizes the strong role of SA in the practicing of Islam throughout the Muslim world, even in countries where no dialect of Arabic is spoken. It also highlights that positive attitudes can coexist with low levels of proficiency.

Table 5.26 The Most Religious Language

ANSWER		RESPONSE	%
French		2	4%
Darija		6	11%
SA		46	85%
Total		**54**	**100%**

Fifty-seven percent of participants chose French as the most *boring* language (Table 5.27), followed by Darija (30%) and SA (14%). The comments indicate that French was selected most often because it is the language that is used in daily interactions and mundane duties outside of the home. Darija, too, is used for mundane duties in the home, but is not seen by as many people as boring.

Table 5.27 The Most Boring Language

ANSWER		RESPONSE	%
French		25	57%
Darija		13	30%
SA		6	14%
Total		**44**	**100%**

[37] The *Fatiha* is the first chapter of the Qur'an.

Darija was chosen by the majority of participants as the most *traditional* language (Table 5.28), presumably because of its ties to the tradition and history of the families of the participants. It is the language of their ancestral home. As one participant pointed out, Darija is the language that all of the generations of her family speak the best. Two participants commented that they would have liked to select two languages: SA and Darija, and French and Darija.

Table 5.28 The Most Traditional Language

ANSWER		**RESPONSE**	**%**
French		6	12%
Darija		33	65%
SA		12	24%
Total		**51**	**100%**

Darija was seen by 73% of participants as the most *fun* language (Table 5.29). The comments both here and from the adjective selection task indicate that participants view Darija as a language without grammatical rules and one that can be more easily bent and played with. As discussed above, this may be due to the fact that it is a language that is not formally taught, unlike French and SA where grammar is strongly emphasized and proper form required, especially in the French school system.

Table 5.29 The Most Fun Language

ANSWER		RESPONSE	%
French		8	16%
Darija		36	73%
SA		5	10%
Total		**49**	**100%**

Darija was also chosen as the most *modest* language (49%), although this time the margins are smaller between Darija, and French and SA (Table 5.30). The comments indicate that Darija was considered modest in terms of its rules and structure because it is viewed as not having grammatical restrictions, rather than having to do with modesty in the society associated with the language. There were no comments left by participants who chose French or SA.

Table 5.30 The Most Modest Language

ANSWER		RESPONSE	%
French		12	26%
Darija		23	49%
SA		12	26%
Total		**47**	**100%**

In section three, the participants were asked some more specific questions about their attitudes toward Darija and French. They were asked to rate their level of agreement with statements on a five-point scale where one equals *don't agree at all* and five equals *completely agree* (Table 5.31). The mean for the level of agreement with the statement "I prefer to marry someone who speaks Darija" is 2.79. The mean is much higher for the statement "I would like my children to speak Darija" at 4.19. The chances of a child speaking Darija are greatly increased if both parents speak Darija, and yet the desire to have a spouse who speaks Darija is much lower than the desire to have a child speak the

language. This supports the theory that in language attitudes surveys multiple questions should be asked about similar topics in order to obtain more nuance in understanding participants' attitudes. As concerns French, there was a moderate sense that one is freer to express oneself in French with a mean of 3.13; however, 16 participants selected the arguably neutral *3* on the scale.[38] It is further necessary to note that 23 participants selected the extreme points on the scale rendering a bi-modal distribution. Thus the mean is deceptive in indicating overall neutral attitudes toward this statement because it conceals that approximately half of the participants felt very strongly one way or the other about this question.

Table 5.31 Statement Agreement Questions on Darija and French

STATMENT	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**TOTAL RESPONSES**	**MEAN**
I prefer to marry someone who speaks Darija	13	9	9	9	8	48	2.79
I would like my children to speak Darija	3	0	11	5	29	48	4.19
I am freer to express myself in French	11	2	16	6	12	47	3.13

The results from the language attitude portion of the survey indicate that French is seen as being a necessary and practical part of life. Participants selected adjectives like necessary, rich, practical and educated and elected it as the most modern of the three languages. Standard Arabic appears to have maintained its status as the language of

[38] It is important to note that there is some doubt in the language attitudes field over whether the mid-point on a scale truly represents a neutral attitude.

religion, beauty and morality, while Darija is associated with tradition, on the one hand, and with being cool and fun on the other.

5.2.2 Attitudes toward religion and nations

In order to understand how religion, culture and national identity are related to language attitudes, it was necessary to construct questions that specifically targeted these topics. Before discussing the results of the correlations between these questions and the results from the language attitude questions, I will present the raw data in order to get an overview of how these participants view France, the Maghreb, and religion, which addresses the second research question:

RQ2. What are the religious and cultural attitudes of this population?

The results from this section come from the statement agreement task from section three in the survey. Three questions in the survey dealt specifically with attitudes toward the Maghreb (Table 5.32). On the subject of pride of being of North African origin, participants had very positive attitudes, with a mean of 4.67. However, when it comes to taking action on this pride the average is lower. The mean for agreeing with the statement "one day I'd like to live in the Maghreb" was 3.45. While this is still relatively high, it is lower than the mean for the previous statement. When it comes to marrying someone from the Maghreb, the mean level of agreement was only 2.73. While this appears to be a fairly neutral mean, it is important to look more closely at the distribution. Sixteen participants completely disagreed and 11 completely agreed with this statement. Fifteen chose the arguably neutral point on the scale. The mean therefore conceals that 27

of the 49 participants who responded to this question had very strong feelings concerning their marriage preferences, and were not at all neutral on the issue.

Table 5.32 Attitudes toward the Maghreb

STATEMENT	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**TOTAL RESPONSES**	**MEAN**
I am proud to be of North African origin	0	0	5	6	38	49	4.67
One day, I'd like to live in the Maghreb	7	5	13	7	17	49	3.45
I would like to marry someone who was born in the Maghreb	16	5	15	2	11	49	2.73

The responses to questions that asked about attitudes toward France are displayed in Table 5.33. There was a low level of agreement with the statement about feeling freer in France than in the Maghreb. Seventeen participants completely disagreed with this statement, which implies that participants feel very strongly about whether France offers them more freedoms. However, it is worth noting that there was moderate agreement to the statement from the previous section that one is freer to express oneself in French. To the statement "I feel at home in France," the mean was only 2.66, indicating that the participants do not feel highly comfortable in France. Fifty-six percent of participants responded that they *strongly disagree* or *disagree* with that statement. There were similarly strong feelings about how religious France is compared to the Maghreb. The mean level of agreement with the statement that France is a more religious country was only 1.92, with 23 participants completely disagreeing with it.

Table 5.33 Attitudes toward France

STATEMENT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL RESPONSES	MEAN
I feel like I have more freedom in France than in the Maghreb	17	2	12	8	9	48	2.79
I feel at home in France	12	16	7	7	8	50	2.66
France is a more religious country then the Maghreb	23	13	8	1	3	48	1.92

Participants were also asked about the extent to which they identify with people from other Arab countries (Table 5.34). The mean for this statement was 3.61, indicating a fairly high level of pan-Arab identification. This is the only question asked on the topic and so the conclusions that can be drawn are limited.

Table 5.34 Attitudes Toward Pan-Arab identity

STATMENT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL RESPONSES	MEAN
I identify with people from other Arab countries	5	2	14	14	14	49	3.61

The questions concerning religion show that this population holds overall very positive attitudes toward religion (Table 5.35). They agreed strongly that religion is important to themselves, their parents, and as a part of their children's education. The lowest mean for agreement comes for the question on participating in religious activities. While still fairly high at 3.52, it is lower than the other questions, which all had means well over 4.

Table 5.35 Attitudes Toward Religion

STATEMENT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL RESPONSES	MEAN
Religion is important to me	3	0	0	4	41	48	4.67
Religion is important to my parents	2	0	6	10	30	48	4.38
I regularly participate in religious activities	6	5	11	10	16	48	3.52
Religion should be a part of children's education	1	1	6	6	34	48	4.48

Finally, participants were asked to complete the sentence "I identify as" and were permitted to choose as many answers from a list provided to them (Table 5.36). The top two responses were *French* (56%) and *French of North African origin* (40%). Of the 27 participants who selected *French*, all but two of them also selected another adjective that referenced their North African heritage to describe themselves. Therefore, of the 48 participants who answered this question only two of them selected *French* alone. These two participants, as well as why so many participants selected *French*, will be explored further in the discussion chapter.

Table 5.36 Self-identification Task

ANSWER	RESPONSE	%
Berber-French	2	4%
Tunisian-French	3	6%
French-Berber	3	6%
Other	4	8%
Moroccan-French	5	10%
Arab-French	5	10%
French-Tunisian	5	10%
Tunisian	6	13%
French-Arab	7	15%
Algerian-French	7	15%
French-Moroccan	7	15%
Moroccan	8	17%
French-Algerian	11	23%
Berber	12	25%
Algerian	13	27%
French of North African Origin	19	40%
French	27	56%

Overall, the participants in this study expressed high levels of pride in their North African heritage, although slightly lower levels of willingness to take action based on this pride when it comes to things like marrying someone from the Maghreb. Their attitudes toward France were fairly negative in terms of feeling at home and feeling free there, while their attitudes toward religion were very positive. They also expressed a general sense of identifying with people from other Arab countries, although this should be explored further.

5.2.3 Language Attitudes and Religion

The third research question that I pose in this study concerns the interaction between language attitudes and attitudes toward religion:[39]

[39] Note that only the female participants' responses were used in the correlations.

RQ3. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward Islam?

I computed a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient to assess the relationship between number of positive and negative adjectives that participants selected both for Standard Arabic (SAPos and SANeg) and Darija (DarPos and DarNeg), and the level of agreement on a one to five scale with statements on religion labeled REL1, REL2 and REL3 (Table 5.37).[40] As discussed in the previous chapter, adjectives were coded as positive or negative (see Table 4.1), and the number of positive and negative adjectives was tallied for each participant.[41] For each language, the number of positive and negative adjectives used was correlated separately with each statement on religion to look for a relationship between them. As noted in the previous chapter, all correlations were one-tailed unless noted with an asterisk.

Table 5.37 Statements on Religion

CODE	**STATEMENT**
REL1	Religion is important to me.
REL2	I regularly participate in religious activities.
REL3	Religion should be a part of children's education.

The significant results from the correlations between selection of both positive and negative adjectives for Standard Arabic, and level of agreement with statements concerning religion are presented in Table 5.38. There was a very strong positive

[40] A Pearson product-moment correlation was used for all correlations in this study.
[41] Note that not all adjectives fell into categories of positive/negative, for example, the adjective "religious."

correlation between choosing positive attitudes to describe Standard Arabic and agreeing with REL2 (r=.51, n=42, p<.001), indicating that participation in religious activities is correlated with positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic. There was a negative correlation between selection of negative adjectives to describe Standard Arabic and REL1 (r=-.29, n=43, p=.03), where the fewer negative adjectives that participants selected the more they agreed that religion is important to them. There was also a negative correlation between number of negative adjectives selected for Standard Arabic and the statement REL2 (r=-.30, n=42, p=.03), such that the fewer negative adjectives a participant chose for SA the more she participates in religious ceremonies.

Table 5.38 Correlations Between Standard Arabic and Religion

VARIABLES	**P-VALUE**	**CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R)**	**N**	**DEGREES OF FREEDOM**
SAPos & Rel2	p < .001	r = .51	42	40
SANeg & Rel1	p = .03	r = -.29	43	41
SANeg & Rel2	p = .03	r = -.30	42	40

There were no significant correlations between positive and negative adjectives selected for Darija and the statements on religion; however, there were significant correlations between level of agreement toward statements on religion and statements concerning Darija labeled DAR1 and DAR2 (Table 5.39).

Table 5.39 Statements on Darija

CODE	STATEMENT
DAR1	I would prefer to marry someone who speaks Darija.
DAR2	I would like my children to speak Darija.

There were significant correlations between agreeing with the statement DAR2 ("I would like my children to speak Darija") and statements REL1-3 (Table 5.40). DAR2 and REL1 are highly positively correlated ($r=.56$, $p<.001$), DAR2 and REL3 are highly positively correlated ($r=.5$, $p<.001$), and DAR2 and REL2 just reach significance ($r=.26$, $p=.05$), indicating a relationship between the importance of Darija in raising children and positive attitudes toward religion.

Table 5.40 Correlations Between Darija and Religion

VARIABLES	P-VALUE	CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R)	N	DEGREES OF FREEDOM
Dar2 & Rel1	$p < .001$	$r = .56$	42	40
Dar2 & Rel2	$p = .05$	$r = .26$	42	40
Dar2 & Rel3	$p < .001$	$r = .5$	42	40

A separate question was asked in section 3 that specifically targeted the intersection between Darija and religion, in order to see whether it has taken on some of the language ideology usually attributed to SA when compared with French (Table. 5.41). The mean agreement on a scale of one to five for whether Darija supports religious values better than French was 2.85, indicating that there is a weak association between Darija and Islam when the language is compared with French.

Table 5.41 Darija and Religion

STATEMENT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL RESPONSES	MEAN
Darija can support my religious values better than French	11	10	10	9	8	48	2.85

In addition to the quantitative data, I looked at the qualitative questions in section five where participants were asked to complete a series of sentences. For the phrase beginning "A good Muslim speaks…" 10 out of 35 (29%) participants made reference to Arabic. Some examples of comments include:

> …ce qu'elle veut, mais le coran doit être récité en arabe, alors si elle connait l'arabe cela lui facilitera la tâche.
>
> (…whatever she wants, but the Qur'an must be recited in Arabic, so if she knows Arabic it will help facilitate the task.)

> …arabe littéraire et toutes les autres langues car l'islam n'a pas de nationalité.
>
> (…Standard Arabic and all other languages because Islam has no nationality.)

> …sa langue et apprend la langue de sa religion.
>
> (…his/her language and learn the language of his/her religion.)

> …l'arabe dialectal ou littéraire et fait des efforts chaque jours pour s'améliorer.
>
> (…dialectal or Standard Arabic and make daily effort to improve him/herself.)

Almost one third of participants who completed this sentence have a sense that although Muslims may speak many languages, they ought all to have some familiarity

with Arabic. Some specify Standard Arabic by referring to the language of the Qur'an or "arabe littéraire" while others just use the term "Arabic." One participant, however, argues that the Qur'an is beautiful in all languages so it does not matter what language a Muslim speaks.

The results from this section indicate that positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic are associated with positive attitudes toward religion. Attitudes toward Darija are also positively correlated with positive attitudes toward religion, although only when it comes to raising children with Darija as part of their life.

5.2.4 Language Attitudes and National Attitudes

In this section, I present the results from the questions and correlations having to do with language attitudes and attitudes toward North Africa, France and the Pan-Arab identity in order to examine the answers to research questions 4-6. The data comes from sections two and three in the survey. I begin with research question 4:

> *RQ4. How are attitudes toward Darija and French associated with attitudes toward the Maghreb?*

The same methodology used to assess RQ3 was used for RQ4. I computed a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient to assess the relationship between the number of positive and negative adjectives each participant selected (based on my coding system) for Darija (DarPos and DarNeg) and their level of agreement, on a one to five scale, with statements concerning the Maghreb labeled MAG1, MAG2, and MAG3. These statements on the Maghreb can be seen in Table 5.42. The same type of correlation was run between the number of positive and negative adjectives participants selected to

describe French (FRPos and FRNeg) and their level of agreement, on a one to five scale, with statements about the Maghreb. For each language, the number of positive and negative adjectives was correlated separately with each statement to look for a relationship.

Table 5.42 Statements on the Maghreb

CODE	STATEMENT
MAG1	I am proud of being of North African descent.
MAG2	I would like to live in North Africa one day.
MAG3	I would like to marry someone who was born in North Africa.

Only two correlations were significant for Darija (Table 5.43). There was a highly significant positive correlation between the selection of positive adjectives to describe Darija and the level of agreement with the statement MAG3 about the desire to marry someone who was born in North Africa ($r=.37$, $p<.01$). There was also a negative correlation between negative adjectives selected for Darija and level of agreement with statement MAG1 ($r=-.27$, $p=.04$), where the fewer negative adjectives that were chosen for Darija the more participants agreed that they are proud of their North African heritage. These correlations indicate a relationship between positive attitudes toward Darija and positive attitudes toward the Maghreb.

Table 5.43 Attitudes Toward Darija and the Maghreb

VARIABLES	P-VALUE	CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R)	N	DEGREES OF FREEDOM
DarPos & Mag3	$p < .01$	$r = .37$	43	41
DarNeg & Mag1	$p = .04$	$r = -.27$	41	39

Correlations were also run between level of agreement with statements about the Maghreb (MAG1-3) and statements about Darija (DAR1-2). There was a weak positive correlation between DAR2 and MAG2 (r=.26, p=.05), and DAR2 and MAG3 (r=.26, p=.05) indicating a connection between a desire to teach children to speak Darija, and both a desire to live in North Africa and a desire to marry someone born in North Africa (Table 5.44). There were also positive correlations between DAR1 and MAG1 (r=.25, p=.05), and DAR1 and MAG3 (r=.36, p<.01), although the correlation with MAG3 was much stronger. Preference to marry a Darija speaker (DAR1) is correlated both with pride in North African heritage (MAG1) and a desire to marry someone who was born in North Africa (MAG3), indicating that attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward cultural heritage are related.

Table 5.44 Attitudes Toward Darija and the Maghreb

VARIABLES	**P-VALUE**	**CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R)**	**N**	**DEGREES OF FREEDOM**
Dar2 & Mag2	p = .05	r = .26	42	40
Dar2 & Mag3	p = .05	r = .26	42	40
Dar1 & Mag1	p = .05	r = .25	42	40
Dar1 & Mag3	p < .01	r = .36	42	40

I also ran correlations on the relationship between attitudes toward French and attitudes toward the Maghreb (Table 5.45), using the same methodology as used above. A negative correlation emerged between the number of positive adjectives selected for French and level of agreement with the statement MAG3 ("I would like to marry someone who was born in North Africa"). The more positive adjectives selected to describe French, the lower the rate of agreement with MAG3. This indicates that positive

attitudes toward French are associated with negative attitudes toward the Maghreb; however, this was the only significant correlation that emerged, necessitating further research on the relationship between attitudes toward French and attitudes toward the Maghreb before any conclusions can be made.

Table 5.45 Attitudes Toward French and the Maghreb

VARIABLES	**P-VALUE**	**CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R)**	**N**	**DEGREES OF FREEDOM**
FRPos & Mag3	p = .02	r = -.32	43	41

Participants were also asked questions specifically directed at the relationship between Darija and North African identity (Table 5.46). For the statement "I feel more North African when I speak in Darija" the mean level of agreement on a scale from one to five was 3.10, a fairly neutral score; however 18 people gave a 1 or 2 and 22 gave a 4 or 5. This indicates that rather than the population feeling ambivalent about the question, they are divided on the issue of Darija and national/cultural identity, especially when asked in this forthright manner. The second statement, "All French people of North African origin should know Darija" prompted a slightly higher mean agreement of 3.36. This points towards a sense of cultural loyalty to their country of heritage and a language that they closely associate with it, Darija.

Table 5.46 Darija and North African Identity

STATEMENT	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL RESPONSES	MEAN
I feel more North African when I speak in Darija	11	7	8	10	12	48	3.10
All French people of North African origin should know Darija	7	7	8	12	13	47	3.36

Because of the historical link between Arabic and pan-Arab identity, I looked to see whether there were a relationship between SA and Darija and attitudes toward a Pan-Arab community for this population:

RQ5. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward individuals from other Arab countries?

Using similar methodology as was used for RQs 4 and 5, I ran correlations between the number of positive and negative adjectives chosen to describe both SA and Darija and the level of agreement with the statement PAN, concerning pan-Arab identity ("I identify with people from other Arab countries"). There were no significant correlations. However, because of the low number of participants it is possible that correlations would emerge between language attitudes and pan-Arab identity in a larger group. This is something that could be explored in more depth in a future study.

In addition to quantitative data on the question of language attitudes and pan-Arab identity, I also explored this topic via an open-ended qualitative question. In section five, participants were asked to complete the sentence beginning "An Arab speaks…" Out of 36 responses, 13 made reference to Arabic (36%), either alone or in addition to other

languages, most often French. This implies that there may be a link in the minds of some participants between being Arab and speaking Arabic. It is possible that more participants feel this way than expressed it in the question. Many simply responded with "…his/her language" or "his/her language of origin," which could refer to Arabic.

The final aspect of language and national identity to explore is the extent to which attitudes toward French and Darija are associated with attitudes toward French national identity, as stated in research question 6:

RQ6. How are attitudes toward French and Darija associated with attitudes toward France?

To explore this question, I ran correlations on the number of positive and negative adjectives that participants assigned to both French (FRPos and FRNeg) and Darija (DarPos and DarNeg) and the level of their agreement with statements about France labeled FRAN1 and FRAN2 (see Table 5.47 for statements). The correlations are displayed in Table 5.48. There was a strong positive correlation between the number of positive adjectives selected for French and level of agreement with feeling at home in France (FRAN1) ($r=.44$, $p<.01$). There was also a positive correlation between the number of positive adjectives chosen for French and a sense of having more freedom in France (FRAN2) ($r=.3$, $p=.03$). There was a negative correlation for number of negative adjectives selected for French and level of agreement with FRAN2 ($r=-.32$, $p=.02$), where the fewer negative adjectives selected, the more participants felt they had more freedom in France than in the Maghreb.

Table 5.47 Statements on France

CODE	STATEMENT
FRAN1	I feel at home in France.
FRAN2	I have more freedom in France than in the Maghreb.

Table 5.48 Attitudes Toward Language and France

VARIABLES	P-VALUE	CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R)	N	DEGREES OF FREEDOM
FRPos & Fran1	$p < .01$	$r = .44$	43	41
FRPos & Fran2	$p = .03$	$r = .3$	42	40
FRNeg & Fran2	$p = .02$	$r = -.32$	42	40

There were no correlations between attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward France, although participants were also asked two questions about French and Darija and their relationship to French national identity (Table 5.49). For the statement, "A good French citizen only speaks French" there was a very strong negative response. The mean level of agreement on a one to five scale was 1.15 with 44 out of the 48 participants responding that they completely disagreed with this statement. The second statement, "It's not important to speak Darija because I live in France" garnered only a 1.75 mean agreement rating with 29 of the 48 participants completely disagreeing. Participants do not see living in France as a reason to give up the language of their heritage. The comments for the statement agreement section were very emotional and had mostly to do with the question about being a good French citizen:

> C'est un cliché raciste qu'etre un bon français c'est parler que français et ça m'ennerve.

(That's a racist cliché to say that being a good French person means only speaking French and it irritates me.)

'Un bon citoyen français parle uniquement français' NOOON !!

(A good French citizen only speaks French' NOOO!!)

Participants went on to explain that they see multiculturalism as part of France's heritage or how they have come to speak both Darija and French.

Table 5.49 Attitudes toward French, Darija and France

QUESTION	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**TOTAL RESPONSES**	**MEAN**
A good French citizen only speaks French	44	2	1	1	0	48	1.15
It's not important to speak Darija because I live in France	29	7	9	1	2	48	1.75

To summarize, the results from this section concerning RQ4, RQ5 and RQ6 indicate that attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward cultural heritage are related, especially when it concerns marriage preferences and feeling North African while speaking Darija. There is also a sense that the Maghrebi diaspora should know Darija. The relationship between attitudes toward French and attitudes toward the Maghreb is not entirely clear, with only one significant correlation emerging. There was no correlation between language attitudes and pan-Arab identity; however, the qualitative data indicates that Arabic and Arab identity are linked for some participants. There is a correlation between positive attitudes toward the French language and France, while there does not

seem to be a relationship between attitudes toward Darija and France, although participants reject the idea that only good citizens of France speak French and that Darija is unimportant in their lives.

5.2.5 Proficiency, Language Attitudes & Cultural Attitudes

The final research question that I explored concerned the relationship between proficiency and attitudes:

> *RQ7. Are high levels of proficiency in a language predictive of positive attitudes toward that language and the culture associated with it?*

I ran correlations between level of proficiency in speaking and understanding Darija (SpkDar and UndDar), French (SpkFR and UndFR) and Standard Arabic (SpkSA and UndSA) with the number of positive and negative adjectives that participants assigned to each language (Table 5.50). Only one correlation was significant. The better a person rated themselves at speaking Darija the more positive their attitudes were toward that language ($r=.29$, $p=.03$). Two other correlations that had to do with proficiency, and a combination of language attitudes and national identity were also significant. The correlation between speaking Darija and agreement with the statement MagDar1 ("I feel more North African when I speak Darija") barely reached statistical significance ($r=.26$, $p=.05$) while understanding Darija and MagDar1 were highly significantly correlated ($r=.37$, $p<.01$). Why only proficiency in Darija was correlated with language attitudes will be explored in more depth in the discussion chapter.

Table 5.50 Proficiency and Language Attitudes

VARIABLES	P-VALUE	CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R)	N	DEGREES OF FREEDOM
SpkDar & DarijaPos	p = .03	r = .29	42	40
SpkDar & MagDar1	p = .05	r = .26	41	39
UndDar & MagDar1	p < .01	r = .37	42	40

There were a number of significant correlations between proficiency in a language and attitudes toward the Maghreb and France (Table 5.51). Speaking Darija was highly correlated with agreement with the statement MAG3 ("I would like to marry someone who was born in North Africa") (r=.41, p<.01) and was significantly correlated with the statement MAG2 ("I would like to live in North Africa one day") (r=.32, p=.02). Understanding Darija was weakly correlated with agreement with MAG2 (r=.25, p=.05). Understanding Standard Arabic was also significantly correlated with agreement with the statement MAG3 (r=.33, p=.02). Speaking and understanding French were both positively correlated with agreement with MAG1 ("I am proud of being of North African descent") (r=.34, p=.03; r=.46, p<.01).

Table 5.51 Proficiency and Cultural Attitudes

VARIABLES	P-VALUE	CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R)	N	DEGREES OF FREEDOM
SpkDar & Mag3	p < .01	r = .41	42	40
SpkDar & Mag2	p = .02	r = .32	42	40
UndDar & Mag2	p = .05	r = .25	43	41
UndSA & Mag3	p = .02	r = .33	43	41
SpkFR & Mag1	p = .03*	r = .34	42	40
UndFR & Mag1	p < .01*	r = .46	43	40

* Indicates a two-tailed test

5.2.6 Additional Findings

In addition to the correlations that were related to the research questions, two more correlations emerged (Table 5.52). There was a strong negative correlation between agreement with statements REL3 and FRAN1 ($r=-.41$, $p<.01$). The more people agreed with the statement "Religion should be a part of children's education," the less they agreed with the statement "I feel at home in France." There was also a significant negative correlation between REL2 and FRAN1 ($r=-.31$, $p=.047$), where the more a person agreed with the statement "I regularly participate in religious activities," the less they reported feeling at home in France.

Table 5.52 Attitudes Toward Religion and France

VARIABLES	P-VALUE	CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R)	N	DEGREES OF FREEDOM
Rel3 & Fran1	$p < .01$*	$r = -.41$	42	40
Rel2 & Fran1	$p = .047$*	$r = -.31$	42	40

*Indicates a two-tailed test

5.3 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I reviewed the background information of the participants who took part in this language attitudes survey and presented the results of the data as they pertain to each of the research questions. Participants were predominately women, with an average age of twenty-five who, based on their employment and the employment of their parents, come from a mid- to low-socioeconomic level. Most claim to speak more than one language, usually French and Darija. As a group they tend to view French in a utilitarian manner and do not express much affection for it, while viewing Standard Arabic as a language of prestige, beauty and religion. Darija is seen as representative of their culture and tradition but is also viewed as cool and flexible. Attitudes toward North

African culture are overall positive, with a strong sense of pride in their heritage and positive attitudes toward religion. Attitudes toward SA, and to a lesser extent, Darija, are correlated with positive attitudes toward religion. There are strong correlations between attitudes toward Darija and the Maghreb, and French and France. Proficiency seems to be most relevant when it comes to correlations concerning Darija and the Maghreb. In the following chapter, I will discuss the results presented above in more detail and the conclusions that can be drawn from them.

6. Discussion

In this chapter, I review each of the research questions in view of the results, which were presented in the previous chapter. After each research question is presented, I discuss the results that pertain to it, specifically addressing the ways in which they relate to previous research, and what they reveal about the second generation North African community in France.

6.1 Research Question 1: Language Attitudes

RQ1. What traits or values do young second-generation North Africans associate with French, Standard Arabic, and Darija?

6.1.1 French

In order to discuss RQ1, which explores language attitudes in a diaspora context, I will present the language attitudes of the participants by addressing one language at a time, beginning with French. For the question, "Which language do you consider your 'own' language," participants overwhelmingly chose French (73%). The comments from participants indicate that they chose French because it is the language they use most often, are the most proficient in, or because they were born and live in France. Participants also replied that French is their "langue maternelle" ("mother tongue"). One said that it is his "langue maternelle" but that he wished he had been taught "les langues arabes" ("the Arabic languages") when he was young. Another said that French is her "langue maternelle" because she was born in France. Both these comments indicate that respondents are using the phrase "langue maternelle" as a way of describing their proficiency rather than out of a sense of affection for the language or because it acts as a

symbol for their identity. Tribalat (1995) similarly found that his second-generation participants chose French as their "langue maternelle", although it was unclear if they understood the question to be asking about proficiency or identity.

The participants were intentionally given little instruction for this question; however, the goal was to get at a sense of ownership of language in terms of identity. Davies and Bentahila (1989) found that participants often claimed a language as their 'own' but went on to comment that it was a language that they did not speak. Thinking of one's 'own language' as a way to express identity did not emerge as strongly for my participants, although it appeared more often for those who selected Darija.

There was one participant who did address the role of French as an identity marker. She wrote in her comment that she chose French, but meant "argo" ("argot"). She detests the French spoken by "les blancs 'français'" ("white 'French' people") because it is "ni mon identité ni mon univers" ("neither my identity nor my universe"). This highlights the ethnic/racial divide felt by this population due to their marginalization by the majority French society and the French state. Speaking "argo" makes her feel like an "arabe de France" ("an Arab from France") and gives her a sense of brotherhood, "on se sent frères" ("one feels like brothers"), presumably among other Arabs in France. This woman implies that it is through a variety of French that she can reinforce her ethnic identity and distinguish herself from the white French population. This suggests a distinction that people may make between standard French, which is taught in the schools and spoken, as this participant sees it, by white French people, and the French that is used within the Arab community. The latter is the variety of French with which she identifies,

and which is spoken by others who share a similar heritage or ethnicity. She gives an example of how "argo" is different from the French of "les blancs" by explaining that she speaks it quickly and contracts "il" into "i" and "elle" into "é." She appears to want to distance herself from formal and standardized pronunciation. While the "argo" she describes represents solidarity with other French people of Arab ethnic descent, she expresses feelings of estrangement from the French of the non-immigrant, "white", population. Future studies on language attitudes in France could explore this distinction between the two dialects of French, especially given the stigmatization of "argo" speech (Stewart, 2012). The correlations between attitudes toward this "argo" in the North African communities in France and rate of Arabic code-switching/borrowing in this "argo" should also be explored (see Lawson & Sachdev, 2000, for a study on language attitudes and code switching in Tunisia, and Post, 2015, for a similar study in Morocco).

The top three adjectives that were selected to describe French by participants were *necessary* (52%), *rich* (43%), and *practical* (43%). French is necessary for these participants because in France it is needed in order to excel in a practical way in terms of jobs etc., but it is also needed in order to be accepted culturally (A. Judge, 2007) because of the emphasis that the country puts on the language as a symbol of national identity as demonstrated in the 1994 *Loi Toubon* (Fenet, 2004). The comment section reveals that many chose French as the most *practical* language because it is "useful on a daily basis" or because they live in France. While *necessary* and *practical* are considered positive adjectives overall, they may also indicate a certain level of detachment for this population. Needing to speak a language to get by economically or socially does not

necessarily indicate affection for a language. By selecting *rich* to describe French it is not clear whether they view the language itself to be rich in terms of beauty, literary tradition etc., or whether they associate it with wealth. There was only one comment that discussed the use of *rich* when applied to French, and this participant used the term to refer to its beauty. French, like SA, has for centuries been defended and praised as a superior language (Lodge, 1993); however, it is also the language of power and status in France, which may lend itself to a perception of wealth. Although both definitions would associate the language with prestige, the former indicates admiration of the language itself, while the latter implies that it is an instrument for attaining wealth.

Other adjectives that were selected by more than 25% of participants were *educated*, *beautiful*, and *prestigious*. French is the language of education in France, as well as in the Maghreb, and this image of French as educated and prestigious seems to be somewhat maintained among this population, although I would have expected it to be more prevalently viewed in this way. This may be because most people speak French in France, so it does not necessarily index being educated. Attitudes that French is beautiful and prestigious are consistent with the language attitudes of people living in North Africa, where French has for many decades been viewed as a language of prestige (Bentahila, 1983; Chakrani, 2010); however, the majority of participants did not view it this way, indicating a decrease in its prestige in the diaspora.

French was selected as the most *modern* language (58%), which is similar to findings from studies done in the Maghreb. Chakrani (2010) argued that French is viewed as more open-minded in Morocco because it is the gateway to modernity and other

cultures. Benrabah (2007) similarly found French to represent modernity and Western culture in the minds of his participants in Algeria. However, when given the chance to comment on this choice, a few participants from the current study said that their assessment of French as *modern* has to do with the history of the language and French's perceived temporal recency when compared with Arabic. This could be because, unlike their counterparts in North African countries, the diaspora in France is surrounded by modernity. They do not have to seek out French in order to access it because they all must learn and speak French anyway. Whether this affects their attitudes toward French as being representative of modernity needs to be investigated further. However, others may have understood the question as having to do with modernity in terms of western culture, technology etc., as the participants in the studies in the Maghreb did.

Although the percentage of participants who selected *close-minded* and *free* was less than 20% each, these are two very different ways of seeing French that merit discussion. On the one hand, it is a language that is viewed as close-minded. This is the language that is used in school, by the government and by people in power. France has had a troubled past with its immigrant populations, and has not been accepting of their cultures and religions, which may explain why participants would associate the language with the close-minded aspects of the country. On the other hand, some participants view French as a free language. It is possible that this refers to freedom of grammar, although this is unlikely given the strong prescriptive tradition of the French language and strict teaching methods used in the French schools for French grammar. Elsewhere in the survey participants describe Darija as being without grammatical restrictions, indicating

that they are aware of grammatical flexibility enough to comment on it. If they had felt that French was free in this way, I would have expected it to come up somewhere in the comments. Furthermore, it is worth noting that none of the participants who selected *close-minded* also selected *free*, indicating that these two adjectives may be mutually exclusive. If participants did not mean that French is free grammatically, they may have been using the word to express a feeling that they see French as free because of its association with French culture, which some women in the first generation consider as offering more freedoms (Killian, 2006). Based on a language attitudes survey conducted in Algeria, Benrabah (2007) concludes that French is allowed to "transgress" language taboos that Arabic cannot, such as topics of love in a dating context because of its association with French culture. When asked whether they agree with the statement that they are freer to express themselves in French, there was a mean agreement of 3.13. However, this mean conceals the fact that 11 of the 47 participants strongly disagreed and 12 strongly agreed, while 16 were somewhat ambivalent by choosing three on a scale of one to five. This multi-modal distribution indicates that the predominantly female participants were divided on this issue, with at least some of them having a sense that French is a language in which they are more at liberty to express themselves. I suggest that for those who agreed with the statement this may be due to the association that French has with French culture, which, according to Killian's (2006) first generation North African female participants, offers them more freedoms. This supports the possibility that by selecting the adjective *free*, participants mean to indicate that they feel a certain freedom when speaking French.

French is perceived as the least *cool* (23%), least *traditional* (12%), and least *religious* (4%) language, and is seen as only slightly more *fun* than SA with 16% compared to SA's 10%. French is not highly associated with any of these solidarity traits, whether in terms of solidarity with peers or with family and tradition. Although *beautiful* was one of the adjectives selected for French, when asked which language was the *most* beautiful, only 13% of participants chose French, indicating that, when compared to SA (82%), French is not nearly as overtly prestigious in this sense. It is seen as the most *practical* language (69%) and also as the most *boring* language (57%). French is the language most used in daily interactions and in mundane tasks like school, shopping, or bureaucracy, which may explain why it is perceived by the majority of participants as both practical and boring. This is corroborated by some of the comments that participants left such as "on l'utilise tous les jours donc elle est banale" ("you use it everyday therefore it is banal").

While French appears to be viewed as an instrumental language and is assigned some symbols of overt prestige and status, there is also a sense that participants view it distantly, given that many of the positive attributes they assign to French are perfunctory in nature. Two participants even went so far as to voluntarily add in the negative adjectives *stupid* and *arrogant* to describe French. It is important to note, however, that it is likely that the term 'French' for these participants refers to the prestige/standard variety of French, as opposed to the "argot" referred to earlier by a participant. The latter variety often represents solidarity in the *banlieues* and is a maker of their identity with others who share their minority and marginalized status in France.

6.1.2 Standard Arabic

There were only two participants who chose Standard Arabic as their 'own' language despite its strong symbolism as the language of Islam. One of these participants left a comment, claiming that SA is their "langue maternelle." This person does not seem to be referring to proficiency because they rated themselves very poorly for speaking and understanding Standard Arabic. Rather, like the participants who used the term to describe Darija, this participant appears to be using the term to describe its importance to them, perhaps as an ancestral language. This points to the persistent language ideology surrounding Standard Arabic. Given the overall positive attitudes toward SA, it seems likely that French was selected so much more often than SA not because most participants identify strongly with it, but because they were answering in terms of proficiency and frequency of use.

The top three adjectives that were selected to describe Standard Arabic were *religious* (71%), *beautiful* (68%), and *rich* (57%). All but three of the participants in this study who completed the background information section identified as Muslim; therefore, when they describe SA as *religious* they are almost entirely referring to Islam. Even in the North African diaspora in France, the language ideology of Standard Arabic, which has been described in the Qur'an and the Hadith as the language of heaven and the language chosen by God (Suleiman, 2003), remains strong and present. It has retained its status as a language that is, according to participants, inherently beautiful in part because it is representative to them of Islam. Once a language has been selected as the most suitable one in which to express a religion, as is the case with Arabic, its association with that religion will help it to maintain its prestige and will encourage loyalty to it. Disassociation from that religion will become difficult and unlikely (Safran, 2008).

It is notable that, while only 29% found French to be beautiful, 68% of the population saw SA in this way, suggesting that the prestige of French is lessened in the diaspora, while SA remains prestigious in this way. Standard Arabic language ideology has long held up the language as inherently beautiful because of its association to Islam, but also because of its use in high art in the medium of calligraphy throughout the Muslim and Arab world. It is also used in many religious rituals, which are themselves considered to be beautiful and meaningful, and the language is part of what adds to these aesthetic experiences. Therefore, its association with ritual and art may in part be driving participants' impression that it is a beautiful language.

The adjective *rich* could either indicate an association with wealth or with the richness of the language itself. This is where comments from the participants can help to clarify the ambiguity of some of the adjectives. Comments indicate that, for Standard Arabic, this adjective was used to refer to its perceived inherent beauty and complexity. Participants who left comments referred to it as "belle, riche, et poetique" ("beautiful, rich and poetic"), "beau, complexe, riche, magnifique" ("beautiful, complex, rich, magnificent"), and "riche en vocabulaire etc." ("rich in vocabulary etc."). These comments indicate that *rich*, when used to describe SA, is referencing the language itself (based on a learned language ideology concerning SA), not wealth that is associated with it.

Other adjectives used to describe SA include *interesting* (48%), *necessary* (43%), *traditional* (43%), *prestigious* (41%), and *educated* (38%). That so many participants describe SA as necessary may come as a surprise given how little it is used in daily life in France and the fact that it is a language that must be learned as opposed to naturally acquired at home. Rather than being necessary in the sense of practicality, however, I argue that it is necessary in a religious sense for this population. Religious services in

Islam are conducted in Standard Arabic (Spolsky, 2010), and the language is needed in order to fulfill one of the five pillars of Islam, prayer (Rouchdy, 2002). Its image as a prestigious language goes hand in hand with it being seen as religious and beautiful. It is viewed as an educated language because, as a language that must be learned via formal instruction, anyone who can speak and write it must have gone to school in order to do so. It is not surprising that SA is considered traditional given that it is the language of Islam and Islam is the religion that most of these participants' ancestors have practiced.

The superlative adjective task reinforces this prestigious image of Standard Arabic. SA was selected as the most *beautiful* (82%), most *religious* (85%), and most *moral* (68%) language. Despite its status as the language of religion, SA was selected by only 24% of participants as the most *traditional* language, while Darija was chosen by 65%. This indicates that tradition and religion are somewhat separate in the minds of these participants and are represented by different languages. While religion is a part of their tradition it does not wholly encompass or embody it. North African culture and language, although related to Islam, stand separate from it and are important to participants in their own right.

SA tied with Darija as the least *modern* language. Some of the comments indicate that participants treated the question as referring to temporal recency, although most did not leave a comment. Participants may have viewed the question as asking about modernity, as Benrabah's (2007) and Chakrani's (2010) participants did, and, like them, did not associate either dialect of Arabic with modernity. While voted the least *fun* language (10%) and only slightly *cooler* than French, with 28% of participants selecting SA, it was also deemed the most *boring* language by only 14% of participants. Perhaps because SA is not used in daily life in France, and because of its history and association with religion, it retains a sense of mystery and excitement for these participants. Many

French women of North African origin, both in the comments for this study and in Killian (2006), express a desire to learn SA because of its religious connotations. On the other hand, it is not perceived as a fun language. This may be because of their general low proficiency in SA, which indicates that they are not using it in social interactions with their peers. It also could be due to the perception that it has a rigid and inflexible grammar that is difficult to learn as compared with Darija.

In the diaspora, Standard Arabic has retained much of the language ideology that was expressed via the language attitudes studies done in the Maghreb both thirty years ago and more recently (Bentahila, 1983; Benrabah, 2007; Chakrani, 2010). These studies found that SA is associated with Islam and sacredness, and is viewed as beautiful and rich. It remains, among the North African diaspora in France, the language that is primarily associated with religion, prestige and beauty. They also view it as an interesting language, a topic that was not explored in previous studies in the Maghreb. There may be a renewed sense of excitement about this language because of a desire on the part of the participants to reclaim the culture and religion of their parents, a trend that can be seen in other studies such as Yağmur and Akinci (2003). This is consistent with what Billiez et al. (2012) describe as the "fetishization" of Standard Arabic. Today's second generation of North African immigrants in France have been described as more religious than their parents, unlike the second generation in the 1980s (Begag, 2007). In terms of language attitudes, these participants appear to be embracing the language that is most closely associated with Islam, which is consistent with their high levels of religiosity.

6.1.3 Darija

While participants who chose French as their 'own' language did so largely because they understood the question to be asking about proficiency, those who chose

Darija (20%) seemed to do so out of a sense of its relationship to their identity. Based on their comments, people who chose Darija did so because it links them to their heritage and to the culture of their ancestors. One participant referred to it as her "langue maternelle" that represents the "cordon ombilical avec mes origines" ("umbilical cord to my origins"). This usage of "langue maternelle" appears to have to do with heritage instead of proficiency. Darija provoked something more personal in their responses and seems to have more weight as an identity marker than French. There were also a couple of participants who added in the comment section that although they chose French, they see Darija as being a part of their identity and that they would have selected it alongside French had they had the option.

The top three adjectives used to describe Darija were *practical* (61%), *traditional* (52%), and *necessary* (50%). Darija is viewed as traditional because it is the language of their culture and ancestors, with participants describing it as the thing that connects them to their heritage. This is supported by the fact that 65% of participants selected it as the most *traditional* language. One participant commented that she would have liked to choose both Darija and French, because they are both family languages for her. Notably, her parents were born in France and she identifies herself as Christian, indicating that parents' birthplace and religion may influence the language(s) selected as a carrier of tradition. Selecting the adjectives practical and necessary for Darija may at first appear counterintuitive given that this is a language that is not written or learned in school, nor is it used outside the Maghreb and its diaspora communities; however, it is the language that is used at home, and possibly the only language with which these participants can communicate with some of their family members, especially those from an older generation, making it both practical and necessary in their lives.

Other adjectives commonly selected for Darija include *alive* (33%), *free* (30%), *flexible*, *fun* and *cool* (all 26%). The superlative adjective selection task reinforces this image of the language. Darija was deemed the *coolest* language (49%), the most *fun* (73%), and the most *modest* (49%). Several participants left comments about these last three adjectives, describing how Darija does not have any rules and is therefore a language that can be played with. These results also imply the possibility that French, rather than being modest, is viewed as haughty. One explanation for this view of Darija is that, because it is not a language that is taught, and these participants were never made to explicitly learn or obey grammatical rules, they think that it is a language that they can play with and manipulate more so than other languages. This brings up questions about method of acquisition that might have theoretical or methodological implications; however, this hypothesis needs to be tested before drawing any conclusions.

Darija is still considered fun even though it is a language used in daily life at home, while French, which is also a daily language, is not seen this way. French is used for school, work and more broadly in a society that puts great value on grammar and precision in language and is unaccepting of slang or non-standard accents, all of which may contribute to it not being seen as fun. It is noteworthy that Darija is viewed as cool and fun while still representing tradition and heritage. However, not everyone felt this way: 30% of participants did select it as the most *boring* language, most likely because of its quotidian use at home.

Describing Darija as cool and fun is unique to the diaspora in France and was not found in the studies of North Africans in Bentahila (1983), Benrabah (2007) or Chakrani (2010). These previous studies found that although Darija was a language of solidarity for participants to a certain extent, it was also seen as ignorant and not cool, although this may be beginning to change. This is reminiscent of the language attitude studies done in

the Welsh diaspora, which found more positive views of Welsh and Welsh society in the diaspora than in Wales, what they call a "diasporic lens" (Garrett et al., 2009). However, a colleague informed me that in Morocco French is less and less considered to be cool, and is being replaced by Darija because it symbolizes Moroccan national solidarity, which has increasing importance in the minds of the youth. On the other hand, in Tunisia, which has had a closer and better relationship with France, French is still considered cool to speak. Regardless, it is notable for a language that is strongly associated with tradition to be equally seen as fun and cool.

Darija was considered the least *beautiful* (5%), and least *moral* (12%) language. This is consistent with attitudes in the Maghreb where Darija is seen as lacking in prestige. It was also seen as the least *practical* (15%) language, almost tying with SA (16%). Although many participants in this study selected *practical* as one of the attributes of Darija (61%), it seems that it is considered far less practical than French, despite being used at home to communicate with family. Darija is not taught in France nor is it used in school, government, most public spaces, or in the work place.

In contrast to Chakrani's (2010) study in Morocco, Darija was not ranked as more *religious* than SA. It was deemed to be the most religious language by only 11% of participants, far behind SA (85%). While Darija is taking on some of the religious connotations of SA in the Maghreb, that does not appear to be occurring in the diaspora. Rather than representing religion, Darija is a far more potent symbol of tradition. However, the relationship with Darija and Islam will be looked at more closely when we discuss the correlations between attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward religion.

When asked whether they prefer to marry someone who speaks Darija, the mean level of agreement on a scale of one to five was 2.79, while the desire to have their children speak Darija produced a mean of 4.19. It is notable that 13 out of 48 participants

completely disagreed with the former statement, while 29 out of 48 participants completely agreed with the latter. It seems that they desire to pass on the language of their culture and heritage to their children but are, for the most part, anywhere from ambivalent to adamant that they do not want to marry a spouse who speaks Darija, even though having two Darija-speaking parents in the home would greatly increase the chances that a child will speak the language. It is important to note that all but five of these participants were women. Although it is not entirely clear what is the cause of these slightly inconsistent attitudes, I hypothesize that these women are somewhat reluctant to marry men who speak Darija because they may have been born in the Maghreb or have strong ties to that culture. As Killian (2006) and Gray (2005) point out, many first generation North African immigrants in France worry that marrying a man from the Maghreb will mean a restriction on the kinds of freedom that they enjoy in France. The second generation women in this study may be torn between wanting to pass on their heritage to their children via language and not welcoming certain aspects of that culture that marriage to a man from the Maghreb might bring into their lives. This is a sentiment that men do not seem to share. Selby (2009) found that second and third generation North African men in France have a preference for marrying women from the Maghreb because they symbolize cultural purity. The mean for preference to marry someone who speaks Darija might be higher were the sample group made up primarily of men rather than women.

6.1.4 Summary of Research Question #1

French is seen as practical and necessary, but not prestigious in the same way that has been reported in the Maghreb over the past few decades. It is still viewed by some as educated because it is the language of school and universities, and is seen as highly

necessary and practical. Although one cannot get by in France without speaking French, this does not mean that it is viewed affectionately or as particularly prestigious. Standard Arabic remains a language that is strongly tied to Islam and which has retained its image of being beautiful because of its ties to that religion, indicating that the strength of the language ideology of Arabic is not weakened in the second generation in the diaspora. It may even be eclipsing French as the language of prestige. Darija, while still not viewed as beautiful, moral or religious, is seen by the diaspora as cool and fun, a view not shared by their counterparts in North Africa. One factor that emerged unexpectedly was the way in which a language is acquired. Participants claimed that Darija is fun and cool because it has fewer rules and can be easily played with. One hypothesis, which needs to be separately tested, is that they view it as being without rules because they are not formally taught the language's grammar or structure. Despite being viewed as fun and cool, it is also still representative of tradition for this population. Here it is necessary to remark that although they may view the prestige variety of French with a lack of affection, and view Darija as a solidarity language, the French spoken within the *banlieues*, the "argot" that one participant refers to, may also be an important solidarity language/variety for them, although attitudes toward this variety were not explored in this dissertation.

Previous research indicates that language can act as an indicator of attitudes toward the related culture and society (Baker, 1992; Choi, 2003). If this is the case, the attitudes of this group indicate a lack of affection for French language and culture, although their feelings are not hostile. They appear, on the other hand, to view North African and Muslim societies more positively, by conferring onto the languages associated with each adjectives of praise, reverence, and solidarity. It is important to note, however, that due to the small sample size, any conclusions drawn from these results must be done so tentatively.

As discussed earlier, language ideologies precede and help to form language attitudes. Both French and Arabic have powerful language ideologies, which is, in part, what motivated studying the language attitudes of participants with varying levels of proficiency in these two languages. One question that arises is whether these extensive language ideologies are being reproduced among this population, and more specifically, whether the language ideologies of the Maghreb are reproduced in the diaspora in France. Based on the data presented above, it appears that the language ideology of Standard Arabic is being reproduced by this population. SA remains a language that is closely associated with Islam, sacredness and beauty. Darija continues to be viewed as the language of tradition and solidarity, similar to how it is viewed in the Maghreb, with the exception that it is now also seen as fun and cool. The language ideology concerning French, however, is not entirely reproduced. It has lost some of its image of being a language of beauty and education. Most importantly, these participants strongly rejected some of the basic tenets of French language ideology, namely its 'vital' role in the construction of French citizenship and French identity.

One further point of discussion is how their language attitudes might differ in other diasporic contexts, such as in Canada or Belgium. Dragojevic et al. (2013) points out that "Language attitudes are not only a product of the present times, but also a reflection of complex histories of domination and sub-ordination that, in some cases, can be traced back hundreds of years" (p. 20). Given the colonial history between France and the Maghreb, including years of strict language policy, a violent fight for independence, and decades of discrimination and rejection in France, it seems highly likely that these language attitudes are shaped, in no small part, by France's stance toward the North African community and their religion. It further indicates that the language attitudes of second-generation North African immigrants might differ if they lived in the United

States, Canada or Britain, countries with very different histories with the Maghreb and stances on immigration. In these contexts we might see more positive attitudes toward the language of the receiving country.

6.2 Research Question 2: Religion and Culture

RQ2. What are the religious and cultural attitudes of this population?

6.2.1 Attitudes toward the Maghreb

The attitudes of the predominately female second-generation North African diaspora in France toward the Maghreb were overall positive. They expressed extremely high levels of pride in being North African (mean of 4.67) and agreed overall with the statement, "one day I'd like to live in the Maghreb" (mean of 3.45). These participants, almost all of who were born in France, have maintained a sense of connectedness with their parents' homeland. In the midst of the ongoing tension in France between the majority culture and the minority North African community, the second generation seems to be looking toward their Maghrebi heritage for a sense of pride and identity in reaction to their rejection from French society, as suggested by Scott (2007) and Kaya (2009).

Despite this pride, participants demonstrated some reluctance to marry someone from the Maghreb with a mean of only 2.73 to the statement "I would like to marry someone who was born in the Maghreb," although 57% of participants were either neutral or felt positively toward the statement, responding with a 3, 4, or 5. This is fairly consistent with the fact that, of the participants who are married/engaged, 42% reported that their spouse/fiancé was born in North Africa. However, it is important to point out that for this question there was a bi-modal distribution with 16 participants completely disagreeing with the statement and 11 completely agreeing with it. This is a topic that is

quite divisive for this population, with no consensus on the issue. All but four of the participants who answered this question about marriage preferences were women. The mean level of agreement for the four men was 3.5, while the mean for the women was lower at only 2.72 (closer to the overall average). All of the participants who completely disagreed with the statement "I would like to marry someone from the Maghreb" were women. This indicates the possibility of a gender difference for this population in terms of marriage preference. As I discussed in the previous section, there is a strong tendency for second and third generation North African men to wed women born in the Maghreb because they symbolize Maghrebi culture (Selby, 2009), whereas, first generation women of North African heritage in France express caution and are reluctant to marry men from North Africa because of a fear that they will be close-minded and will not allow them the kind of freedom that they desire (Gray, 2005; Killian, 2006). This is similar to Gal's (1978a) female participants who she describes as "less committed than the men to the traditionally male-dominated system…" (p. 2-3). The data above suggests that although women may have high levels of pride in their Maghrebi culture, they may not wish to marry based on this pride, while this may not be the case for men. This topic should be researched further with an even gender distribution.

6.2.2 Attitudes toward France

Attitudes toward France are overall more negative than attitudes toward the Maghreb. The mean level of agreement for the statement "I feel like I have more freedom in France than in the Maghreb" was 2.79, with 17 participants completely disagreeing with it. This is interesting in light of their similarly low level of agreement to wanting to marry someone from the Maghreb, perhaps due to a perception that male spouses from the Maghreb will be more conservative and controlling. It is possible that they, like many

people, hold slightly contradictory and complicated attitudes toward their culture. So, while these women tend to be reluctant to marry someone from the Maghreb they also do not want to acknowledge directly that that region may be more restrictive in some ways. Another possibility is that participants do not feel freer in France in terms of practicing their religion and cultural rituals, including veiling and prayer in public, because of the official and cultural secularism in France, even if they may experience more freedom in other, more secular, ways. It could also be that when they visit the Maghreb they are on vacation and are only experiencing certain aspects of life there and thus are not fully conscious of the freedoms that France affords them.

Participants expressed a strong sense of not feeling at home in France. Over 50% answered with a 1 or 2, on a scale where 1 equaled 'completely disagree' and 5 equaled 'completely agree', to the statement "I feel at home in France," with an overall mean of 2.66. This is unsurprising given the background and history between France and the Maghreb during the colonial period, and the ensuing hostility within France toward North African immigrants and their children. France has been largely unreceptive to Islam and its Arab Muslim population, with 60% of French people claiming in a 2012 poll that Islam has become "too visible and influential" in France (Kern, 2012). Participants also strongly disagreed that France is more religious than the Maghreb (mean of 1.92). France is officially a secular state, which has caused problems for Muslim women desiring to wear headscarves in public places. It is also largely culturally secular, with only 4.5% of French Catholics claiming to attend Mass regularly (IFOP, 2009). Given that almost all of the participants who took my survey stated that they are religious and that their religion is important to them, it follows that viewing France as a less religious country than the Maghreb conveys a negative attitude toward France. This is supported by the fact that many of these participants do not feel at home there. The responses to these two

statements support the possibility that the reason participants do not overall feel that they have more freedoms in France is because they do not feel free to practice their religion there. It also indicates that religious freedoms may be valued higher than the secular freedoms that they gain by living in France.

6.2.3 Pan-Arab Identity

When it comes to identifying with people from other Arab countries, participants had fairly positive attitudes. The mean level of agreement on a five-point scale was 3.61, and only 7 of the 49 participants responded with a 1 or 2, on a scale where 1 equaled 'completely disagree' and 5 equaled 'completely agree.' Participants have a general sense of solidarity with people from other Arab countries, a sentiment that is contextualized by the powerful history of the now defunct project of Arab nationalism, and the association, going back centuries, of the Arab people with the religion of Islam. Although Arab nationalism has lost its political goals there is a persisting sense of pan-Arab identity that exists as an ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic group (Rouchdy, 2002). Dawisha (2003) calls this sense of shared identity "Arabism." The results from this question indicate that there is a sense of Arabism alive among second-generation North Africans in France. Future studies could explore this further by giving participants more questions on this topic, including action-oriented ones, in order to see if these positive attitudes toward Arab identity would carry over into behavior.

6.2.4 Attitudes toward religion

Participants expressed very positive attitudes toward religion. Given that of the 48 participants who completed this section, one is not religious and two are Christian, the results from the questions on religion can be overall interpreted as attitudes toward Islam. When appropriate I will look more closely at these three participants who were not

Muslim. It is important to note that there is a difference between practicing Islam and identifying as Muslim. Identifying with a religion may just be a matter of identifying with ones culture and heritage rather than actually practicing it, as Kaya (2009) points out. This is why it was important to ask not only how they identify themselves, but also to ask questions about the role that religion plays in their own lives, in terms of participating in religious activities, and in the lives of their children, in terms of wanting it to be a part of their children's education. In this way, we can begin to differentiate between religion as a symbol of cultural identity and religion as a practice of a faith.

Religion is seen as highly important both to the participants (mean of 4.67) and to their parents (mean of 4.38). Forty-one out of 48 participants responded with a 5 to the statement "religion is important to me." It appears that these participants were for the most part raised in very religious homes, and that the importance of religion has been passed on to them. Only three responded with a 1, completely disagreeing with the statement "religion is important to me." Of these three, one is an atheist/secularist, one is Christian and one is Muslim. Participants also expressed positive attitudes toward religion in terms of participation in religious activities.

The mean level of agreement with the statement "I regularly participate in religious activities" was 3.52. Although slightly lower than the mean level of agreement for the other questions about religion, this is still fairly high. There are many religious activities in which Muslims can participate. The five pillars of Islam include 1) prayer, 2) charitable giving, 3) declaring that Allah is the one true god, 4) fasting during Ramadan, and 5) making the pilgrimage to Mecca. Of these five, Ramadan is the pillar most frequently observed by North African Muslims in France (Ben Brower, personal communication). In addition, there are also religious services on Friday that are attended

at Mosques, of which there were approximately 2000 in 2011 (Guénois, 2011), indicating that Mosque attendance is a factor in the religious activities of Muslims in France.

Participants expressed very positive attitudes toward the role of religion in the education of children (mean of 4.48). The response to this question implies not only that participants want religion to be a part of their children's education, but perhaps also suggests dissatisfaction with the secular French school system. This supports the hypothesis that participants do not feel very at home in France in part because of religion. If religion is important to the North African diaspora, and they think it should be part of the schooling of their children, but the dominant culture and government does not value it and forbids it in public life, then it follows that these participants would feel ill at ease in France to some extent.

This data supports the researchers who have argued in the past several years that there is an increase in religiosity among the second generation in France today, as opposed to the second generation of the 1980s (Gray, 2005; Begag, 2007; Scott, 2007). Tribalat (1995) found a low level of attendance to religious ceremonies among the second generation in the early 1990s. If his data is correct, this does suggest an increase in religiosity over the past twenty years. Today, these youths more visibly demonstrate their religion via clothing, adherence to Ramadan, and even in their enthusiasm for Standard Arabic. One of the reasons for this renewed interest in Islam is, according to researchers like Kaya (2009), out of a reaction to their marginalized status in France. They therefore create an "Islamic parallel societ[y]" (Kaya, 2009, p. 85) as a substitute for French society in order to find acceptance and a sense of belonging.

6.2.5 Self-identification

While expressing negative views toward France, it is notable that in the self-identification task, over 50% of participants selected *French* (they were permitted to choose as many titles as they liked). Forty percent chose *French of North African origin*. It is possible that participants strongly identify as French; however, given their overall positive attitudes toward the Maghreb and their relatively negative ones toward France, it is also possible that they viewed this question as asking not how they identify culturally but how they identify in terms of their legal status. After all, France puts a heavy emphasis on the concept of citizenship, what it means to be a "vrai français" ("real French person"), and on assimilation to French culture (Weil, 2010). While 56% responded with *French*, all but two of these also made reference to their North African heritage. Of the 27 participants who identified themselves as *French*, 15 also identified as *French-Algerian*, *French-Tunisian* or *French-Moroccan*, 13 as *French of North African origin*, 12 as *Algerian*, 7 as *Moroccan* and 6 as *Tunisian*. Forty-four percent of participants chose not to select French at all. This indicates that almost all of these participants identify partly or entirely as North African as expressed in any number of ways (*French-Algerian*, *Moroccan*, etc.). This suggests that these participants identify themselves as, at least to some extent, separate from mainstream French identity. This may have its roots in their sense of ethnic 'separateness' from majority French society in part due to France's exclusion of and discrimination against the North African immigrant community.

Only two participants selected *French* and no other adjectives. It is worth looking more closely at these two participants in order to see if there is anything particular about their profiles. The first participant is 28 and was born in Tours. When asked where her parents were born she responded with *other* but did not elaborate in a comment, although

she reports that she does not often return to the Maghreb. She was one of the two participants who identified as Christian, not Muslim, and she describes religion as being very important to her and her parents. When it comes to proficiency in Darija, she rated herself very poorly. However, she responded with a 5, *strongly agree*, when presented with the statement "I am proud to be of North African heritage." She gave a response of *3* to many of her answers for statements about attitudes toward France and the Maghreb. She does not think it is very important to marry someone who speaks Darija nor does she think that people of North African origin must speak Darija. She chose French as her 'own' language, just like over 70% of participants, and found French to be the most religious and traditional language. This may be because French is more connected to the Catholic tradition in France. She also found French to be the most fun language. Because of her low proficiency levels in Darija she most likely does her socializing with peers who speak French, not Darija. She has overall very positive attitudes toward French, while selecting Darija as the most boring language. Her profile indicates that religion and language proficiency may be related to her self-identifying solely as French despite being of North African heritage and expressing pride in that heritage. Christianity is more accepted in France than is Islam, which may be why she expressed feeling at home there and more able to comfortably designate herself exclusively as *French*.

The second participant who chose only *French* to describe herself was a woman who was born in Lyon and did not disclose her age. Her parents were born in Tunisia, and she identifies herself and her parents as Muslim. Religion is very important to her and her parents, although slightly higher for herself. She participates regularly in religious activities and strongly agrees that religion should be part of education for children. She strongly agrees that she has more freedom in France than in the Maghreb but very much does not feel at home in France. She also expressed feeling very proud of

her heritage. She, just like the other participant, rated herself a two out of five for speaking and understanding Darija, indicating that proficiency may be a factor in self-identification. She chose *French* as her own language, although so did the majority of participants. She also had generally positive attitudes toward SA but less so toward Darija. She strongly disagrees with statements about feeling more North African while speaking Darija, and marrying someone who speaks Darija. This participant, similar to the other, has very positive attitudes toward French, although unlike the other participant she has relatively negative attitudes toward the Maghreb. The fact that both participants had low levels of proficiency in Darija and positive attitudes toward French suggests that proficiency may be a factor in forming language attitudes and a sense of national identity.

6.2.6 Summary of Research Question #2

Overall, participants tend to have positive views of the Maghreb and their North African culture and heritage, although as discussed above, the question concerning marrying someone from the Maghreb showed a bi-modal distribution indicating polarized attitudes. This question may also have been affected by the fact that almost all of the responses were from women. Attitudes overall toward France are somewhat negative. Participants do not feel very at home there nor do they feel like it is a very religious country, a significant factor for a population that expressed the importance of religion in their lives and in the lives of their family. This sense of feeling ill at ease in France and having more positive attitudes toward North African culture and Islam may be due to France's anti-Islamic rhetoric and chilly reception of the North African diaspora. In terms of how they identify themselves, more than 50% of participants identified as *French*. Almost all participants, however, selected other adjectives that describe some aspect of North African identity either instead of, or in conjunction with, *French*.

6.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 3: ARABIC AND ISLAM

RQ3. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward Islam?

The overall findings for the correlations that I ran in order to respond to this research question indicate that there is a correlation between positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and positive attitudes toward religion, namely Islam. The strongest correlations were between the adjectives used to describe SA and participation in religious activities. Women who expressed positive attitudes toward SA reported regularly participating in religious activities.[42] Their attitudes toward SA are not just correlated with a feeling that religion is important to them, although there was a significant correlation there as well, but also with how they actually behave concerning religion in their own lives. This suggests that SA continues to act as a symbol of Islam even in the second generation in France, and that language attitudes are related to religiosity, at least for women. It seems that the renewed enthusiasm for Islam in France is reflecting what Billiez et al. (2012) call the "fetishization" of Arabic among the North African diaspora. This correlation further supports the claims in the literature on the sociology of religion and language on the relationship between language and religion across cultures (Spolsky, 2010), and more specifically for the relationship between Arabic and Islam (e.g. Suleiman, 2003).

[42] As discussed in the previous chapter, the five male participants were excluded from the correlations. Any conclusions drawn for RQ3-7 have to do exclusively with second-generation North African women in France.

This data supports the argument that religion needs to be more closely scrutinized both in language attitude studies and in sociolinguistics, especially for a population that has a religious affiliation. As Garrett (2001) points out, language attitudes affect language variation, and the two should be more integrated. Thus, the data indicating that religion plays a role in language attitudes should spur investigations into the role that it plays in variation, as was recently done by Baker-Smemoe and Bowie (2015). One way to do this is to give a brief survey that, in addition to investigating typical topics, such as age, gender, education, proficiency etc., also includes a handful of scalar questions about religion. This dissertation specifically points to the need to do this when studying Muslim North African Arabic speakers in France.

The correlations also reveal that there may be a connection between attitudes toward Darija and Islam, despite the fact that participants did not often select *religious* or *moral* to describe the dialectal variety. There were no significant correlations between the adjective selection task for Darija and questions about religion; however, there were correlations between attitudes toward religion and attitudes toward Darija as expressed through the statement agreement task from section three of the survey. Women who hold positive attitudes toward religion also have positive attitudes toward Darija, but only in the specific sense of wanting Darija to be a part of their children's lives. The correlations were highly significant between wanting their children to speak Darija and the following two statements: "religion is important to me" and "religion should be a part of my children's lives." The correlation between wanting children to speak Darija and the statement "I regularly participate in religious activities" just reached significance. Parents typically desire what they consider to be best for their children, and so asking about their desires for them in terms of religion and language is somewhat of a covert way of accessing their language attitudes, even if these attitudes do not manifest themselves in

regular participation in religious activities themselves. The results from the correlations for this research question suggest that, for the North African female Muslim diaspora in France, Darija and Islam work in conjunction to form their identity, such that if they deem one to be important they will more likely also deem the other to be so. This data indicates that Darija could become symbolic of Islam, although when asked specifically about whether Darija supports their religious values better than French, the response was slightly negative (a mean of 2.85).

6.3.1 Summary of Research Question #3

In response to the research question "*Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward Islam?"* I found that positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and religion, namely Islam, are correlated, such that the more positive one's attitudes are toward SA the more positive one's attitudes will be toward religion. Attitudes toward Darija, while not correlated with religion in terms of the adjectives that were selected, was correlated with religious attitudes in terms of the desire for it to be a part of their children's education. However, because of the small sample size, these conclusions are tentative, and are in need of follow up work on a broader population in order to make any generalizable conclusions.

6.4 Research Questions 4-6: Language Attitudes and National Identity

6.4.1 Research Question #4

RQ4. How are attitudes toward Darija and French associated with attitudes toward the Maghreb?

The data from the previous chapter indicates that there was a correlation between attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward the Maghreb. Selection of positive adjectives for Darija was strongly correlated with the desire to marry someone born in North Africa, indicating perhaps that one reason to marry someone from the Maghreb could be due to their language skills. If a person views Darija in a positive light then they may also value marrying a person who speaks that language. There was also a weak negative correlation between selection of negative adjectives for Darija and being proud of North African descent, where the more negative things participants had to say about Darija the less proud they were of their Maghrebi background, suggesting that part of pride in their heritage revolves around the language of that heritage.

There were also significant correlations between desiring one's children to speak Darija, and a) wanting to live in North Africa and b) preferring to marry someone who was born in North Africa. The preference to marry someone who speaks Darija was also highly correlated with the desire to marry someone form the Maghreb. It is consistent that participants who want their children to speak a language would also want to live in, and marry from, the country where that language is spoken. However, there is a disparity between overall desire to marry someone who speaks Darija (mean of 2.79) and wanting one's children to speak Darija (mean of 4.19). Although feelings about the latter are much stronger than the former, there does appear to be a link between the two. Preference to marry a Darija speaker was also mildly correlated with being proud of North African descent. Attitudes toward Darija appear to be related to feelings about cultural and national identity especially when it concerns marriage preferences and the lives of their children. The language represents, for them, the country and culture of their heritage.

When asked specific questions about Darija and national/cultural identity, participants continued to express attitudes indicating a link between the two. The mean

level of agreement to feeling more North African when speaking Darija was 3.10, just slightly above the neutral point on the scale; however, 11 people completely disagreed while 12 completely agreed with the statement, suggesting that people are somewhat torn about this question. Only 8 people entered a score of 3 for this statement, the mid-point on the scale. Although participants are divided about whether the language they are speaking expresses their identity when asked a direct question about it, their responses to questions elsewhere in the survey produced correlations that indicate that Darija is connected to their North African cultural identity. There are slightly stronger feelings when it comes to whether French people of North African origin should know Darija. The mean level of agreement that they should know Darija was 3.36, with 25 out of 47 respondents replying with a 4 or 5, indicating some sense of duty for them to maintain the language of their heritage in the diaspora because of their background.

Language has long been seen as a crucial component of nation building and of national identity (Joseph, 2004). It is often used as the cultural product that a nation uses to bind people together (Suleiman, 2003). The data on Darija and the Maghreb is consistent with this understanding of the nation, while also indicating that dialectal Arabic can symbolize national identity, despite SA being the official national language. It further suggests that language can continue to represent nation and culture in a migration context. Laguerre (2010) describes a kind of nationalism without borders, what he calls the digital diaspora because members of this diaspora connect online. He argues that language is an important symbol of this nationalism outside of the nation. Language, in addition to religion, helps to solidify this sense of national cohesion, because both are "the cultural materials used to shape a national identity" (Safran, 2008, p. 187-88). This seems to be the case for the North African community in France.

When it comes to attitudes toward French and attitudes toward the Maghreb, only one correlation came back as significant. Selection of positive adjectives to describe French are negatively correlated with wanting to marry someone born in North Africa, such that, the more positive adjectives they chose the less they wanted to marry someone from the Maghreb. This implies that positive attitudes toward French are related to negative attitudes toward the Maghreb; however, this was the only significant correlation. One possibility why the results produced only one correlation is that while Darija plays an active role as a symbol for North African identity, French may be less involved. However, in order to draw this conclusion much more research would need to be conducted. It would be necessary to ask more specific questions about attitudes toward French in the statement agreement task and to run correlations between those and the answers to attitudes about the Maghreb. This would offer a more nuanced understanding of whether attitudes toward French are in fact related to feelings of North African identity.

6.4.1.1 Summary of Research Question #4

In response to Research Question #4, there appears to be a relationship between attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward North Africa. This emerged strongly for attitudes toward marrying a spouse from North Africa, marrying a spouse who speaks Darija, wanting to move back to North Africa, and having children who speak Darija. There was also a relationship between viewing Darija positively overall and desiring to marrying someone from the Maghreb, although it is important to note that participants were very divided over their marriage preferences. Language, specifically Darija, plays a principal role in the lives of these participants in terms of their expressed attitudes toward where they live, whom they marry and how they raise their children. Like Baker's (1992)

participants, degree of cultural attachment is correlated with attitudes toward the language of that culture. This research question also inquired after the relationship between French and North African identity. Only one correlation emerged as significant, linking positive attitudes toward French with negative attitudes toward the Maghreb; however, this data is insufficient to draw conclusions about the relationship between attitudes toward French and attitudes toward North African culture for this diaspora group in France.

6.4.2 Research Question #5

RQ5. Are positive attitudes toward Standard Arabic and Darija associated with positive attitudes toward individuals from other Arab countries?

The answer to this research question about language and pan-Arab identity cannot be fully ascertained at this time because no significant correlations emerged. However, this does not necessarily mean that a correlation does not exist. One reason that could have led to the lack of significant correlations is the small number of participants. With only approximately 40 participants sufficiently completing the survey, significant correlations may have been difficult to reach. A future study with a larger population might produce significant results for this topic. Although no clear conclusions can be made about the association between attitudes toward dialects of Arabic and a sense of pan-Arab identity within the North African diaspora in France, some qualitative comments can be made about the association. When participants were asked to complete the phrase "An Arab speaks…," 36% of them responded with *Arabic* or *Arabic* plus another language. This seems to indicate that Arab ethnicity and identity are connected with language in the minds of some participants. The history of Arab nationalism was based on the shared language of Arabic throughout much of the Arab world and acted as

a symbol to bind them together (Dawisha, 2003). This sense of ethnolinguistic identity has persisted for more than one third of these participants, despite the failure of the Arab nationalist project of the mid-20th century.

6.4.3 Research Question #6

RQ6. How are attitudes toward French and Darija associated with attitudes toward France?

This research question inquires after the relationship between language attitudes and attitudes toward national and cultural identity, although this time it concerns French and French national identity. There were several correlations that emerged as significant between attitudes toward French and attitudes toward France. Participants who chose more positive adjectives to describe French were more likely to agree that they feel at home in France and that France offers them more freedoms than the Maghreb. Similarly, participants who chose fewer negative adjectives were also more likely to agree with those statements. This suggests a relationship between positive attitudes toward the French language and positive attitudes toward the country. It supports the hypothesis that French acts as a proxy for French culture and that those that view the former in a positive light will also view the latter in this manner. It also supports the hypothesis that women who appreciate the freedoms that France offers them will view French more positively.

When it comes to the relationship between Darija and attitudes toward France no correlations emerged. It is not clear why attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward France would not have a relationship. One would have expected that, given the association between Darija and the Maghreb, attitudes toward Darija would coincide not only with increased positivity toward North African culture as we saw for RQ4, but also with decreased positivity toward French culture. It is possible that, similar to what was

discussed in reference to attitudes toward French and the Maghreb, Darija does not play an active role in the formation of attitudes toward France. It could also be due to the limited sample size. This is an area that should be studied in more depth in order to understand this relationship better.

Participants also responded to two statement agreement questions that specifically targeted the relationship between language and France. Participants had a strong revulsion against the statement that 'good' French citizens only speak French. Their mean agreement was 1.15 with 44 of the 48 participants completely disagreeing with the statement. These participants do not see their identity as French citizens to be compromised in any way by the fact that they are bi or multi-lingual. In this way they reject the French nationalistic ideology that strongly relates the French language to French national identity, a rejection that perhaps manifests itself in their fairly distant attitudes toward French. French language ideology is held in varying degrees by different sections of French society. It was implemented during the colonial era when France foisted French upon its North African colonies to the exclusion of Arabic, and has been an integral tool used by the French state to assimilate immigrants. These participants see French citizenship to be compatible with multiple languages. This is consistent with their positive attitudes toward Darija, as well as their generally high levels of proficiency in the language. Similarly, they also reject the idea that Darija is not important to speak just because they live in France. They do not see their country of residence as having an effect on the importance of Darija in their lives. The language of their heritage supersedes the fact that they live in France. Because of the close association between Darija and the Maghreb, this implies that they may not feel the need to leave behind North African culture just because they live in France either. This, too, is consistent with their generally positive attitudes toward North African identity.

6.4.3.1 Summary of Research Question #6

There appears to be a positive correlation between attitudes toward French and attitudes toward France, which is expected given the tendency for attitudes toward a culture to be transferred onto the language most closely associated with that culture. Although this correlation exists, participants overwhelming do not think that French is the only language that should be spoken by French citizens. They strongly believe that one can be French and speak multiple languages, and that in no way should the North African diaspora abandon Darija because they live in France. No correlations emerged between attitudes toward Darija and attitudes toward France.

6.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 7: PROFICIENCY AND ATTITUDES

RQ7. Are high levels of proficiency in a language predictive of positive attitudes toward that language and the culture associated with it?

The relationship between language attitudes and language proficiency[43] appears to depend on the language in question. The only significant correlation that emerged was between proficiency in and positive attitudes toward Darija. Two more correlations that surfaced were between proficiency in Darija and feeling more North African when speaking Darija. The better participants are at speaking and understanding Darija, the more they report feeling North African while speaking Darija. This may shed some light on the earlier discussion about why participants felt so divided on the topic of identity while speaking this language. The reason for this division may be that the more proficient

[43] It is important to note again that their proficiency was based on limited self-assessment.

a participant is in the language, the more she is able to tap into the identity related to that language when speaking it, in this case North African identity. Participants who rated themselves poorly for Darija may therefore be less likely to feel North African while speaking the language.

Although there is some relationship between proficiency and attitudes for Darija, there was none for French and Standard Arabic. SA is a language with a long lasting and powerful language ideology that is tightly woven together with the history and practice of Islam. It is possible that language attitudes toward SA are relatively fixed, such that they are impervious to the effects of language proficiency. Perhaps attitudes may wax and wane some depending on the cultural and linguistic context, but overall, whether one speaks and understands SA is beside the point. It is a language that is idolized by much of the Arab/Muslim community whether in Muslim majority countries or in the diaspora, as was displayed in the results section for RQ1. This elevated status may make it resistant to some extent to proficiency effects. Davies and Bentahila's (1989) participants reported Arabic as their 'own' language, while reporting low proficiency. Similarly, Billiez (1985) reported one participant who described Arabic as his language even though he does not speak it. This indicates that positive attitudes do not, in fact, always indicate proficiency. That said, I would have expected that positive attitudes would affect motivation to learn the language thus linking it to proficiency.

The reason that there were no correlations between proficiency and attitudes when it comes to French seems most likely to be due to the fact that nearly all of the participants speak French at high levels of proficiency (mean of 4.61 for speaking, 4.87 for understanding). They have gone through at least some part of the school system where knowing French is mandatory, and they live in a society where French is required in order to get by and to thrive. These participants speak French at high levels of

proficiency whether they want to or not. This may confound any potential relationship between proficiency and attitudes for French, such that their attitudes toward the language do not interact with their proficiency.

Darija, on the other hand, has neither the same kind nor strength of ideology behind it that SA and French have. It is also not a language that participants are required to master in the same way as French. Although they need it to communicate with some family members at home, participants can probably get by with speaking Darija at varying levels of proficiency. They certainly are not required to maintain a certain standardized variety or to read and write in it. There is, therefore, more variance in proficiency for Darija allowing for correlations between proficiency and attitudes to emerge.

I also looked at the relationships between language proficiency and attitudes toward the Maghreb and France. There were half a dozen significant correlations between language attitudes and attitudes toward the Maghreb. Three of these correlations concerned proficiency in Darija and wanting to live in the Maghreb one day or wanting to marrying someone from the Maghreb. It is not surprising that deciding whether or not to marry someone who speaks Darija or whether to move to a country where Darija is the language spoken on the street would be related to how well one speaks Darija. This is also expected given that proficiency in Darija is somewhat correlated with attitudes toward Darija, and attitudes toward Darija are correlated with attitudes toward the Maghreb. This is supported by data that indicates that for second generation Hispanic-Americans, the more they were dominant in English, the more they had adopted the values and beliefs that are characteristic of the general U.S. public (Pew Hispanic Center, 2002), linking proficiency with attitudes toward culture.

There was a significant correlation between understanding SA and wanting to marry someone from the Maghreb. This would seem to imply that SA proficiency is linked to attitudes toward SA as a symbol of Muslim or North African identity; and yet there were no significant correlations between proficiency in SA and attitudes toward SA. This is an area that needs to be explored further. One way to go about this would be to provide more opportunities for participants to express their attitudes toward SA via the statement agreement tasks, so that there are more ways to explore the correlations between language attitudes and proficiency when it comes to SA. In addition to its status as the national language of all three North African countries, it is possible that proficiency in SA is correlated with religiosity, a relationship not explored in this study, and that people with high levels of proficiency in SA seek out people from the Maghreb who might similarly value religion.

Speaking and understanding French were strongly correlated with pride in North African heritage. Most of the participants rated themselves extremely high in their proficiency in French (over 4.5 average for understanding and speaking). These participants speak French very well, but, as was discussed above, this has little to do with their preferences and much to do with the fact that they were raised and live in France. A high level of proficiency is nearly unavoidable. They also agreed strongly with the statement "I am proud to be of North African origin" with a mean of 4.67. I argue that the correlation between proficiency in French and pride in heritage may be coincidental. If participants had had a choice when it came to learning French and attaining high levels of proficiency, then this correlation would be meaningful, but as it is, I am skeptical of how much meaning to assign to this result.

6.5.1 Summary of Research Question #7

It appears that proficiency can be correlated with positive attitudes toward language and the culture associated with it; however, it depends on the language in question, and possibly on its history, ideology, and how it is learned and used by the population. In this case, there is a connection between proficiency in Darija and attitudes toward Darija as well as attitudes toward the Maghreb. However, there were no correlations between proficiency in French and SA and attitudes toward French and SA. This may have to do with the high levels of proficiency in French throughout this population, and to the strong language ideology of SA, which may make it as least partially impervious to interaction with language attitudes. It may also be due to the small sample size. Proficiency in SA was correlated somewhat with positive attitudes toward the Maghreb, indicating that SA has some involvement in the formation of national and cultural attitudes.

6.6 Additional Findings

6.6.1 The Role of Religion in Alienation

Two additional correlations emerged that were not expected but that, while not dealing with language directly, are worth discussing because they support some of the findings discussed above. There was a strong negative correlation between feeling that religion should be a part of the education of one's children and feeling at home in France. The more that people wanted religion to be a part of education the less they felt at home in France. France maintains an official policy of secularism and has been particularly resistant to Islam, most notably with the decades long *affaire des foulards*, but also in the rhetoric of groups like the far right *Front National* who have been very vocal about their

anti-Muslim stance. Public opinion polls show that 74% of people polled think that Islam is incompatible with French values (Le Bars, 2013). These predominantly Muslim participants, who have expressed a high level of devotion to their religion and a desire for it to be a part of raising their children, do not feel at home in a country that rejects these values. Similarly, there was a mild negative correlation between participating in religious activities and feeling at home in France, such that the more they reported participating the less they reported feeling at home there. This supports the argument that the secular nature of French society presents a barrier for this population to feeling at ease and at home in France.

6.6.2 Imbalanced Gender Distribution

One of the unexpected outcomes of this study came not from the data itself, but from the uneven gender distribution, with only five men participating in the survey. This made a gender comparison impossible in terms of comparing data; however, perhaps the very fact that women were more willing to participate in the study is informative in and of itself. There are several reasons why this may have happened. First, most of the participants learned about the survey on Facebook groups. It is possible that these groups are predominantly made up of women, indicating that women of North African descent in France are more willing to self-identify as part of the cultural/ethnic/religious diaspora in France (depending on the group's focus). Another possibility is that men and women frequent these groups equally, but that the men were hesitant to engage in a survey about language, identity and religion. Men may be more suspicious of these types of studies, especially when distributed by a researcher who is not an in-group member, whereas, women were more eager to have their voices heard and to support research on their community. Maybe men would be more willing to participate if the survey were

distributed by an institution in France that they felt would be less likely to take advantage in some way, or skew the results to paint a negative picture of the North African community (e.g. *Institut du Monde Arabe*). These are all things to be taken into consideration when designing and conducting a study on the North African diaspora in France.

Whatever the reason, it is important to consider how the uneven distribution may have affected the results. One way, which was discussed above, is in terms of their marriage preferences. Despite otherwise positive attitudes overall toward the Maghreb, when it comes to preferring to marry someone from the Maghreb there is a multi-modal distribution, with 16 participants completely disagreeing, 11 completely agreeing, and 15 selecting the mid-point on the scale. Marriage preference appears to be a divisive topic, especially for a predominantly female group. It is possible that, if there had been more male participants, attitudes may have been generally more positive.

It is also worth noting how the gender distribution did *not* affect the results in a way in which it was expected to. An early prediction was that women of North African origin in France would have more positive attitudes toward France and French because of its association with a culture that permits more material freedoms to women. However, this predominantly female sample, although small in size, had very positive attitudes toward religion, and expressed negative attitudes toward France and toward French language ideology. Based on the data, it seems that whatever liberties French culture affords these women, they are overshadowed by France's hostility toward their community, especially when it comes to religious freedoms. Although no conclusion can be drawn on the subject, it is possible that there would not be the kind of gender effect for language and cultural attitudes that was predicted.

6.7 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have summarized the results that were presented in Chapter Five and have discussed them according to how they pertained to each of the seven research questions whose exploration have been the goal of this dissertation. These include the overall attitudes toward language, national identity and religion, and the relationship between these three. In the following chapter, I will make my closing remarks, and discuss the significance and limitations of this study as well as possibilities for future research.

7. Conclusion

This dissertation investigated the language attitudes of the second-generation North African diaspora in France. The main goals of this research were to understand the general attitudes of this group toward French, Standard Arabic and Darija, as well as toward religion, France and the Maghreb. It specifically explored how language attitudes correlate with religious, cultural and national attitudes, and whether proficiency plays a role in the formation of these attitudes. In order to reach these goals and answer the research questions that were posed, I launched an anonymous online language attitude survey targeted at 18 to 30-year-old French men and women who were born in France, and whose parents are Arabic speakers who were born in Morocco, Tunisia or Algeria. In addition to collecting original data, I contextualized the study by giving an overview of the history between France and North Africa, including the colonial era, the fight for independence, migration from the Maghreb, and the current status of the immigrant community in France. The purpose of this study was to investigate, via language attitudes, how this community views itself in relation to the majority French society and the country and culture of their heritage.

The results of this dissertation have shed light on how members of the North African diaspora in France identify themselves in a culturally and linguistically antagonistic environment, although their implications are limited because of the small sample size. This population still strongly values both Darija and Standard Arabic, the former because it is the carrier of their heritage and culture, while still acting as a language of solidarity, and the latter because it symbolizes their religion. French is viewed as a practical and necessary part of life. It has lost much of its prestige and status as a language of beauty, possibly because of negative associations with majority French

society. The prestige variety is not a symbol of solidarity for this diaspora community, although the spoken "argot" variety may be. This population's attitudes toward these languages seem to reflect the attitudes that they expressed toward Islam, France and the Maghreb. Their desire to engage with Darija in their lives, and in the lives of their children, is connected to their religiosity and their sense of North African identity. They have strong positive attitudes toward North African culture, although for some items their attitudes were sharply divided. They highly value religion and want it to be part of their children's education, so much so that it appears to be one of the reasons why they do not feel at home in France. This underscores the role that France's treatment of North African immigrants plays in how this community views itself in relation to the state, as well as how they view French and Arabic. The fact that two of the most essential aspects of their identity—language and religion—are unwelcome in France, may be causing them to turn away from French culture and society and seek out their identity in the country, culture, and languages of their heritage.

7.1 CONTRIBUTIONS

This dissertation makes contributions to various fields methodologically, theoretically and substantively, although they must be approached tentatively because of the small sample size. Methodologically, it has innovated on the language attitude survey tool by launching a survey online, which, to my knowledge, has not previously been done in this field. This allows for two things: the first is absolute anonymity. Although all surveys and experiments are by nature invasive, and while there is no way to completely avoid the observer's paradox or interviewer bias, an anonymous online survey can minimize these effects in ways that previous researchers in the field have been unable to do. This anonymity should allow participants to answer more freely, in the privacy of

their home or other comfortable environment, without the pressure of being in a laboratory or interacting with an unknown researcher.

Launching the survey online also permits people to become participants who might otherwise not be reached by a traditional study done in a university setting. Many researchers rely on finding their participants via the university because it ensures that their participants will be literate in the languages they seek to study (e.g. Chakrani, 2010) and also because the university provides institutional backing which reassures participants (although see Garrett et al., 2009, for an example of targeting participants at cultural events). This tends to limit the study to include only university-educated participants, leaving out large sections of the population. An online distribution allows the researcher to avoid this problem by reaching people from varying educational and socioeconomic backgrounds (although it does require access to a computer or smart phone, which have become increasingly prevalent, and typing ability). It further allows people who might be unwilling or unable to travel to participate in a study with very little inconvenience.

Theoretically, this dissertation has made contributions in a number of ways. The first concerns the variables examined in sociolinguistic studies of language variation. Typically the field has shied away from including religion as a factor when considering what influences linguistic variation, although Yaeger-Dror (2014) has recently urged the field to change in this way and a recent sociophonetic study found that degree of religiosity was a significant variable in a Mormon community in Utah (Smemoe & Bowie, 2015). The current study, by demonstrating the relationship between religion and religiosity, and language attitudes for this population, supports claims made by researchers such as Omoniyi and Fishman (2006) that religion plays a key role in language use and should be studied by sociolinguists. Garrett (2001) recommends more

integration between language attitude studies and sociolinguistic studies in general because the former is an "essential component" of the latter (p. 626), therefore, if religion is a factor in language attitudes, it may also be a sociolinguistic variable in language variation. My data specifically points to the need to consider religious identity when conducting studies on the North African diaspora in France, considering that the second generation is more religious today than the second generation of the 1980s (Begag, 2007). Future sociolinguistic studies on the second or third-generation North African diaspora in France, or other similarly religious groups, should consider giving brief surveys about religious attitudes to their participants before moving on with their experiment.

Second, this dissertation has more generally contributed to the field of language attitudes by providing more data on language attitudes among diverse populations. The more cultures, languages, and social contexts that are studied, the more we will come to understand how language attitudes function on the whole. It also contributes to the smaller sub-field that examines how migration affects language attitudes. This study indicates that, although language shift almost always occurs in migration contexts, awareness of and attitudes toward the language(s) in question are not necessarily quick to disappear, and may sometimes be enhanced, supporting the research done for the Welsh diaspora that found that there is a "diasporic lens" through which diaspora communities view their language and heritage (Garrett et al., 2009).

Third, it indicates that proficiency is not correlated equally with all language attitudes in a given linguistic context. Proficiency was only correlated with Darija in this study, but not with Standard Arabic or French. The reasons for this are not clear, although I have suggested some possible explanations. Fourth, the data from this survey suggests that studying language attitudes in a diaspora setting can allow for enhanced

understanding of attitudes toward national and cultural identity, and therefore provide insight into assimilation and integration for migrant communities. Finally, this research has indicated that the method of acquiring a language, specifically whether or not it was formally taught, may impact language attitudes, although no conclusions regarding this were drawn.

Substantively, this dissertation has increased our understanding of the attitudes of the North African diaspora, not only toward language, but also toward religion and national identity. It has specifically looked at how language is viewed by a group that has been understudied in the language attitude literature, despite living in a country where language and culture are closely intertwined. By studying their attitudes toward language, culture and religion, this dissertation has enriched our understanding of a highly stigmatized and marginalized community that is rapidly growing both in France, and as members of the Muslim diaspora, in Europe in general. The conflict-filled history between France and the Maghreb, and the unrest of the past decade makes this a crucial population to study. An increased understanding of how linguistic, religious and cultural identity are intertwined for this group can help guide future research in areas outside of linguistics, such as diaspora studies, sociology, psychology, history and European studies. More specifically, this dissertation has suggested one major way in which language attitudes toward Darija may differ in the diaspora from the attitudes of those living in the Maghreb. Darija has come to be viewed as cool and fun, while still being the bearer of tradition. This is a change from the attitudes of their counterparts in North Africa where, although Darija is a solidarity language, it is not viewed as explicitly cool, being viewed instead in a more negative light (Chakrani, 2010).

The findings in this dissertation particularly expand our knowledge of the post-colonial relationship between former colonizers and their former subjects by suggesting

that languages can act as important symbols of cultural and religious identity. In this case, there was mass migration from the former colonies in the Maghreb to the country of their former ruler, such that the North African immigrants in France continue to be in a power relationship with the French government, although now it is on the European continent as opposed to their native lands. In this post-colonial diaspora context, language continues to be a potent tool for assimilation, on the part of the French state, and, for some members of the diaspora, a symbol of rejection of French culture and identity and a turning toward the culture and religion of their heritage. By examining the role that language plays in the post-colonial identity of this population, this study has broadened our understanding of post-colonial migration, and emphasized the importance of language in these contexts. These findings could encourage researchers in post-colonial studies to take language into account as an enduring locus of struggle between former ruler and subject. This study could also aid efforts on the ground level when it comes to repairing strained relations between the North African community in France and the French state.

7.2 LIMITATIONS

While contributing to a better understanding of language attitudes, sociolinguistic variables and the North African diaspora in France in general, this study also has certain limitations. The primary limitation of this dissertation is the small sample size, which makes the data less generalizable, the correlations less powerful and restricts the conclusions that can be drawn.[44] The length of the questionnaire may have discouraged some participants from beginning it, and convinced others to quit before completing it,

[44] According to the Office of Survey Research at the University of Texas at Austin, the ideal target sample size would have been 300 participants.

something that piloting would have helped to prevent. This is a limitation that could be avoided in future research by keeping length a primary concern in survey construction. Other ways to improve sample size would be a) to consult with experts in social media content to work on how to make a flyer more attractive to consumers of media, b) to start connecting with people on social media who are members of the target network earlier in the process so that the Facebook messaging function does not get blocked, c) to form personal relations with members of these social networks in real life who may be able to help spread the word, and finally, d) consult or collaborate with a French survey company to aid in distribution. Despite the manifest drawbacks of this small sample size, the results gathered can help direct future research both in language attitudes and in sociolinguistic variation studies.

Another major limitation of this study concerns the gender distribution of the participants. As discussed in the results chapter, only five men responded to the survey. This eliminated the possibility of looking at gender as a factor in language attitudes specifically, and made any conclusions drawn from this study less generalizable because they pertain almost entirely to women. This unequal gender distribution may be due, in addition to the small sample size, to women self-selecting to participate in studies of this nature. It is possible that men are more wary of voicing their opinions and attitudes about sensitive topics such as language, religion and national identity.

There were also limitations that have to do with the nature of surveys and of measuring attitudes. To begin with, there is no way to know for certain whether participants are responding truthfully to the questions that they are being asked. This is an inherent drawback of surveys, but one that is unavoidable. Presumably, most people are not willing to spend the time and effort to fill out a survey only to respond falsely; however, it is something that must be acknowledged as a possibility. Another inherent

limitation concerning surveys has to do with section placement. The final section in a survey will always be the most vulnerable because it is least likely to be completed. It is necessary, therefore, to organize the sections purposefully with full awareness of the possible consequences.

As is the case with most quantitative studies, I have only been able to determine correlations, not causations. I have demonstrated relationships between attitudes toward certain languages and religion, national identity and proficiency, but I can only speculate about causation. This is an important distinction to call to mind when considering any conclusions that have been drawn.

7.3 Future Research Recommendations

This dissertation has opened up several directions for future research, some of which were noted in the discussion chapter. In this section, I highlight those areas of research that are the most needed. First, a follow up study needs to be done that has an even distribution of male and female participants, as well as a larger sample size, in order to be able to draw more generalizable conclusions about the language attitudes of the North African diaspora in France. In addition, a study with an even number of men and women would allow for a gender comparison. Based on previous studies that were discussed in the literature review, it is possible that women in this population would express different language attitudes than men in part because of the differences between life in France and life in the Maghreb for women (Sadiqi, 2003). This is supported by the way that language has been seen in previous studies to act as a symbol or proxy for freedom and changes in status and position (Gal, 1978a). This could have implications for language use, which could in turn have implications for sociolinguistic studies. While

gender is often studied in sociolinguistics, for this population it might be the case that linguistic behavior is influenced by an interaction between gender, religion and cultural identity.

A second area that should be explored is how the method of acquiring a language affects language attitudes, and relatedly language variation. I suggested that the way in which Darija is acquired may have affected participants' views that it is without rules and therefore fun and cool, as opposed to the strict grammatical and prescriptive tradition of learning French and Standard Arabic. This needs to be studied explicitly in order to understand how acquisition plays a role in attitudes and in linguistic behavior.

Another research project could explore attitudes toward two dialects of French described by one participant as the French spoken by the "white French people" and the "argot" that she speaks with other people of Arab descent. Specifically, a study of this sort could examine how language attitudes toward these two varieties correlates with attitudes toward the majority French society and with the Arab diaspora in France. It could further study how attitudes toward the argot that the participant refers to correlate with the rate of Arabic code-switching.

An additional research recommendation is to do a similar study on language attitudes for the North African diaspora in France that focuses solely on French and Darija, to the exclusion of Standard Arabic. The purpose of this would be to see whether Darija takes on the religious and prestige attributes conferred to Standard Arabic when the latter is no longer an option, as was the case in Belazi's (1992) study in Tunisia. It is possible that Darija, when contrasted with French, will become the language that is viewed not only as traditional but also as religious, even if participants in this study did not strongly agree that Darija is better able than French to support their religious values.

A final future research direction is to compare the language, cultural and religious attitudes of second-generation North Africans with the attitudes of their parents' generation. It is thought that the second generation today is more religious than their parents, and that they are turning more toward the culture of their heritage (Begag, 2007), and by extension, language (Billiez et al., 2012); however, there has not yet been a study of this nature which spans both generations for this population (although see Yağmur and Akinci, 2003, for a similar study for the Turkish diaspora in France). A study like this would permit a more nuanced understanding of the effects of migration on language and cultural attitudes by exploring whether the attitudes of the second generation are, in fact, more potent. If so, where is this increase in positive attitudes toward religion, culture and language coming from? A study of this nature could explore whether it is coming from within their diaspora community, from other Muslim communities both in France and abroad, or whether it is a reaction against French culture and society.

7.4 SUMMARY

This dissertation contributes methodologically, theoretically and substantively to the field of language attitudes, contributions that extend into sociolinguistics, sociology, psychology, diaspora studies and European studies. It has helped to broaden our understanding of the highly marginalized North African diaspora in France via an exploration of language attitudes and their relationship with religious, cultural and national identity. There is evidence to suggest that the North African diaspora strongly identifies themselves with Islam and that they do not feel at home in France, a place that is not welcoming to their religion. These attitudes are reflected in their attitudes toward Arabic and French. If attitudes are a "map of the social world" (Garrett et al., 2003, p. 3),

and language is a fundamentally social tool, then understanding language attitudes can provide great insight into the social world and positioning of this population.

Appendix A: Questionnaire in French

Section 1

Dans cette partie vous répondrez au sujet de votre savoir des langues.

1. Comparé à vos amis, camarades de classe et collègues,
décrivez votre aptitude à **parler** les langues suivantes en cochant la case qui convient.

	PAS DU TOUT	**PAS TRES BIEN**	**ASSEZ BIEN**	**BIEN**	**PARFAITEMENT**
L'arabe littéral					
Français					
L'arabe dialectal (darija)					
Le tamazight					

2. Comparé à vos amis, camarades de classe et collègues,
décrivez votre aptitude à **comprendre** les langues suivantes en cochant la case qui convient.

	PAS DU TOUT	**PAS TRES BIEN**	**ASSEZ BIEN**	**BIEN**	**PARFAITEMENT**
L'arabe littéral					
Français					
L'arabe dialectal (darija)					
Le tamazight					

Section 2

Dans cette partie vous répondrez aux questions au sujet des langues.

1. Quelle langue est-ce que vous considérez comme votre « propre » langue ?
    a. Le français
    b. Le tamazight
    c. L'arabe littéral
    d. L'arabe dialectal (Darija)

2. Expliquez pourquoi vous considérez cette langue votre "propre" langue**:**

_____
_____

3. Parmi les adjectifs ci-dessous, cochez la case à côté de ceux qui décrivent le mieux le **français** selon vous. Vous pouvez choisir autant d'adjectifs que vous désirez. Si vous voulez laisser une remarque au sujet de vos réponses, n'hésitez pas.

Pratique, mort, moral, riche, flexible, beau, moderne, inutile, vivant, nécessaire, obsolète, religieux, prestigieux, à l'esprit fermé, traditionnel, modeste, intéressant, ennuyeux, cool, laid, impoli, fier, absurde, pauvre, éduqué, sévère, intelligent, libre, amusant, aucune de ces réponse, autre

Autre :

_____
_____

Si vous voulez laisser une remarque au sujet de vos réponses, n'hésitez pas:

_____
_____
_____

4. Parmi les adjectifs ci-dessous, cochez la case à côté de ceux qui décrivent le mieux **l'arabe dialectal (darija)** selon vous. Vous pouvez choisir autant d'adjectifs que vous désirez. Si vous voulez laisser une remarque au sujet de vos réponses, n'hésitez pas.

Pratique, mort, moral, riche, flexible, beau, moderne, inutile, vivant, nécessaire, obsolète, religieux, prestigieux, à l'esprit fermé, traditionnel, modeste, intéressant, ennuyeux, cool, laid, impoli, fier, absurde, pauvre, éduqué, sévère, intelligent, libre, amusant, aucune de ces réponse, autre

Autre :

_____

_____

Si vous voulez laisser une remarque au sujet de vos réponses, n'hésitez pas:

_____

_____

_____

5. Parmi les adjectifs ci-dessous, cochez la case à côté de ceux qui décrivent le mieux **l'arabe littéral** selon vous. Vous pouvez choisir autant d'adjectifs que vous désirez. Si vous voulez laisser une remarque au sujet de vos réponses, n'hésitez pas.

Pratique, mort, moral, riche, flexible, beau, moderne, inutile, vivant, nécessaire, obsolète, religieux, prestigieux, à l'esprit fermé, traditionnel, modeste, intéressant, ennuyeux, cool, laid, impoli, fier, absurde, pauvre, éduqué, sévère, intelligent, libre, amusant, aucune de ces réponse, autre

Autre :

_____

_____

Si vous voulez laisser une remarque au sujet de vos réponses, n'hésitez pas:

_____

_____

_____

Instructions: Répondez aux questions suivantes en choisissant le français, l'arabe dialectal (darija) ou l'arabe littéral. Si vous voulez laisser une remarque au sujet de votre réponse, n'hésitez pas.

6. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus **belle** ?
    a. Le français
    b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
    c. L'arabe littéral

Des commentaires au sujet de votre réponse, si vous voulez:
_____
_____
_____

7. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus **morale** ?
    a. Le français
    b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
    c. L'arabe littéral

Des commentaires au sujet de votre réponse, si vous voulez:
_____
_____
_____

8. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus **moderne** ?
    a. Le français
    b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
    c. L'arabe littéral

Des commentaires au sujet de votre réponse, si vous voulez:
_____
_____
_____

9. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus **cool** ?
    a. Le français
    b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
    c. L'arabe littéral

Des commentaires au sujet de votre réponse, si vous voulez:

_____
_____
_____

10. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus **pratique** ?
    a. Le français
    b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
    c. L'arabe littéral

Des commentaires au sujet de votre réponse, si vous voulez:

_____
_____
_____

11. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus **religieuse** ?
    a. Le français
    b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
    c. L'arabe littéral

Des commentaires au sujet de votre réponse, si vous voulez:

_____
_____
_____

12. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus **traditionnelle** ?
    a. Le français
    b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
    c. L'arabe littéral

Des commentaires au sujet de votre réponse, si vous voulez:

_____
_____
_____

13. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus **ennuyeuse** ?
    a. Le français
    b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
    c. L'arabe littéral

Des commentaires au sujet de votre réponse, si vous voulez:

_____
_____
_____

14. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus **modeste** ?
    a. Le français
    b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
    c. L'arabe littéral

Des commentaires au sujet de votre réponse, si vous voulez:

_____
_____
_____
___

15. Quelle langue est-ce que vous trouvez la plus **amusante** ?
    a. Le français
    b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
    c. L'arabe littéral

Des commentaires au sujet de votre réponse, si vous voulez:

_____
_____
_____

Section 3

Voici quelques remarques sur le français, l'arabe dialectal, et la vie culturelle. Pour chaque phrase dites si vous êtes d'accord ou non en cochant la case qui correspond le mieux à votre point du vue.

1 = pas du tout d'accord
5 = tout à fait d'accord

	1 PAS DU TOUT D'ACCORD	2	3	4	5 TOUT A FAIT D'ACCORD
Je suis fier/fière d'être d'origine maghrébine.					
Je m'identifie avec des peuples d'autres pays arabes.					
Un jour, j'aimerais habiter au Maghreb.					
La religion est importante pour moi.					
La France me donne le sentiment d'être chez moi.					
J'aimerais me marier avec quelqu'un qui est né(e) au Maghreb.					
J'ai l'impression que j'ai plus de libertés en France qu'au Maghreb.					
La religion est importante pour mes parents.					
La France est un pays plus religieux que le Maghreb.					
Je me sens plus maghrébin(e) quand je parle en arabe dialectal (darija).					
L'arabe dialectal peut soutenir mieux mes valeurs religieuses que le français.					
Tous/toutes les français(es) d'origine maghrébine devraient connaître l'arabe dialectal.					
Je préfère me marier avec quelqu'un(e) qui parle l'arabe dialectal.					
Je participe régulièrement aux activités religieuses.					
Je voudrais que mes enfants parlent l'arabe dialectal.					
Un(e) bon(ne) citoyen(ne) français(e) parle uniquement français.					
La religion devrait faire partie de l'éducation des enfants.					
Je suis plus libre de m'exprimer en français.					
Il n'est pas important de parler en arabe dialectal parce que j'habite en France.					

Si vous avez des commentaires au sujet de vos réponses, n'hésitez pas à les ajouter ci dessous:

_____
_____
_____

Section 4

Dans cette partie vous répondrez aux questions personnelles de vous-même.

1. Quel est votre âge? _____

2. Quel est votre sexe ?
   a. Homme
   b. Femme

3. Où est-ce que vous êtes né(e)? _____

4. Dans quelle ville est-ce que vous habitez ? _____

5. Dans quel département est-ce que vous habitez? _____

6. Est-ce que vous habitez avec vos parents?
   a. Oui
   b. Non

7. Si non, avec qui est-que vous habitez?_____

8. Quel est le plus haut niveau de vos études?
   a. Collège
   b. Lycée
   c. Un peu de l'université
   d. License
   e. Masters
   f. Doctorat

9. Quel type de travail a votre père (ou tuteur)?
   a. Education
   b. Informatique
   c. Médecine

d. Ingénieur
e. Ouvrier
f. Cadre
g. Homme au foyer
h. Fonctionnaire
i. Chômeur
j. Autre : _____

10. Quel type de travail a votre mère (ou tuteur)?
    a. Education
    b. Informatique
    c. Médecine
    d. Ingénieur
    e. Ouvrier
    f. Cadre
    g. Femme au foyer
    h. Fonctionnaire
    i. Chômeuse
    j. Autre :_____

11. Où sont nés vos parents?
    a. En France
    b. En Algérie
    c. Au Maroc
    d. En Tunisie
    e. Autre :_____

12. Quel type de travail est-ce que vous avez?
    a. Etudiant(e)
    b. Informatique
    c. Médecine
    d. Ingénieur
    e. Education
    f. Ouvrier/Ouvrière
    g. Cadre
    h. Femme/Homme au foyer
    i. Fonctionnaire
    j. Chômeur/Chômeuse
    k. Autre :_____

13. Quelle(s) langue(s) est-ce que vous parlez?
    a. Le français

b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
c. L'arabe littéral
d. Le tamazight
e. Autre:_____

14. Combien de fois est-ce que vous visitez le Maghreb?
a. Jamais
b. Moins d'une fois par an
c. Une fois par an
d. Plus d'une fois par an

15. Quelle(s) langue(s) est-ce que vous parlez quand vous êtes dans votre pays d'origine au Maghreb ?
a. Le français
b. L'arabe dialectal (darija)
c. L'arabe littéral
d. Le tamazight
e. Autre:_____

16. Combien de fois est-ce que votre famille au Maghreb visite vous et votre famille en France ?
a. Jamais
b. Moins d'une fois par an
c. Une fois par an
d. Plus d'une fois par an

17. Etes-vous croyant ?
a. Oui
b. Non

18. Avec quelle religion est-ce que vous vous identifiez?
a. Le christianisme
b. L'islam
c. Le judaïsme
d. Autre:_____

19. Sont vos parents croyants ?
a. Oui
b. Non

20. Avec quelle religion est-ce qu'ils s'identifient ?
    a. Le christianisme
    b. L'islam
    c. Le judaïsme
    d. Autre:_____

21. Est-ce que vous êtes marié(e) or fiancé(e)?
    a. Oui
    b. Non

22. Où est-ce que votre époux(se) ou fiancé(e) est né(e)?
    a. En France
    b. En Afrique du Nord
    c. En Angle Terre
    d. En Espagne
    e. Aux Pays-Bas
    f. Autre:_____

23. Je m'identifie comme (cochez toutes qui conviennent):
    1. Français(e)
    2. Marocain(e)
    3. Algérien(ne)
    4. Tunisien(ne)
    5. Berbère
    6. Français(e)-Marocain(e)
    7. Marocain(e)-Français(e)
    8. Français(e)-Algérien(ne)
    9. Algérien(ne)-Français(e)
    10. Français(e)-Tunisien(ne)
    11. Tunisien(ne)-Français(e)
    12. Français(e)-Arabe
    13. Arabe-Français(e)
    14. Français(e)-Berbère
    15. Berbère-français(e)
    16. Français d'origine Maghrébine
    17. Autre:_____

Section 5

Instructions : Voici quelques phrases qui ne sont pas finies. Complétez-les comme vous voulez. **Il n'y a pas de réponse « correcte ».**

1. Mon devoir dans la vie est _____
2. Un bon mari est quelqu'un qui _____
3. Un(e) Arabe parle _____
4. Une bonne fille est quelqu'une qui _____
5. Un(e) bon(ne) musulman(e) parle_____
6. Les femmes au Maghreb sont _____
7. La liberté, c'est _____
8. Une bonne épouse est quelqu'une qui_____
9. Chaque homme doit_____
10. Mes parents souhaitent que je _____
11. Un bon fils est quelqu'un qui _____
12. La religion est _____
13. Les femmes en France sont_____
14. Les hommes au Maghreb sont _____
15. Chaque femme doit _____
16. Les hommes en France sont_____

Section 6

Instructions: Voici quelques remarques sur l'usage des langues. Cochez la case qui décrit le mieux la **fréquence** avec laquelle vous parlez chaque langue avec chaque personne, ou dans chaque situation.

(**FR-AR** veut dire un mélange de français et d'arabe dialectal)

		JAMAIS	**PARFOIS**	**SOUVENT**	**TRES SOUVENT**	**TOUJOURS**	**SANS OBJET**
1. Avec votre famille en France							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	**PARFOIS**	**SOUVENT**	**TRES SOUVENT**	**TOUJOURS**	**SANS OBJET**
2. Avec votre famille au Maghreb							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	**PARFOIS**	**SOUVENT**	**TRES SOUVENT**	**TOUJOURS**	**SANS OBJET**
3. Avec vos ami(e)s							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	PARFOIS	SOUVENT	TRES SOUVENT	TOUJOURS	SANS OBJET
4. Avec vos voisins							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	PARFOIS	SOUVENT	TRES SOUVENT	TOUJOURS	SANS OBJET
5. Au bar/en boîte							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	PARFOIS	SOUVENT	TRES SOUVENT	TOUJOURS	SANS OBJET
6. Au travail							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	PARFOIS	SOUVENT	TRES SOUVENT	TOUJOURS	SANS OBJET
7. Chez vous							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	PARFOIS	SOUVENT	TRES SOUVENT	TOUJOURS	SANS OBJET
8. A la mosquée							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	PARFOIS	SOUVENT	TRES SOUVENT	TOUJOURS	SANS OBJET
9. Sur les médias sociaux							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	PARFOIS	SOUVENT	TRES SOUVENT	TOUJOURS	SANS OBJET
10. Pour donner des directions							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	PARFOIS	SOUVENT	TRES SOUVENT	TOUJOURS	SANS OBJET
11. Pour raconter une blague							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	PARFOIS	SOUVENT	TRES SOUVENT	TOUJOURS	SANS OBJET
12. Pour insulter quelqu'un							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

		JAMAIS	PARFOIS	SOUVENT	TRES SOUVENT	TOUJOURS	SANS OBJET
13. Pour draguer							
	Français						
	Arabe dialectal						
	FR-AR						

Voici une liste de thèmes. Indiquez quelle langue vous utilisez pour parler au sujet de chaque thème.

	FRANÇAIS	ARABE DIALECTAL	FR-AR	SANS OBJET
1. La musique				
2. La religion				
3. L'argent				
4. Le travail				
5. Le travail scolaire				
6. L'amour				

Comment est-ce que vous vous êtes renseigné(e) sur ce questionnaire ?

_____

_____

Est-ce que vous seriez disposé(e) à distribuer le lien pour ce questionnaire à vos amis/collègues qui sont aussi d'origine maghrébine ? Si oui, vous aideriez beaucoup avec la recherche sur les attitudes vis-à-vis du langage en France.

Appendix B: Questionnaire in English

Section 1

In this section you will respond to questions about your knowledge of language.

1. Compared to your friends, classmates and colleagues, describe how well you **speak** the following language by checking the appropriate box.

	NOT AT ALL	**NOT VERY WELL**	**SOMEWHAT WELL**	**WELL**	**PERFECTLY**
Standard Arabic					
French					
Dialectal Arabic (Darija)					
Tamazight					

2. Compared to your friends, classmates and colleagues, describe how well you **understand** the following language by checking the appropriate box.

	NOT AT ALL	**NOT VERY WELL**	**SOMEWHAT WELL**	**WELL**	**PERFECTLY**
Standard Arabic					
French					
Dialectal Arabic (Darija)					
Tamazight					

Section 2

In this section you will respond to question about language.

1. What language do you consider to be your "own" language?
   a. French
   b. Tamazight
   c. Standard Arabic
   d. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)

2. Explain why you consider that language to be your "own" language:

_____
_____

3. Among the adjectives below, check the box next to those that best describe **French** according to you. You can choose as many adjectives as you like. If you would like to leave a comment about your response, please do not hesitate.

Practical, dead, moral, rich, flexible, beautiful, modern, not useful, alive, necessary, obsolete, religious, prestigious, close-minded, traditional, modest, interesting, boring, cool, ugly, impolite, proud, absurd, poor, educated, severe, intelligent, free, fun, none of these responses, other

Other:

_____
_____

If you would like to leave a comment, please do not hesitate:

_____
_____
_____

4. Among the adjectives below, check the box next to those that best describe **Dialectal Arabic (Darija)** according to you. You can choose as many adjectives as you like. If you would like to leave a comment about your response, please do not hesitate.

Practical, dead, moral, rich, flexible, beautiful, modern, not useful, alive, necessary, obsolete, religious, prestigious, close-minded, traditional, modest, interesting, boring, cool, ugly, impolite, proud, absurd, poor, educated, severe, intelligent, free, fun, none of these responses, other

Other:

_____

If you would like to leave a comment, please do not hesitate:

_____
_____
_____

5. Among the adjectives below, check the box next to those that best describe **Standard Arabic** according to you. You can choose as many adjectives as you like. If you would like to leave a comment about your response, please do not hesitate.

Practical, dead, moral, rich, flexible, beautiful, modern, not useful, alive, necessary, obsolete, religious, prestigious, close-minded, traditional, modest, interesting, boring, cool, ugly, impolite, proud, absurd, poor, educated, severe, intelligent, free, fun, none of these responses, other

Other:

_____

If you would like to leave a comment, please do not hesitate:

_____
_____
_____

Instructions: Respond to the following question by choosing French, Dialectal Arabic (Darija) or Standard Arabic. If you would like to leave a comment, please do not hesitate.

6. What language do you find to be the most **beautiful**?

a. French
b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
c. Standard Arabic

Leave a comment about your response if you would like:

_____
_____
_____

7. What language do you find to be the most **moral**?
    a. French
    b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
    c. Standard Arabic

Leave a comment about your response if you would like:
_____
_____
_____

8. What language do you find to be the most **modern**?
    a. French
    b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
    c. Standard Arabic

Leave a comment about your response if you would like:
_____
_____
_____

9. What language do you find to be the **coolest**?
    a. French
    b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
    c. Standard Arabic

Leave a comment about your response if you would like:
_____
_____
_____

10. What language do you find to be the most **practical**?
    a. French
    b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
    c. Standard Arabic

Leave a comment about your response if you would like:
_____
_____
_____

11. What language do you find to be the most **religious**?
    a. French
    b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
    c. Standard Arabic

Leave a comment about your response if you would like:
_____
_____
_____

12. What language do you find to be the most **traditional**?
    a. French
    b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
    c. Standard Arabic

Leave a comment about your response if you would like:
_____
_____
_____

13 What language do you find to be the most **boring**?
    a. French
    b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
    c. Standard Arabic

Leave a comment about your response if you would like:
_____
_____
_____

14. What language do you find to be the most **modest**?
    a. French
    b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
    c. Standard Arabic

Leave a comment about your response if you would like:
_____
_____
_____

15. What language do you find to be the most **fun**?
    a. French
    b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
    c. Standard Arabic

Leave a comment about your response if you would like:
_____
_____
_____

Section 3

Here are some comments about French, Dialectal Arabic and cultural life. For each sentence, say whether or not you agree by checking the box that best describes your opinion.

1 = completely disagree
5 = completely agree

	1 COMPLETELY DISAGREE	2	3	4	5 COMPLETELY AGREE
I am proud to be of North African origin.					
I identify with people from other Arab countries.					
One day, I would like to live in the Maghreb.					
Religion is important to me.					
France feels like home to me.					
I would like to marry someone who was born in the Maghreb.					
It seems like I have more freedoms in France than in North Africa.					
Religion is important to my parents.					
France is a more religious country than North Africa.					
I feel more North African when I speak Dialectal Arabic (Darija).					
Dialectal Arabic (Darija) can maintain my religious values better than French.					
All French people of North African origin should know Dialectal Arabic (Darija).					

I would prefer to marry someone who speaks Dialectal Arabic (Darija).					
I regularly participate in religious activities.					
I would like my children to speak Dialectal Arabic (Darija).					
A good French citizen only speaks French.					
Religion should be a part of children's education.					
I feel freer to express myself in French.					
It isn't important to speak Dialect Arabic because I live in France.					

If you have any comments about your response, do not hesitate to add them below:
_____
_____
_____

Section 4

In this section you will respond to personal questions about yourself.

1. How old are you? _____

2. What is your sex?
   a. Male
   b. Female

3. Where were you born? _____

4. What city were you born in? _____

5. What department do you live in? _____

6. Do you live with your parents?
   a. Yes
   b. No

7. If not, with whom do you live? _____

8. What is the highest level of your education?
    g. Middle School
    a. High School
    b. Some College
    c. College Degree
    d. Masters Degree
    e. Doctorate Degree

9. What kind of job does your father (or guardian) have?
    k. Education
    l. Computer Science
    m. Medicine
    a. Engineer
    b. Manual Labor
    c. Executive/Middle Management
    d. Homemaker
    e. Bureaucrat
    f. Unemployed
    g. Other: _____

10. What kind of job does your mother (or guardian) have?
    a. Education
    b. Computer Science
    c. Medicine
    d. Engineer
    e. Manual Labor
    f. Executive/Middle Management
    g. Homemaker
    h. Bureaucrat
    i. Unemployed
    j. Other: _____

11. Where were you parents born?
    a. France
    b. Algeria
    c. Morocco
    d. Tunisia
    e. Other:_____

12. What type of job do you have?
    a. Student
    b. Computer Science
    c. Medicine

d. Engineer
e. Education
f. Manual Labor
g. Executive/Middle Management
h. Homemaker
i. Bureaucrat
j. Unemployed
k. Other:_____

13. What languages do you speak?
    a. French
    b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
    c. Standard Arabic
    d. Tamazight
    e. Other:_____

14. How many times per year do you visit the Maghreb?
    a. Never
    b. Less than once per year
    c. Once per year
    d. More than once per year

15. What language(s) do you speak when you're in your ancestral country in North Africa?
    a. French
    b. Dialectal Arabic (Darija)
    c. Standard Arabic
    d. Tamazight
    e. Other:_____

16. How often does your family in the Maghreb visit you and your family in France?
    a. Never
    b. Less than once per year
    c. Once per year
    d. More than once per year

17. Are you religious?
    a. Yes
    b. No

18. What religion do you identify with?
    a. Christianity
    b. Islam

c. Judaism
d. Other: _____

19. Are your parents religious?
    a. Yes
    b. No

20. What religion do they identify with?
    a. Christianity
    b. Islam
    c. Judaism
    d. Other: _____

21. Are you married or engaged?
    a. Yes
    b. No

22. Where was your spouse or fiancé born?
    a. France
    b. North Africa
    c. England
    d. Spain
    e. Netherlands
    f. Other: _____

23. I identify as (check all that apply):
    1. French
    2. Moroccan
    3. Algerian
    4. Tunisian
    5. Berber
    6. French-Moroccan
    7. Moroccan-French
    8. French-Algerian
    9. Algerian-French
    10. French-Tunisian
    11. Tunisian-French
    12. French-Arab
    13. Arab-French
    14. French-Berber
    15. Berber-French
    16. French of North African origin
    17. Other: _____

Section 5

Instructions: Below are some incomplete sentences. Complete them in any way that you wish. **There are no "correct" answers.**

1. My duty in life is _____
2. Is good husband is someone who _____
3. An Arab speaks _____
4. A good daughter is someone who _____
5. A good Muslims speaks _____
6. Women in the Maghreb are _____
7. Freedom is _____
8. A good wife is someone who _____
9. Every man must _____
10. My parents wish that I _____
11. A good son is someone who _____
12. Religion is _____
13. Women in France are_____
14. Men in the Maghreb are _____
15. Every woman must _____
16. Men in France are _____

Section 6

Instructions: Below are some remarks on the use of language. Check the box that best describes the **frequency** with which you speak language with each person or in each situation.

(**FR-AR** means a mix of French and Dialectal Arabic (Darija))

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
1. With your family in France							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
2. With your family in the Maghreb							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
3. With your friends							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
4. With your neighbors							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
5. At the bar/club							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
6. At work							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
7. At home							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
8. At the Mosque							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
9. On social media							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
10. To give directions							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
11. To tell a joke							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
12. To insult someone							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

		NEVER	SOMETIMES	OFTEN	VERY OFTEN	ALWAYS	N/A
13. To flirt							
	French						
	Dialectal Arabic						
	FR-AR						

Below is a list of themes. Indicate which language you use to talk about each theme.

	FRENCH	DIALECTAL ARABIC	FR-AR	N/A
Music				
Religion				
Money				
Work				
School work				
Love				

How did you find out about this questionnaire?

_____

_____

Would you be willing to distribute the link to this questionnaire to your friends/colleagues who are also of North African origin? If so, you will help with the research on language attitudes in France.

Appendix C: Sample of Survey Interface



Appendix D: Survey Flyer



Appendix E: IRB Exemption Letter

OFFICE OF RESEARCH SUPPORT

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

P.O. Box 7426, Austin, Texas 78713 · Mail Code A3200
(512) 471-8871 · FAX (512) 471-8873

FWA # 00002030

Date: 08/18/14

PI: Barbara Ellen Bullock

Dept: French

Title: Attitudes Toward Language and Culture in France

Re: IRB Exempt Determination for Protocol Number 2014-05-0019

Dear Barbara Ellen Bullock:

Recognition of Exempt status based on 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2).

Qualifying Period: 08/18/2014 to 08/17/2017. *Expires 12 a.m. [midnight] of this date.*
A continuing review report must be submitted in three years if the research is ongoing.

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